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The aim of this study is to investigate the implementation of peace operations deployed by the 
international community in third countries. Considering the lack of knowledge on what happens 
when peace operation policies are implemented, this inquiry intends to explore in-depth what 
emerges as security sector reform (SSR) and stabilization policies are executed in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Following implementation studies, implementing actors play a decisive role 
in implementation since their decisions made, based on their understandings, are assumed to 
effectively become the policies that are executed. Hence, the key focus of analysis is the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the three aspects of the policy content, actor interaction and 
the implementation context, which are considered as constituting implementation. The main research 
question guiding this study is formulated as: How do implementing actors understand the 
implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo? 
The data underlying this inquiry consist of semi-structured interviews conducted with UN and 
EU officials, national diplomats, and staff of local and international non-governmental organizations 
between 2012 and 2013 in Goma, eastern DR Congo, as well as in the capital city of Kinshasa. These 
data are furthermore complemented by other primary and secondary sources, such as legal 
documents, reports and scholarly articles. 
The overall pictured painted by implementing actors is one in which the implementation of SSR 
and stabilization policies, as part of the broader peace operations, is understood as deficient. The 
findings suggest that the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo is 
affected by the vagueness of the policy content and an apparent need of the donor community for 
visible and publicly exploitable short-term projects. The spatial distance between Kinshasa and 
Goma, in combination with a hierarchical and capital-focused institutional set-up and lack of 
leadership, are furthermore highlighted as impeding actor interaction and thus policy execution. 
Finally, the complexity of both the conflict and the political setting, the latter being characterised by 
a situation of state fragility and perceived lack of political will, capacity and ownership are frequently 
pointed out by implementing actors as influencing the execution of SSR and stabilization policies in 
the DR Congo. 
 
Keywords: Peace operations; policy implementation; implementing actors; security sector reform; 
stabilization; Democratic Republic of the Congo; United Nations; European Union 
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1.Introduction 
 
Today, a greater number of peace operations than ever before are deployed in 
exceedingly complex conflict situations all over the world to implement 
increasingly challenging duties and responsibilities. These include, for 
instance, provision of support for the rebuilding of state institutions, delivery 
of humanitarian aid, as well as surveillance of ceasefire agreements and 
political commitments. Moreover, and in UN peace operations alone, more 
than 100,000 peacekeepers are currently deployed under a Chapter VII 
mandate.3 Peacekeepers are more and more frequently tasked to use all 
necessary means in order to protect civilians from direct harm (Bellamy & 
Hunt, 2015, p. 1277) and to implement stabilization initiatives (cf. Bloching, 
2011; Boshoff, Hendrikson, More, & Vircoulon, 2010; Jackson, 2011; 
Muggah, 2014c; Steven A. Zyck, Barakat, & Deeley, 2014). 
In terms of the scholarly debate on peace operations, discussions have 
predominantly centred either on the shortcomings of peace operations or on 
criticisms regarding the assumptions, aims and methods underlying the 
liberal peacebuilding project. Proponents of a problem-solving perspective 
essentially aim at identifying adequate approaches to fix the embodiment of 
liberal peacebuilding. Critical voices, in contrast, generally reject the idea 
that interventions can or should create any ‘liberal peace’ (cf. Bellamy, 2004; 
Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007; Tadjbakhsh, 2011b). However, despite the 
critique raised from both camps, the prevailing understanding is that peace 
operations do more good than harm (Paris, 2010b, p. 338). Hence, instead of 
suspending peace operations, scholars increasingly call for a broadening and 
deepening of the study of peace operations to overcome the existing divide 
between problem-solving and critical approaches (cf. Paris, 2000; Sending, 
                                                                 
3 Peacekeeping forces are usually assumed to be authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the 
‘pacific settlement of disputes’. Decisions under Chapter VI are thus not enforceable but recommendatory. The 
use of military force by the UN, in contrast, is considered to derive its legality from Chapter VII, on ‘action 
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’, authorizing a peace 
operation to use force beyond self-defense (Findlay, 2002, p. 8). 
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2011). In this context, Paris (2011, p. 32) demands, for instance, a refocus on 
analyses of policy practices to challenge the principles and methods of peace 
operations. 
Up until now, however, there has been troubling lack of in-depth 
analyses, which explicitly investigate the execution of peace operations from 
an implementation perspective. While an implementation perspective has 
been adopted, for instance, regarding questions on effectiveness and impact 
of peace operations, often illustrated with statements regarding the success 
and/or failure of missions, implementation in this context has usually been 
equated with policy accomplishment. In cases where results lack behind 
expectations, this has provoked discussions around the experienced 
implementation gap (cf. Detzner, 2017; Druckman et al., 1997; Giffen, 2011). 
Interestingly, though, this has not encouraged a focus on implementation 
understood as policy execution in the scholarly debate on peace operations. 
Consequently, a troubling lack of adequate in-depth analyses on what 
happens when peace operation policies are de facto executed can be 
identified. 
This knowledge gap is more surprising as the deployment of ever more 
complex peace operations in shifting contexts is expected to have a set of 
consequences. First, the demands on the array of actors involved, including 
inter-institutional collaborations, are escalating (cf. Brosig, 2015; de Coning, 
Gelot, & Karlsrud, 2016). Second, peacekeeping principles no longer 
adequately inform and guide contemporary peace operations. In the context 
of UN peacekeeping missions undergoing an increasing orientation towards 
civilian protection and stabilization, subsumed under the header of a robust 
turn, a growing gap emerges between these changing practices and the 
existing doctrine which forms the basis of UN peacekeeping and relies upon 
consent, impartiality and limited use of force (cf. de Coning, Aoi, & 
Karlsrud, 2017; Hunt, 2017). Third, in connection with the expanding scope 
of mission mandates, international institutions are expected to reform, adapt, 
and improve the design and delivery of peace operations (cf. HIPPO, 2015). 
Hence, instead of solely criticising the underlying political practices, what 
is needed is a better understanding of the key dimensions of peace operations. 
This thesis thus explicitly investigates what happens when peace operations 
are executed. Without having knowledge on the stage of policy 
implementation, institutions authorizing and deploying these missions 
struggle to know, for instance, how to meet the current challenges they are 
confronted with. This, in turn, is further expected to affect adaptation and 
reform endeavours considered as necessary. The costs of lacking in-depth 
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knowledge on the implementation of peace operations are thus not only 
expected to be high but continuously rising. 
To enable the in-depth study of the implementation of peace operations, 
more precise analytical tools have to be developed. In this context, an explicit 
focus on the group of implementing actors has been chosen.4 Implementing 
actors are those actors who are granted “the legal authority, responsibility, 
and public resources to carry out policy directives” (Nakamura & 
Smallwood, 1980, p. 47). Since the implementers’ decisions and routines as 
well as their strategies to handle uncertainties and work pressures are 
understood as effectively becoming the policies they implement, they are 
expected to play a decisive role in policy implementation (Lipsky, 1971, p. 
xiii). 
Despite their anticipated significance, implementing actors have only 
rather recently become an object of study in research on peace operations. 
Autesserre (2014, p. 25), for instance, challenges the seemingly accepted 
assumption that “instructions from capitals and headquarters automatically 
translate into corresponding action in the field”. Aiming at developing 
complementary explanations for peacebuilding effectiveness, she thus shifts 
the focus towards the international interveners deployed at field level and 
examines their social habits, standard security procedures, as well as habitual 
approaches to collect information on violence (ibid. p. 9). Similarly, Da 
Costa and Karlsrud (2013, p. 294) underline the significance of individual 
actions of civilian peace operation personnel, claiming that “local 
peacebuilding outcomes depend as much or more on negotiations, bargains 
and compromises between different actors, than on institutional decision-
making deriving from headquarters”. Thus, the predominant focus on top-
down perspectives, which underestimate the field level, is often criticized. 
Hence, motivated by the apparent lack of knowledge regarding the 
implementation stage where peace operations are executed, this inquiry 
explicitly focuses on the implementing actors and their understandings of the 
implementation of peace operation policies. This approach is further inspired 
by the decades-long discussions on policy implementation in the field of 
public policy studies. When an apparent gap between expected and actual 
results following the implementation of policies was detected, public policy 
scholars started to challenge the effectiveness of the policy. It was thus 
acknowledged that mere knowledge of the objectives of a policy adopted 
hardly reveals anything about how successful the policy will be and how it 
will be accepted and adopted by those directly affected (cf. Mazmanian & 
                                                                 
4 In addition to the term ‘implementing actors’, the term ‘implementers’ will be used interchangeably in this 
inquiry.  
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Sabatier, 1989; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn, 
1975). Aiming at developing “systematic knowledge regarding what 
emerges, or is induced, as actors deal with policy problems” (Laurence J. 
O'Toole, 2000, p. 266), implementation scholars thus started to elaborate on 
the question of “[w]hat happens between the establishment of policy and its 
impact on the world of action” (ibid. p. 273). 
As the area of interest for this inquiry, I will analyse the implementation 
of the international peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), with the policy fields of SSR and stabilization, constituting two sub-
units of analysis. The implementation of the extensive international peace 
operations in the DRC are considered an exemplifying example of the 
increasingly complex interventions deployed worldwide by the international 
community. MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the DRC, is the world’s largest ongoing UN peacekeeping 
mission, with a current strength of approximately 22,000 personnel and a 
yearly budget of roughly 1.4 billion US Dollars (MONUSCO, 2015, 2017).5 
In addition to MONUSCO, a multitude of UN agencies, regional 
organizations, individual nation states and numerous international and 
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become active 
players in the DRC (cf. Boshoff et al., 2010; DFID, 2010; Vaillant, Condy, 
Robert, & Tshionza, 2010). Besides the protection of civilians, peace 
operation efforts in the DRC aim at to support the Congolese Government in 
its overall peace consolidation efforts, including aspects of SSR and 
stabilization.  
Although SSR and stabilization initiatives have increasingly become 
integrated parts of peace operations, with the DRC representing an 
exemplifying case, the scholarly debate has mainly focused on the principles 
and norms of the policies (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012, p. 145). 
Focusing on SSR, the prevalent lack of knowledge regarding its practice and 
implementation is thus criticized as “an area of benign analytical neglect” 
(Peake, Scheye, & Hills, 2006b, p. 83). It is furthermore critically observed 
that coherent SSR strategies as well as instruments to implement SSR 
activities have not yet been identified (cf. Sedra, 2010). Likewise, the 
stabilization concept is criticized as being too vague. Specifically, scholars 
criticize that the objectives and expectations of stabilization are not explicitly 
spelled out although stabilization operations and activities are carried out, 
with the international stabilization efforts in the DRC serving as a prime 
example. Furthermore, poor evaluation of stabilization activities in practice 
                                                                 
5 Nonetheless, even if the UN mission is one of the biggest missions ever deployed, it is one of the smallest, 
relative to the size of the DRC and its population (Tull, 2009). 
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and profound lack of knowledge regarding the implementation of 
stabilization as part of international peace operations have been observed 
(Muggah, 2014b, p. 58).  
1.1 Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the implementation of peace operations 
deployed by the international community in third countries. Through in-depth 
analysis of the implementation of security sector reform and stabilization 
policies, understood as key areas of the broader peace operation efforts in the 
DR Congo, the research intends to explore what emerges as these policies are 
executed. Since the implementing actors are understood as playing a decisive 
role in implementation, I take an actor-oriented approach, thus implying that 
their understanding of implementation becomes the key focus of analysis. 
The main research question guiding this study is formulated as: How do 
implementing actors understand the implementation of peace operations in 
the DR Congo?  
Building upon the debates in the fields of peace operations and public 
policy implementation, three sub-questions, constituting the analytical 
framework, will be addressed in the analysis: 
o How do implementing actors understand the content of the policies 
that are to be implemented? 
o How do implementing actors understand interaction taking place in 
implementation? 
o How do implementing actors understand the context in which the 
policies are implemented? 
The peace operations carried out by the international community in the DR 
Congo constitute the empirical case. More specifically, I will draw upon the 
security sector reform and stabilization policies performed under the 
International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) as two sub-
units of analysis.  
1.2 Research Approach 
This thesis is built upon qualitative research, commonly viewed as “a 
naturalistic, interpretative approach” (Ormston, Spencer, Barnard, & Snape, 
2014, p. 2). By building upon the perspectives and accounts of those 
participating in the research, phenomena are addressed “from the interior” 
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(Flick, 2009). Since the core of qualitative research is the desire to 
understand social phenomena, rather than to explain them, researchers 
therefore study what they see, hear and understand. Understanding, however, 
is not simply based on particular experiences, but emerges from reflections 
on what has happened (Ormston et al., 2014, p. 11). 
Based on the assumption that implementing actors play a decisive though 
understudied role in peace operations, this inquiry is set up to explore the 
implementing actors’ understanding of policy implementation. By providing 
interpretations of the implementing actors’ understandings, I take an 
interpretative stance. My interpretations of the implementers’ understandings 
are thereby guided by extensive theoretical and conceptual discussions in the 
fields of peace operations and policy implementation, which will be explored 
in-depth in the following chapter. 
In terms of the relationship between theory and research, I will follow an 
iterative strategy instead of applying either a purely inductive or deductive 
approach. A purely inductive approach requires the collection of evidence 
before building knowledge and theories from the evidence collected. 
Developing theory is thus the desired outcome of an inductive stance. Using 
a deductive approach, in contrast, the evidence collected would be used to 
support a conclusion. The researcher would thus initially develop hypotheses 
before collecting evidence to either confirm or reject them (Ormston et al., 
2014, p. 6). Since the collection of empirical data and analysis thereof is 
guided and structured by the analytical framework, which is constructed by 
drawing upon implementation studies and combining key aspects identified 
in both fields of peace operations and public policy implementation (see 
chapter 2), a purely inductive approach is ruled out. The analytical 
framework is however also not thought up a priori, aiming at exclusively 
testing specific hypotheses. Hence, a purely deductive approach is also ruled 
out. Instead, I will follow an approach that enables me to combine and 
alternate between empirical evidence, which is informed by theory, and 
theory which is empirically grounded. This allows me to dig deeper into the 
empirical case by asking further questions. Hence, both the theory (i.e. the 
framework for analysing the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
implementation of peace operations) and the empirical case of investigation 
(i.e. SSR and stabilization policies as part of the extensive international peace 
operations in the DR Congo) will be developed further in a mutually 
reinforcing process. Theory and empirical data will thus cross feed and 
strengthen each other. In sum, this approach will allow me to apply my 
analytical framework within the case study, without being bound to causal 
theory testing. 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.3 Contributions of the Study 
This study is set up to provide specific and original, theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the study of peace operations. 
The key theoretical contribution of this study is to apply implementation 
theory to investigate the execution of peace operations. By introducing an 
explicit focus on implementation, defined as policy execution, and by 
developing an analytical framework, which enables an in-depth analysis of 
the stage of policy implementation, this study provides knowledge on what 
happens when peace operations are executed. Considering the increasing 
challenges faced by institutions authorising and deploying peace operations, 
including a change in practice towards more robust and stabilization-oriented 
approaches, a better understanding of what happens when peace operations 
are executed is understood as essential for any adaptation and reform 
endeavours (cf. HIPPO, 2015; Hunt, 2017).  
A second theoretical contribution is this study’s focus on the 
implementing actors and their understanding of policy execution. By 
introducing an explicit investigation of the implementation of peace 
operations from the perspective of implementing actors based in the receiving 
country, this inquiry explicitly contributes with knowledge on a group of 
actors that has only rather recently gained in importance in studies on peace 
operations (cf. Autesserre, 2010, 2014; da Costa & Karlsrud, 2013). Yet, 
implementing actors are assumed to play a key role in policy implementation, 
since their decisions made based on their understandings, interests, and 
motives effectively become the policies that are executed (Lipsky, 2010, p. 
xiii). Hence, the implementing actors’ understanding of implementation is 
expected to provide crucial insights on what emerges as peace operation 
policies are executed and thus helps to understand the embodiment of policy-
in-practice. 
In addition to the two main theoretical contributions and by illustrating 
what happens when peace operations are executed, this thesis further 
constitutes a possible attempt to bridge the prevailing divide between 
problem-solving and critical perspectives regarding the shortcomings and 
critiques on peace operations. 
The first empirical contribution of this study is the provision of knowledge 
on the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies. While the last few 
years have seen an increase in both policy-oriented and academic studies 
regarding the key norms and principles of SSR (cf. Sedra, 2006; OECD, 
2007) and in terms of conceptual and practice-oriented debates related to 
stabilization (Muggah, 2014c; Steven A. Zyck et al., 2014), there remains a 
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lack of adequate critical examinations on the implementation of SSR and 
stabilization (cf. Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012; Peake, Scheye, & 
Hills, 2006a). Also insufficiently studied is the relation of stabilization 
strategies to peace- and state building efforts (Muggah, 2014c). By analysing 
the implementing actors’ understanding of implementation, this inquiry 
elaborates on factors potentially affecting the execution of SSR and 
stabilization policies. In view of the changing practices of peace operations 
undergoing a robust turn, this study thus provides empirical knowledge on 
two policy fields, which increasingly gain in significance in the context of 
contemporary peace operations. 
This study furthermore presents unique empirical material, which 
enhances our understanding of crucial factors directing the execution of SSR 
and stabilization policies in the specific context of the DR Congo. By 
investigating the understandings and decisions made by both capital- and 
field-based implementing actors tasked to implement SSR and stabilization 
policies, this inquiry contributes original knowledge on factors considered as 
constituting the execution of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo. 
These factors include the implementing actors’ attempts to balance policy 
ambiguities as well as to handle the discrepancy between politically-claimed 
and de facto technically-oriented approaches, to use interaction strategically 
as well as to deal with obstacles impeding interaction, and to manoeuvre 
ongoing conflict as well as a particular political setting. The study thus finds 
its niche, in relation to the comparatively large number of studies on the 
international peace operation efforts in the DRC, ranging from more general 
organization-focused analyses on the efforts of the UN and the EU (cf. 
Justaert, 2012; Piccolino, 2010; Spijkers, 2015; Tull, 2009) to reports 
published by international NGOs and Think Tanks on the assumed failures of 
the international stabilization strategy (cf. International Crisis Group, 2012; 
OXFAM, 2012) or written by practitioners based on personal experiences 
and perspectives (cf. de Vries, 2015; Quick, 2015). 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter illustrated the general set up of this inquiry, 
including the underlying research problem to be addressed, the declared aim 
of the study and the research questions to be answered, the research approach 
chosen and the intended theoretical and empirical contributions to 
knowledge.  
In the subsequent chapter 2, I will first elaborate on the theoretical 
perspectives in the two fields of peace operations and public policy 
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implementation. This will then lay the ground for the development of the 
analytical framework underlying this inquiry. Hence, I will first define the 
concept of peace operations and elaborate on SSR and stabilization as two 
policies which have become increasingly important aspects of peace 
operations. Following this conceptual elaboration, I will review and discuss 
the theoretical foundations of the scholarly fields of peace operations and 
public policy implementation. Key issues addressed in the respective debates 
will furthermore be identified. Drawing upon implementation studies and 
combining key issues identified regarding both peace operations and policy 
implementation, the analytical framework will be constructed around three 
aspects: policy content, actor interaction and implementation context. This 
framework will then guide the empirical analysis of the implementing actors’ 
understanding of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the 
DR Congo. 
In chapter 3, I will then discuss the methodology and methods applied in 
this study. Following an interpretative research approach, this inquiry is built 
upon a qualitative single case study design which allows for in-depth analysis 
of the implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo. I will thus 
discuss the procedure of selecting the case and motivate why I chose to focus 
on the implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo and more 
specifically on the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies as sub-
units of analysis. Following this discussion, I will reveal how the data were 
derived from semi-structured interviews and how primary and secondary 
sources were included in the analysis. Building upon a discussion on the 
challenges encountered during my field work, I will conclude the chapter 
with a discussion on the process of data analysis. 
Through an elaboration of the international response to war and conflict 
in the DR Congo, chapter 4 constitutes the backdrop for the analysis of the 
implementation of peace operations in the DRC. In this context, I will 
explicitly focus on the international support for the two policy fields of SSR 
and stabilization under the ISSSS as part of the broader peace operation 
efforts. In the subsequent three empirical chapters, divided according to the 
analytical framework, I will present the empirical analysis of the 
implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo.  
Chapter 5 starts by investigating the implementing actors’ understanding 
of the content of SSR and stabilization policies. More specifically, I will 
analyse the implementing actors’ understanding of the policy standards and 
objectives, specifically regarding aspects of policy clarity, consistency, 
flexibility, achievability and context specificity. Building upon this analysis, 
I will discuss the implementing actors’ understandings of the policy 
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approaches chosen to translate SSR and stabilization policies into concrete 
projects and programmes. 
In chapter 6, I will investigate the implementing actors’ understanding of 
interaction taking place in the implementation of SSR and stabilization 
policies. Based on the empirical material, I will start by focusing on aspects 
understood as facilitating interaction, including the implementing actors’ 
attempt to sharpen a common understanding of vague and inconsistent policy 
standards and objectives aiming at aligning diverging understandings, to 
either achieve the goals set in the policies or to essentially influence and push 
Congolese decision-makers. Moreover, I will focus on aspects understood as 
restricting interaction, including the impact of the spatial distance between 
the capital and the eastern provinces, the given institutional structures at both 
levels, aspects of leadership and personalities as well as competitive 
behaviour. Interaction in this chapter is predominantly limited to a focus on 
interaction among international implementing actors. 
In the third and last empirical chapter, chapter 7, I will analyse the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the implementation context. The 
chapter is structured along two key aspects pointed out by implementing 
actors as affecting implementation: First, the intricacy of ongoing conflict in 
eastern Congo, notably addressed by field-based implementers, and second, 
the broader political setting characterized by a state of fragility and perceived 
lack of political will, capacity and ownership, addressed notably by 
Kinshasa-based implementers. In this context, I will furthermore explore the 
role of interests, understood as lying behind and driving the embodiment of 
certain aspects of SSR and stabilization policies targeted at the DR Congo.  
In the concluding chapter 8, I will discuss the central findings of the 
research and thus comprehensively answer the main and subsidiary research 
questions. In this regard, I will elaborate on the implementing actors’ 
perceived necessity to balance policy vagueness and to handle the dominance 
of technically-oriented policy approaches. Furthermore, I will investigate 
their strategic use of interaction and approaches to manoeuvre the ongoing 
conflict and a particular political setting at the stage of policy execution. 
Moreover, I will reflect upon the analytical framework underlying this 
inquiry and its applicability beyond the specific case of the DR Congo. I will 
then elaborate on how an implementation focus can contribute to bridge the 
prevailing gap between the theory and practice of peace operations. Finally, I 
will discuss avenues for future research. 
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2.Theoretical Perspectives and 
Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter reviews and discusses the conceptual and theoretical 
foundations of peace operation and policy implementation studies. Upon this 
elaboration and through drawing on key issues identified in the respective 
scholarly debates, the analytical framework will be developed. The chapter, 
which is divided into three main parts and a chapter conclusion, is structured 
as follows: In the first part of the chapter, I will explore the policy field of 
peace operations. I will thus elaborate on the general concept of peace 
operations before I will more specifically discuss the two policy fields of 
SSR and stabilization as part of peace operations. Since the deployment of 
peace operations is commonly justified using liberal rhetoric, the theoretical 
point of departure is rooted in the debates on liberal peace. In this context, 
two approaches, namely problem-solving and critical perspectives, have 
dominated the debate. From both problem-solving and critical perspectives, I 
will explore the shortcomings and the critique raised regarding peace 
operations as well as elaborate on key issues in the practice of peace 
operations identified as being of prime importance. These key issues 
comprise the content of the policies and their sensitivity to the given context, 
actor interaction, political will and ownership. 
Likewise, in the second part of the chapter, I will start by discussing the 
field of implementation theory, which developed upon two initially different 
approaches to implementation. While scholars following a top-down 
perspective made the authoritative decision as the starting point of interest 
and located the responsibility for producing the desired outcomes with actors 
at the level of policy making, bottom-up scholars criticized the perceived 
hierarchical relation between policy making and policy implementation. 
Emphasized, instead, was the role played by implementing actors at the level 
of policy implementation. Three key issues in policy implementation, 
identified as being of prime importance by both top-down and bottom-up 
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scholars, will be investigated, namely the policy content and discretion, actor 
interaction and the implementation environment. 
Building upon these discussions, the analytical framework, consisting of 
the three aspects of policy content, actor interaction and the implementation 
context, will be developed in the third part of the chapter. Finally, the chapter 
will be rounded up with a concluding discussion. 
2.1 Defining Peace Operations 
Peace operations are peculiar beasts. Born of international politics, they deploy 
within states broken by conflict, Janus-faced institutions of both global and local 
governance. They combine orthodoxy with evolution, retaining the roots of status 
quo Cold War peacekeeping upon which have been grafted the ever-more 
transformative ambitions of contemporary peacebuilding. Today’s peace 
operations have expansive aims: to create security, to build states, to demobilize, 
democratize, and develop societies out of war. (Whalan, 2013, p. 1) 
Since the turn of the century, peace operations have considerably changed. 
They have become increasingly complex, in terms of both variety of actors 
authorizing and conducting them and tasks performed.6 Focusing on actors in 
peace operations, the term ‘international community’ has become a “catchall 
shorthand phrase” (Fortna, 2008, p. 8), combining international and regional 
organizations with individual nation-states, civilian agencies and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (M. N. Barnett, 2011, pp. 3-5; Bellamy 
& Williams, 2005; Heldt, 2008, p. 11).7 In terms of tasks performed, the 
traditionally drawn boundaries between peace-making, peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding have increasingly become blurred. Initially, 
peace-making aimed at ending violence between conflict parties and 
achieving a peace agreement through diplomatic efforts, while peace 
                                                                 
6 An excellent overview of these changes with a specific focus on UN peace operations is, for example, 
provided by Alex J. Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt, (2015), “Twenty-first century UN peace operations: 
protection, force and the changing security environment." International Affairs 91(6): 1277-1298.  
7 Besides the UN as the leading international organization carrying out peace operations, regional 
organizations, such as the EU and increasingly also the African Union (AU) are highlighted, see, for example: 
Bellamy, A. J. and P. D. Williams (2005). "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary 
Peace Operations." International Security 29(4): 157-195; Whitman, R. G. and S. Wolff (eds.) (2012). The 
European Union as a Global Conflict Manager. London and New York: Routledge ; Coning, C. D., L. Gelot, 
et al. (eds.) (2016). The Future of African Peace Operations. From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram. London: 
Zed Books. . An excellent analysis of the collaboration between the UN and African regional organizations in 
the field of conflict management, is furthermore provided by Gelot, L. (2012). Legitimacy, Peace Operations 
and Global-Regional Security. The African Union-United Nations Partnership in Darfur. London: Routledge. 
In terms of individual nation-states, the US, France, the UK but also Germany are commonly mentioned; see, 
for example, Sarjoh Bah, A. and K. Aning (2008). "US Peace Operations Policy in Africa: From ACRI to 
AFRICOM." International Peacekeeping 15(1): 118-132.  
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enforcement involved a range of coercive measures, including use of military 
force, to restore international peace and security. Peacekeeping aimed at 
preserving the peace, which had oftentimes been reached through such 
efforts. Hence, peacekeeping included deployment of military and/or police 
personnel with the aim to create a buffer zone between adversaries, to 
enforce a ceasefire agreement or to monitor peace processes. Finally, 
peacebuilding was defined as a long-term process aimed at preventing the 
recurrence of violence through activities targeting the deep-rooted, structural 
causes underlying the violent conflict (DPKO, 2008, pp. 17-18).  
Today, peace operations are rarely restricted to only one type of activity, 
which becomes, for instance, explicit in the dissolving boundaries between 
civil and military tools applied in peace operations. While Boutros-Ghali, by-
then Secretary-General of the UN, coined the term “multifunctional 
peacekeeping operations” in 1997 (UN General Assembly, 1997), they are 
now generally termed ‘multidimensional’ interventions (DPKO, 2008, p. 22; 
Riis Andersen & Engedal, 2013, pp. 15-16). In its Security Council 
Resolution 2086 (2013), the UN officially acknowledged the 
multidimensional character of peace operations in the beginning of 2013. 
Highlighted in the resolution are a wide range of issues that can be addressed 
through such operations, including the “support to basic safety and security 
by assisting national security sector reform programs”, the enabling of 
“national governments in conceiving and developing the programs of 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration”, the support of “the 
strengthening of rule of law institutions”, “peace consolidation and inclusive 
political processes” as well as a focus on humanitarian assistance, human 
rights and protection of civilians (UN Security Council, 2013a, p. paragraph 
8). Furthermore, the significance of “national ownership” and context 
sensitivity in the sense that each mission mandate has to be “specific to the 
needs and situation on the country concerned” has been highlighted (UN 
Security Council, 2013a, p. preamble and paragraph 7). Hence, the support of 
national security sector reform initiatives is explicitly mentioned as part of 
multidimensional UN peace operations, while the support of stabilization 
initiatives, in contrast, is not explicitly emphasized in the resolution.  
Highlighted in this context is however the increasing importance of the 
protection of civilians which should pervade all mission activities. This 
increased centrality of civilian protection has encouraged two 
transformations: First, missions move towards a more robust approach, 
potentially including the use of “significant force, including small arms fire, 
cannon and artillery fire, and the use of helicopter-launched munitions, 
against an armed group” (Spijkers, 2015, p. 1281). Second, mandates 
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undergo a subtle shift towards actively supporting the consolidation and 
extension of state authority rather than impartially overseeing peace 
processes (ibid. 1279). According to Hunt (2017, p. 110), this “robust turn” 
in UN peace operations clearly marks “a shift towards stabilization logics”. 
This implies that stabilization, as a political strategy, has become “both an 
explicit goal and an implicit logic of mission design” (ibid. 112). This 
“doctrinal change” is exemplified in UN peace operations, in the mandates of 
MINUSCO in the Central African Republic, MONUSCO in the DR Congo 
and MINUSMA in Mali (Hunt, 2017, p. 112; Karlsrud, 2015, p. 41). 
In this thesis, the term peace operation is used as an umbrella term 
referring to the extensive and complex international efforts to help maintain 
peace and security in the DR Congo. As discussed above, support for SSR 
and stabilization has gained increasing significance regarding peace 
operations in general, and particularly with those deployed in the DRC 
constituting a prime example. Hence, the following two sections will 
highlight these two policy fields in more detail. Chapter 5 will then provide 
an in-depth discussion of SSR and stabilization policies as applied in the 
specific context of the DR Congo.  
2.1.1 Security Sector Reform 
From the late 1990s onwards, security sector reform has become a key 
concept for development practitioners, security experts as well as democracy 
advocates. Initially, the first phase of SSR, lasting until the beginning of the 
21st century, saw the development of the conceptual model. This was then, in 
the second phase of SSR, rapidly institutionalized in the development and 
security policies of bilateral and multilateral organizations and followed by a 
first wave of implementation. From around 2010 onwards, the lessons 
learned from these first implementation experiences were distilled, aiming at 
developing “more flexible, politically sensitive and realistic reform doctrines 
and approaches” (Sedra, 2010, p. 115). Until today, however, the SSR 
concept remains ambiguous, referring to a vast number of aspects related to 
the reform of those sections of the security sector that oversee the provision 
of internal and external security. Generally speaking, the aim of SSR is to 
ensure “the efficient and effective provision of state and human security 
within a framework of democratic governance” (Hänggi, 2004, p. 1).8 More 
specifically, following the OECD DAC definition, SSR is targeted at 
                                                                 
8 On the concept of security sector reform see, for example: Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2007). OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and 
Justice. Paris (2007); Jackson, P. (2011). "Security Sector Reform and State Building." Third World Quarterly 
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the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their 
roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the 
system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound 
principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security 
framework (OECD, 2005, p. 24). 
Since the DR Congo represents a state emerging from violent internal 
conflict, a more specific focus on SSR, as it is applied in post-conflict 
contexts, is of interest. In this regard, the prevalent and shared understanding 
among international actors is that SSR constitutes a key aspect in the overall 
reconstruction efforts. Key tasks for both external and internal actors include, 
amongst others, strengthening of the peacetime capacity of the military and 
police forces as well as of the judicial and penal systems; promotion of 
respect for human rights and the rule of law; prioritization of demobilization 
and long-term reintegration as well as integration and mainstreaming of SSR 
into political dialogue and cooperation. While many of these tasks constitute 
an integral part of peace operation mandates, their integration into ongoing 
interventions remains a challenge, and mechanisms have to be created to 
ensure their functioning even if an intervention is closed down (Schnabel & 
Ehrhart, 2005, pp. 7-9). 
Focusing on the record of SSR initiatives, and despite two decades of 
implementation experiences, Detzner (2017, p. 116) comes to the conclusion 
that “there has been no increase in the tiny number of post-conflict SSR 
efforts generally considered successful”. In this context, SSR initiatives are, 
for instance, criticized for being frequently accompanied by “large claims 
and unrealistic expectations” and for being donor-driven (Chappuis & 
Bryden, 2015, p. 152). The dominance of external models and timetables is 
nevertheless justified, oftentimes with insufficient national capacity 
combined with the urgency of reform results (Hendrickson & Karkoszka, 
2002, p. 196). Weak state institutions, fragile inter-ethnic or political 
situations, as well as potentially precarious economic conditions are 
furthermore outlined as potentially having negative effects on the 
implementation of SSR initiatives in post-conflict settings. According to 
Hänggi (2004, p. 8), however, the post-conflict context can also provide 
“window(s) of opportunity” due to the obvious need for reform of the 
security sector in such settings. This may in turn possibly lead to greater 
openness towards external actor involvement in reforming the security sector, 
                                                                                                                                          
32(10): 1803-1822; Born, H., M. Caparini, et al. (eds.) (2002). Security Sector Reform and Democracy in 
Transitional Societies. Baden-Baden: Nomos; Brzoska, M. (2003). Development Donors and the Concept of 
Security Sector Reform. DCAF Occasional Paper No. 4. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces. 
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which is intrinsically considered as being very sensitive towards external 
interference (ibid.). Sedra (2010, p. 110) nevertheless reminds of the 
limitations of SSR by stating that SSR should not be considered a “panacea 
or magic bullet for the stabilization of troubled states”. 
2.1.2 Stabilization 
Stabilization, both as a concept and as a set of practices, has spread out 
during the last two decades (Stephen A. Zyck & Muggah, 2015, p. 1). 
Broadly speaking, stabilization and stability operations encompass “a cluster 
of policies and practices intended to promote safety and security, constitute 
or strengthen political pacts and polities, and enable recovery and 
reconstruction across a wide range of settings” (Muggah, 2014a, p. 1). In line 
with the ‘robust turn’ of peace operations, stabilization has become an 
increasingly prominent approach in addressing so-called fragile, failing or 
failed states. Stabilization initiatives have furthermore become part of peace 
operations and been authorized by the UN Security Council (cf. Hunt, 2017). 
Like the SSR concept, the concept of stabilization as such remains vague and 
depends on the context in which it is applied. 
According to Bailey (2011), stabilization is “[g]rounded in the security 
imperative of removing or reducing threats such as armed groups [and] 
encompasses both ‘hard’ (military) and ‘soft’ (civilian) interventions” (p. 5). 
Following this interpretation, stabilization approaches can range from direct 
security action, countering threats to aspiring social transformation through 
interlinking peacebuilding, state-building and development initiatives 
(Paddon & Lacaille, 2011, p. 2). The concept as such thus remains broad. In 
terms of framing stabilization approaches, however, there seems to be 
consensus that stabilization is not pursued by single actors or agencies. 
Instead, stabilization initiatives intentionally unite a variety of different 
actors, ideally allowing for coordinated responses to situations of fragility. 
These actors can vary from diplomats, development experts and humanitarian 
workers to military and police personnel as well as urban planners. 
Stabilization approaches thus intentionally move “beyond civil-military 
interaction or coordination and towards a more broadly joined-up approach 
which encompasses roles for diplomacy, the private sector and national 
governments among others” (Muggah, 2014b, p. 57).  
The term stabilization was introduced to peace operations with the 
establishment of SFOR, the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in 1995. Since then, the term has notably implied military 
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efforts to stabilize a situation or a country to the extent that efforts could be 
undertaken to build sustainable institutions (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 42). 
Following this understanding and the application of stabilization in diverse 
contexts such as Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Haiti, one can conclude that 
“stabilization has therefore emerged as a key component of a broader liberal, 
transformative peacebuilding project” (Collison, Samir Elhawary, & 
Muggah, 2010, p. 5). Similarly, Karlsrud (2015) draws the conclusion that 
the mandates of the UN peace operations in the Central African Republic, the 
DRC and Mali, which are “oriented towards stabilization, with a high level of 
robust use of force” indicate that a “new generation of peacekeeping 
operations is in the making” (p. 43). 
However, and although the UN initiated a specific stabilization mission in 
Haiti in 20049 and introduced stabilization into the ongoing peacekeeping 
mission in the DR Congo in 2010, the term as such is hardly mentioned in 
official UN documents, be it in UN Security Council Resolutions or 
statements of the UN General Assembly.10 Instead, the objective and 
expectation of stabilization appears to be implied, either as “a synonym for a 
“peacekeeping” mission, a sub-component of a peacekeeping mission, or a 
follow-on or additive activity including civilian surges and policing in the 
wake of a peacekeeping draw-down” (Muggah, 2014b, p. 58). In this context, 
the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(HIPPO) requested the UN to further specify its understanding of 
stabilization since it was realized that the term “stabilization” had been used 
by a number of UN organs for several missions despite the terms’ ambiguity 
(HIPPO, 2015, p. 30). Similarly, the political and institutional interests of 
introducing and diffusing stabilization approaches remain unclear. Speaking 
in very general terms, one can assume that “stabilization appears to constitute 
a “transition” from large-scale peacekeeping operations in areas affected by 
widespread insecurity to more modest security and development packages” 
(Muggah 2014b, p. 57). The definition of specific stabilization approaches 
targeted at areas of instability is usually based on both the interests of the UN 
Security Council and the bilateral interests of individual nation-states in 
                                                                 
9 MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti was established on 1 June 2004 by Security 
Council Resolution 1542, and set up to support, amongst others, the Transitional Government in ensuring a 
secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National 
Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
programmes, and to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public 
order in Haiti (MINUSTAH). 
10 Focusing on the use of stabilization in open UNSC meetings between 2000 and 2014, David Curran and 
Paul Holtom (2015, p. 14) demonstrate however that the frequency of the use of stabilization has significantly 
increased from ten percent in 2002 to 40 per cent of open UNSC meetings in 2014. The authors thus conclude 
that “[p]roposals for peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions led by the UN or regional organizations 
focusing on stabilization and longer-term measures to prevent conflict and support political and socio-
economic development have become firmly embedded in UNSC discourse.” 
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relation to the interests of the host government. The overall goals of 
stabilization initiatives, however, remain the same and include the promotion 
of security and support of the host government to resume its responsibilities, 
in terms of providing security and stability. 
2.2 The Liberal Peace Approach 
Following the end of the Cold War, there was strong belief in liberalism, and 
it was assumed that exporting liberalism to troubled regions of the world 
would enable the development of peaceful and democratic societies (cf. 
Fukuyama, 1992). Based on the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, this in turn was 
expected to decrease the number of conflicts since it is assumed that 
democracies at interstate level are less likely to wage war with other 
countries they classify as democratic. Following the same logic, liberal 
democracies are least likely to descend into civil war or anarchy (cf. Doyle, 
1986).11 The theory and practice of international peace operations has thus 
commonly been legitimized by the aim of building liberal peace in war-torn 
societies (cf. Bellamy & Williams, 2004; R. Mac Ginty & O. P. Richmond, 
2009; Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2005). 
According to Mac Ginty (2010), the concept of “liberal peace” is perceived 
as “the dominant form of internationally supported peacemaking and 
peacebuilding that is promoted by leading states, leading international 
organizations and international financial institutions” (p. 392). The concept 
as such serves as a “broad umbrella” as it includes “the ideology of 
peacemaking, the socio-cultural norms of peacemaking, the structural factors 
that enable and constrain it, its principal actors and clients, and its 
manifestations” (ibid. 393). In short, the term seeks to capture the multitude 
of internationally sponsored peace operations. 
The ‘liberal peace’ approach to international peace operations is, 
however, not uncontroversial but has provoked extensive debates between 
problem-solving and critical scholarship. Going more into detail, the two 
approaches can be distinguished by their purpose, their understanding of the 
social world and their position on the relationship between theory and 
practice. Regarding their purpose, problem-solving approaches are 
instrumental and predicated on implicit normative assumptions, while critical 
                                                                 
11 The democratic peace thesis is based on several assumptions. Decision-makers in liberal democracies are 
constrained by powerful institutional oversight, which limits the opportunities for waging war. Democratic 
states are furthermore tied to international organizations, such as the UN, at the same time as they guarantee 
human rights and offer possibilities for non-violent conflict resolution, minimizing the risk for civil war 
(Owen, 1994). In addition, legitimacy is mutually recognized by democratic states, and they have an interest in 
keeping up international trade which would be distorted by civil war (Hegre, 2000). 
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approaches have an explicit normative agenda. In terms of the nature of the 
social world, the former follows an objectivist world view, which implies the 
understanding that problems are pre-given, and interventions are discrete acts 
to solve these problems. The latter builds upon the understanding that the 
social world and its problems are socially constructed. Finally, problem-
solving approaches, as implicit in their name, do not reflect on the 
relationship between theory and praxis, while critical approaches intend to 
uncover the ideological preferences of dominant theories and practices as 
well as search for alternatives (Bellamy, 2004, p. 17). The next two sections 
will thus explore the arguments made by proponents of both problem-solving 
and critical perspectives to peace operations. 
2.2.1 Problem-Solving Perspectives 
From a problem-solving perspective, criticism on peace operations is 
commonly oriented towards the discrepancy between the ambitious goals set 
and the interventions’ limited record in achieving them. Increasingly 
discussed have thus been factors for the success or failure of peace operations 
(cf. Brzoska, 2006; Detzner, 2017; Diehl & Druckman, 2015). In this context, 
the efficiency of institutions has traditionally been accentuated, including the 
timing and sequencing of reforms, availability of resources, aspects of 
political will, and increased inclusion of local actors in peace operations 
(Tadjbakhsh, 2011a, p. 2). Coordination issues between the various actors 
involved in peace operations have furthermore been intensively discussed. In 
this regard, criticism has commonly been expressed, in terms of oftentimes 
contradicting strategies and activities potentially provoking situations in 
which actors work at cross-purposes (de Coning, 2007; Lurweg, 2011; Paris, 
2009; Paris & Sisk, 2007). Furthermore, peace operations are consistently 
accused of not being sensitive enough to the particular context in which they 
are deployed (Campbell, 2011, p. 90). In this regard, Sending (2009, p. 1) 
points out that “sensitivity to local context is preached but not practiced” 
(emphasis in original). This implies, for instance, the frequent application of 
standard templates of strategies, programmes and activities, instead of 
acknowledging the uniqueness of each situation (cf. Pouligny, 2005). 
With the increasing complexity and robustness of peace operations, the 
international community and, in particular, those states contributing with the 
provision of financial and human resources have increasingly requested more 
accountability and transparency to be able to measure their investments in 
today’s peace operations (Lipner & Livingstone, 2015, p. v). It has become of 
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more and more significance to present results and to effectively integrate 
lessons learned in prospective plans and operations. A focus on the 
effectiveness and impact of peace operations has thus become a frequent 
subject of scholarly and policy oriented literature (cf. Brusset, de Coning, & 
Hughes, 2016; Diehl & Druckman, 2015; Stave, 2011; van der Lijn, 2009; 
Whalan, 2013). Moreover, several authors point to the complex relationship 
and the prevalent power disparity between international interveners and 
national and local counterparts (Autesserre, 2010; Gelot & Söderbaum, 2011; 
Pouligny, 2006). Scholars have furthermore increasingly argued for a 
stronger focus on peacebuilding efforts at the lower and subnational levels, 
instead of being first and foremost concerned with activities at the capital-
level of host countries (cf. Autesserre, 2010, 2014; Neumann, 2011). In this 
context, it has also been requested to study peacebuilding more 
ethnographically (cf. Schia & Karlsrud, 2013).  
Recent studies also increasingly acknowledge the reciprocal relationships 
between the political economy at the local level and national conflict 
dynamics. In this context, external actors have initially been understood as 
frequently forming a rather homogenous group. Autesserre (2011) argues, for 
instance, that a “dominant international peacebuilding culture” has evolved 
which “shapes intervention in a way that precludes action on local violence, 
ultimately dooming the international efforts” (p. 57). Hence, a “common 
culture”, in terms of a shared set of “ideologies, rules, rituals, assumptions, 
definitions, paradigms and standard operating procedures (…) influences the 
interveners’ understanding of the causes of violence, the paths toward peace, 
and the roles of foreign actors.” Consequently, the contextualization of peace 
operation policies to local dynamics is made more difficult, if not impossible 
(ibid.).  
Other scholars, however, criticize this understanding for being too 
constricted (cf. da Costa & Karlsrud, 2013). By emphasizing the individual 
actions of actors at field level, Da Costa and Karlsrud shift the focus towards 
the social interactions and dynamics in the context of local peacebuilding. 
The authors claim that the outcomes of local peacebuilding depend first and 
foremost on “negotiations, bargains and compromises between different 
actors at the ‘field’ level” (ibid. 293). Institutional policy and decision-
making at capital and headquarter level is understood as being of less 
significance. The underlying reason is that the implementation of peace 
operation policies depends on decisions made daily by field level 
implementers in “politically-charged, fluctuating situations” (ibid. 299). 
Discrepancies between official UN HQ policy and action at field level are 
thus recognized and the “relationship between policy and practice and the 
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location of agency and authority in civilian peacekeeping” are explored 
(ibid.). 
2.2.2 Critical Perspectives 
Critical voices, in contrast to problem-solvers, generally criticize the liberal 
peace that is to be established for primarily reflecting “the practical and 
ideological interests of the global north” (Mac Ginty 2010, p. 393). Critics 
furthermore point out that illiberal means are oftentimes used to promote 
liberal values. This is understood as starkly contrasting the ultimate 
motivation behind the deployment of peace operations, based on core liberal 
values such as “the primacy of the individual, the belief in the reformability 
of individuals and institutions, pluralism and toleration, the rule of law, and 
the protection of property” (ibid). Consequently, criticism has been expressed 
in relation to its assumptions and aims as well as the international 
community’s practices regarding “the way in which it suits or fails in its 
offering of a sustainable peace through democracy, neoliberalism, human 
rights, the rule of law and development” (R. Mac Ginty & O. Richmond, 
2009, p. 2).  
In terms of context sensitivity, and similar to critique raised by problem-
solvers, critics of the liberal peace ask for increasing the focus on “the local 
and national actors, and the everyday reality that they live in” to negotiate 
with, empower and emancipate these actors (Campbell, 2011, p. 92). In this 
regard, Sending (2011, p. 57) argues for shifting the focus in order to further 
explore the interests, behaviour and power of internal actors, notably at the 
local level, instead of assuming that external actors are omnipotent and thus 
exclusively responsible for the success or failure of interventions: 
[A]nalysts often invoke outcomes of peacebuilding processes (…) as a measuring 
stick for the effectiveness of what external actors are doing. This is tantamount to 
measuring the causal significance of only one among many possible core 
independent variables by looking at the value of the dependent variable (…) 
without demonstrating (…) the relative significance of other factors or actors in 
shaping these outcomes. It is simply assumed that external actors control 
peacebuilding outcomes and hence that it makes sense to assess their effectiveness 
by looking at some of the key indicators of (liberal) peace in a country. 
While external actors aim, for instance, to build capacity, their internal 
counterparts receive, select, use but also ignore aspects of these efforts. The 
outcome of peace operations thus becomes a result of the interaction between 
the various external and internal actors involved (Sending, 2011, p. 64). 
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International and local actors are therefore unable to act autonomously and 
thus should not be understood as discrete categories (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 
392). Instead, the comprehensive intervention strategies developed by 
international actors become distorted as they compete with the strategies as 
well as the reactions of the local actors involved. The result, according to 
Mac Ginty, is a hybrid peace, which reminds us of “the lack of autonomy on 
the part of actors in peacemaking contexts” (ibid. p. 392). In this context, 
Bellamy (2004) highlights the necessity of questioning the ideological 
preferences of the interveners to be able to evaluate whether peace operation 
practices “help reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in 
the first place” (p. 19). Peace operations are thus criticized for reinforcing the 
position of power-holders, be they national, regional or international elites 
and their allies in the private sector, instead of emancipating the general 
population (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 394).12 Hence, the tendency of the liberal 
peace approach to be top-down, state-centric and ideological is called into 
question (Newman et al., 2009, pp. 10-14).  
In line with this, Chandler (2013) proposes a “non-linear understanding of 
the limits to peacebuilding interventions” (p. 18). This implies that any 
analysis should focus on “the problematic of the local or societal agents and 
actors and the processes, practices and interrelationships that shape ideas and 
understandings” (ibid.). Under the keyword of the ‘local turn’, the role of the 
local in peace operations has received increasing attention.13 In this context, a 
discussion along two different lines has developed: In terms of increasing the 
effectiveness of peace operations, aspects of decentralization and local 
governments for peace are highlighted as well as the need to increase local 
capacity and ownership. Moreover, the role of the local “as a means for 
emancipation and inclusion of local agency” is emphasized (Leonardsson & 
Rudd, 2015, p. 825). 
2.2.3 Summary 
The ‘liberal peace’ approach to international peace operations is thus not 
uncontroversial. Extensive debates have developed regarding its value and 
validity, based on assumptions around the pacifying effects of fostering 
                                                                 
12 The same critique has recently been raised against the critical, especially the local turn itself (cf. Bräuchler 
& Naucke, 2017; Randazzo, 2016). Hence, discussions around the liberal peace approach to interventions 
seem to be rather circular instead of moving forward. 
13 See, for example, the Special Issue on “The ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding: the liberal peace challenged” 
(Hughes, Öjendal, & Schierenbeck, 2015), including a comprehensive literature review on the ‘local turn’ 
(Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). 
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democratization, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, and 
developed, open markets. Within the academic community, two schools of 
thought have evolved from these discussions, namely proponents of more 
applied scholarship, the so-called ‘problem solvers’ and the ‘critical voices’. 
In short, problem-solvers predominantly focus on the shortcomings of peace 
operations and accentuate the need to improve those interventions without 
necessarily questioning their inherent value, while critical voices generally 
reject the idea that interventions can or should create any ‘liberal peace’ (cf. 
Bellamy, 2004; Campbell, Chandler, & Sabaratnam, 2011; R. Mac Ginty & 
O. P. Richmond, 2009; Richmond, 2005; Tadjbakhsh, 2011b). 
While problem-solvers generally acknowledge the criticism raised by 
critical scholars, the latter are accused of not providing realistic alternatives 
to the existing liberal frameworks, which would help to understand the need 
for interventions and the problems to be addressed. Paris (2010a), for 
instance, recognizes very well that peace operations are “tremendously 
complex and prone to unanticipated consequences” (p. 170). At the same 
time, though, he highlights that peace operations are “too important to lose or 
abandon”. He thus argues for “saving peacebuilding” while clarifying that 
this does not imply “blindly defending current international practices” (Paris, 
2011, p. 32). Paris argues instead that the current challenge is “not to replace 
or move ‘beyond’ liberal peacebuilding, but to reform existing approaches 
within a broadly liberal framework”. Such a reform would have to include 
both conceptual and policy elements since “[p]eacebuilding remains ripe for 
theoretical treatments that shed light on the meaning and effects of these 
operations” (Paris 2010a:170). It has thus been increasingly advocated to 
overcome the existing divide between problem-solving and critical 
perspectives on peace operations. 
2.3 Key Issues of Peace Operations 
Motivated by the ever frequently voiced demand for better understanding of 
peace operations and departing from the assumption that there may not be 
realistic alternatives to the liberal peace approach, this section elaborates on 
key issues on the practice of peace operations, identified as being of prime 
importance regarding policy execution in both problem-solving and critical 
perspectives. Critical perspectives are understood as being valuable since 
dilemmas that contradict assumptions of the liberal peace are expected to be 
found in the empirical analysis. Likewise, the significance of problem-
solving approaches lies in the interest to include the implementing actors’ 
understanding of and response to problems arising during the execution of 
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SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo. Thus, the key issues 
presented in the following sections include the content of the policies and 
their context sensitivity as well as aspects of coordination, political will and 
ownership. 
2.3.1 Policy Content 
With regard to peace operations, the content of the policies, and more 
concretely, the content of the mandate establishing a peace operation, has 
been scrutinized (Tull, 2009, p. 219). According to van der Lijn (2009, p. 52), 
the stated objectives in the mandate should be clear and appropriate as well 
as achievable and problem-oriented based on an understanding of the conflict 
situation. This understanding is also highlighted in the so-called ‘Brahimi 
Report’, which was published in 2000 by the Panel on UN Peace Operations, 
and which highlighted that the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions 
depends on proper resources and equipment as well as a on a clear, credible 
and achievable mandate. This is considered as being of utmost significance 
regarding peace operations deployed in dangerous circumstances. Having 
ambiguities in the mandate, in contrast, is understood as potentially 
provoking serious consequences in the field: “if the mandate is then subject 
to varying interpretation by different elements of a peace operation, or if 
local actors perceive a less than complete Council commitment to peace 
implementation that offers encouragement to spoilers” (Brahimi, 2000, p. 
10). 
However, defining ‘clear and achievable goals’ is understood as a very 
difficult attempt, due to the specificity of conflict situations that are 
continually evolving (see A. B. Fetherston in Druckman et al., 1997, p. 157). 
A too strict conceptualization and codification of peacekeeping experiences 
is furthermore understood as being potentially counterproductive. Karlsrud 
(2013, p. 539), for instance, highlights the need for discretion to be able to 
benefit from the “local knowledge and previous experience” of senior high-
level mission officials in the field. The author is thus a bit more cautious, 
arguing against “a too fine-grained and detailed normative framework that 
limits the freedom of action of special representatives and envoys”. Mandates 
and guidelines should consequently possess “generative ambiguity” instead 
of spelling out rules “for all forms of behavior” (ibid.). 
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2.3.2 Context Sensitivity 
In addition to the significance of the policy content, peace operations are 
expected to be sensitive to the conflict and the context in which they operate 
since they are “not deployed in a vacuum (…) [but] must deal with the 
circumstances of the conflict” (Diehl, 2008, p. 134). Context sensitivity can 
thereby be defined as the ability of an organization to understand the context 
in which it is operating, the interaction between the intervention and that 
context, and to act upon that understanding, in order to avoid negative 
impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict (International Alert, 
2004, p. 1). International actors are thus requested to acknowledge the 
uniqueness of each situation, instead of relying on standard templates of 
strategies, programmes and activities (cf. Pouligny, 2005). In other words, 
“cookie-cutter” approaches to peace operations should be avoided (Call & 
Cousens, 2008, p. 14). Context sensitivity implies furthermore that 
international actors are expected to adapt as well as to learn from those 
institutions at the national and the local level that they aim to influence. 
Supporting state-society relations and supporting those institutions that in the 
end will embody liberal democratic norms is otherwise considered 
impossible (M. Barnett & Zürcher, 2008). Moreover, emphasis is put on 
assisting national capacities to build peace and local democratic processes to 
increase the endogenous capacity of the targeted country to sustain peace 
(Ottaway, 2003; Pouligny, 2005).  
Insufficient sensitivity to the given conflict and thus, the context, is in 
turn taken as an explanation for the ineffectiveness and unsustainability of 
peace operation efforts in the long run.14 Hence, there is a shared 
understanding that peace operations depend on the ability “to support an 
endogenous change process that enables the existence of formal and informal 
institutions of state and society that can sustain a just peace” (Campbell, 
2011, p. 92). While a call for more context-sensitivity regarding peace 
operations policies is thus uncontested, three aspects are understood as 
impeding it: First, following the growth of the peacebuilding enterprise and 
its increasing professionalization, a reliance on standard operating procedures 
has become the norm. Second, there is commonly only a limited number of 
“standard people” available to be deployed in peace operations, who cannot 
be expected to have in-depth knowledge about every unique context. Third, 
due to serious resource constraints, the number of country experts, on whom, 
                                                                 
14 An interesting study on the experiences of peace operation practitioners is for example provided by 
Anderson, M. B. and L. Olson (2003): Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge: 
The Collaborative for Development Action.  
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for instance, the UN can rely on, is considered as being insufficient (Call & 
Cousens, 2008, pp. 14-15). 
2.3.3 Coordination 
In addition to the necessity of context sensitivity, coordination among 
international actors implementing peace operations is widely recognized (cf. 
de Coning, 2007; OECD-DAC, 2008). The understandings of the content and 
meaning of coordination differ however among actors (Paris, 2009, p. 61). 
According to Uvin (1999, p. 18), coordination commonly implies 
development of common strategies and determination of common objectives, 
exchange of information as well as division of roles and responsibilities. In 
this context, coordination is understood as facilitated by dialogue, liaison and 
common training (Council of the European Union, 2008). Others, such as 
Kaspersen and Sending (2005, p. 19), propose a “functional centralization” 
for UN-led peace operations and a “fully integrated structure (…) to reduce 
supply-driven programming and turf battles” and to allow for a more 
effective use of the tools and expertise of the UN. These visions of how to 
improve coordination are however quite different. While the former 
encourages actors involved in peace operations to work more efficiently 
through activities such as sharing of information, thus avoiding new 
hierarchies, the latter explicitly proposes a hierarchical structure centred 
within the UN. 
Barnett and Zürcher (2008) furthermore argue for stronger focus on the 
strategic interaction taking place between the various actors in the process of 
implementing peace operation policies. The authors thereby identify three 
key actors and their preferences: 1) peacebuilders, who want stability and 
liberalization; 2) state elites, aiming at maintaining their power; and 3) sub-
national elites, whose aim is to maintain both autonomy from the state and 
power in the countryside. Goal achievement for each actor is understood as 
depending on the strategies and behaviour of the other two actors. 
Consequently, it is the “strategic interaction [that] will shape the 
peacebuilding agenda and hence the outcome of the peacebuilding process” 
(ibid. 24). The advantage of this model, according to Barnett and Zürcher, is 
that “domestic politics” are brought back into the explanation instead of 
solely focusing on external actors and “treating domestic politics as 
“constraints”, and thus failing to incorporate fully the preferences and 
strategies of local actors” (ibid. 25). 
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Paris (2009) furthermore argues that actors at times pool together, 
describing the international state building machinery as “a loosely structured 
network of national governments and international governmental and non-
governmental agencies” (p. 61). According to Paris, one can speak about a 
network since “its constituent members share information with each other, 
discuss common objectives, work together to achieve these objectives both at 
the headquarters-level and in the field, and use several formal and informal 
coordination mechanisms” (ibid.) He describes this network however as “a 
loosely structured network in that there is little joint planning for missions, 
patchy information sharing, inconsistent and often non-existent coordination, 
and no hierarchical command structure for the system as a whole” (ibid.). 
While the necessity of coordination is widely shared, several factors are 
however generally understood as restricting coordination. These include the 
multitude of actors involved, costs entailed in coordination regarding time 
and money, competition for influence and visibility between the different 
actors and a more general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for 
manoeuvre by the discipline of coordination (Uvin 1999:19). Since 
coordination “cannot be achieved by dictate but requires genuine 
participation and influence of all relevant actors”, the greatest challenge of 
coordination is thus understood as being anchored in the difficulty to get “all 
participating actors to commit themselves to an overall strategy and plan” 
(Kaspersen & Sending, 2005, p. 15). 
While improved coordination among the various actors involved in peace 
operations is considered as being uncontroversial and generally desirable, 
Paris (2009, p. 58), for instance, nevertheless cautions against using this 
‘coordination problem’ as “a convenient catch-all” phrase. Hence, one should 
not expect to rather easily solve the deeper underlying problems of peace 
operations, such as the general complexity of interventions and incompatible 
strategies of the various actors involved, through increased coordination 
(ibid. pp. 53-60). In a similar vein, Kofi Annan, by then Secretary General of 
the UN, urges the international community to not approach peacebuilding as 
a largely technical exercise made up of knowledge and resources, but to 
“understand local power dynamics (…) [and to] recognize that it is itself a 
political actor entering a political environment” (ibid.). Hence, Annan 
underlines that “increased resources and improved coordination will not, in 
themselves, be enough to bring about lasting peace” (United Nations, 2006). 
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2.3.4 Political Will  
Understood as possibly being of even greater significance than the technical 
design of peace operations is, according to Riis Andersen and Engedal 
(2013), “the overall political climate and will of the actors involved” (p. 239). 
While political will is thus considered significant, it is understood as being 
“inherently difficult to quantify and measure” (ibid.). The concept of political 
will is furthermore described as at least ambiguous if not “the slipperiest 
concept in the policy lexicon” (Hammergren, 1998, p. 12). In this context, 
Post, Raile and Raile (2010) propose a pragmatic and systematic definition of 
political will as “the extent of committed support among key decision makers 
for a particular policy solution to a particular problem” (p. 659). By using 
“key decision makers” as those actors upon whom committed support 
depends, their authority, capacity and legitimacy become incorporated in the 
definition. Hence, political capacity is understood as integral part of political 
will (ibid.). Capacity development should thus be understood as “an 
endogenous process that engages not just the abilities and skills, but the 
motivation, support, and aspirations of people within a country”, instead of 
an exogenous process of outside intervention and assistance (Brinkerhoff, 
2007, p. 111). Since political will is understood as being inextricably linked 
to policy outcomes, political power and other resources, such as financial 
means, are also considered essential parts of political will (Post et al., 2010, 
p. 658).  
Despite the ambiguity regarding the concept of political will, it is 
frequently identified as key issue regarding peace operations in general and 
more specifically, in terms of any potential outcomes. In this context, it is 
considered as “ideal for achieving political aims and for labelling political 
failures when the diagnosis is unclear” (Post, Raile et al. 2010, p. 654). The 
lack of political will and political capacity at the receiving end is, for 
instance, repeatedly brought up by analysts as an “easy answer” to justify 
policy failure in terms of international interventions (cf. The World Bank, 
2017, p. 7). While a lack of political will and capacity in the context of peace 
operations is thus commonly attributed to the receiving side, the international 
community is also criticized for at times lacking the political will to intervene 
in the first place. Kofi Annan, in his annual report to the General Assembly in 
1999, pointed out the lack of political will which was identified as being the 
major obstacle to being able to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. 
The underlying lack of will to intervene was understood as being based on 
Member States’ concerns “to risk injury to their troops, a lack of perceived 
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vital interests in the conflict, concerns over financial cost, and doubts over 
the effectiveness of intervention in halting the genocide” (Ramsbotham). 
In a similar vein, but with specific focus on international actors, Call and 
Cousens (2008) elaborate on problems of political will and attention, in terms 
of short political attention spans. While peace operations require sustained 
political attention, it is understood as generally being “short-lived, crisis-
driven, and prone to weaken when it is needed the most” (pp. 11-12). The 
authors furthermore criticize that interventions oftentimes reflect the strategic 
interests of influential nation states, leading to a situation in which crises 
receive differing political attention as well as financial resources (ibid.).15 
2.3.5 Ownership 
The concept of ownership has increasingly become a buzzword, both in the 
field of development policies and in relation to post-conflict interventions. Its 
operational implications have however predominantly remained unclear. In 
terms of post-conflict reconstruction and state building, Chesterman (2007) 
argues that ownership within a more positive understanding “reflects a desire 
on the part of external actors to avoid undermining pre-existing local 
processes that may be the most effective response to local political questions” 
(p. 9). However, the term “ownership” can also be used more defensively “to 
avoid the appearance of paternalism or neo-colonialism” (ibid.). According to 
Donais (2012), local ownership refers to “the degree of control that domestic 
actors wield over domestic political processes; in post-conflict contexts, the 
notion conveys the commonsense wisdom that any peace process not 
embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail” (p. 1). This 
understanding of ownership therefore implies that “peace cannot be imposed 
by external forces, military or otherwise, but must rather be nurtured through 
patient, flexible strategies carefully calibrated to the domestic political 
context” (Tschirgi, 2003, p. ii). 
It is however criticized that in practice, “local ownership in peacebuilding 
contexts has come to be less about respecting local autonomy and more about 
insisting that domestic political structures take responsibility for – ownership 
                                                                 
15 The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ has been extensively discussed in the literature. See, for example, Evans, G. 
and M. T. Sahnoun (2001). "The Responsibility to Protect." Foreign Affairs 81(6): 99-110; Bellamy, A. J. 
(2009). Responsibility to Protect. The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities  Cambridge: Polity Press; Luck, E. 
C. (2011). "The Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade." Global Responsibility to Protect 3(4): 387-399. 
In the context of humanitarian crisis, Mepham, D. and A. Ramsbotham argue that the absence of political will 
and leadership should be understood as “governments that were potentially in a position to do something about 
these crises judged that the costs of action were out-weighed by the risks or disadvantages of doing so” 
(Mepham & Ramsbotham, 2007, p. 62). 
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over – the implementation of a pre-existing (and externally-defined) set of 
policy prescriptions” (Donais, 2008, p. 7, as quoted in Sending, 2009, p. 19). 
Hence, instead of providing support, international actors tend to define plans 
and give specifications on what government officials should do, based on the 
understanding that post-conflict societies commonly lack both capacity to 
govern effectively and the political will to implement the goals contained in 
liberal peace operations (Sending, 2009, p. 19). Such an approach, however, 
undermines local institutions and contradicts the goal of establishing 
sustainable peace since international efforts are considered unsustainable 
without strong domestic support and ownership. According to Uvin (1999, p. 
21), this is in particular the case regarding the politically sensitive and 
complex governance issues dealt with in post-conflict situations. 
2.4 Approaches to Policy Implementation 
People (…) appear to think that implementation should be easy; they are, 
therefore, upset when expected events do not occur or turn out badly. We would 
consider our effort a success if more people began with the understanding that 
implementation, under the best of circumstances, is exceedingly difficult. They 
would, therefore, be pleasantly surprised when a few good things really happened 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973, pp. xii-xiii). 
Implementation studies have their origin in the late 1960s and 70s when the 
effectiveness of public policy and governance became a matter of concern. 
Both in the US and UK, it was recognized by that time that although there 
was an increasing number of government interventions aimed at addressing 
social problems, these interventions oftentimes remained ineffective (cf. 
Barrett, 2004; Elmore, 1979; Hill & Hupe, 2009; Lipsky, 1971; Nakamura & 
Smallwood, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; P. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 
1980; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Williams, 1975). It was thus recognized 
that independent of the policy or programme in focus, the objectives set 
usually only provide a rather general indication of where the policy or 
programme is headed. It was also realized that knowledge on the 
understandings and activities of the implementers, bearing the responsibility 
for carrying out the programme, remained vague. Consequently, it was 
acknowledged that mere knowledge of the objectives of a policy adopted 
hardly reveals anything, in terms of potential policy success or acceptance by 
those being directly affected (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989, p. 4).  
A number of initiatives were implemented as a response that aimed at 
enhancing the policy content of government decision-making, improving 
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public decision-making processes and co-ordination of policy as well as 
streamlining management structures and service delivery (Barrett, 2004, p. 
250). Hence, instead of primarily concentrating on the stage of policy 
formation, the implementation of the policies became of interest. This 
approach was further motivated by a growing tendency to challenge both the 
articulateness of political mandates and the degree of compliance by 
administrators, with regard to what their superiors expected from them (Hill 
& Hupe, 2009, pp. 42-44). 
Consistent with concerns regarding the effectiveness of public policies in 
everyday life, a concurrent development took place in the field of academic 
policy studies, focusing on the three main areas of policy analysis, evaluative 
studies and organizational studies (Heclo, 1972).16 Notably, the results of 
evaluative studies, which aimed at monitoring policy effectiveness, showed 
that policy performance frequently lagged behind policy expectations, thus, 
reflecting the frustration of the general public. Scholarly concern therefore 
shifted from a focus on the outcomes of policy to the reasons for the 
perceived policy failures. What emerged was a growing research interest 
aiming at opening the black box of policy implementation.  
In this context, implementation was understood as constituting one 
specific stage of the policy implementation process. This process commonly 
starts with a first stimulus when a problem, goal or issue attracts attention. 
The next stages, through which intention is linked to action, include political 
mobilization and the development of policy based on the preceding stimulus, 
the translation of policy into programmes and their actual implementation 
(Alexander, 1985, p. 412).17 However, the process of policy implementation 
should not be interpreted as linear, in which one stage directly follows the 
other, but rather as “a continuous interactive process” (Alexander, 1985, p. 
411) in which intent is transformed into action (see also Barrett, 2004). 
Hence, scholars increasingly aimed at developing “systematic knowledge 
regarding what emerges, or is induced, as actors deal with policy problems” 
(Laurence J. O'Toole, 2000, p. 266). In this context, two different approaches 
emerged, focusing on implementation either from a top-down or bottom-up 
perspective. 
                                                                 
16 While policy analysis is concerned with understanding and explaining the substance of policy content and 
the processes of decision-making, evaluative studies aim at understanding and assessing policy outcomes as a 
basis for evaluating effectiveness. Organizational studies, in contrast, are interested in understanding how 
political and administrative organizations are operated as behavioural systems (Barrett, 2004, p. 251). 
17 A policy can be defined as “a set of instructions from policy-makers to policy implementers that spell out 
both goals and the means for achieving these goals” (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980, p. 31). Policies thus 
mark the starting point for action. Building on that, programmes can be defined as “the prescription of a 
specific intervention to achieve defined objectives, identifying resources to be deployed, the relevant contexts 
or locations, the prescribed course of action, and the beneficiary population” (Williams, 1975, p. 533). 
Programmes thus intend to specify policies in more detail and include regulations, plans or projects. 
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2.4.1 Top-down Implementation 
The early days of implementation studies were characterized by so-called 
top-down approaches interpreting implementation as “an essentially top-
down administrative and hierarchical follow-on process” (Barrett, 2004, p. 
252).18 Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), the founding fathers of 
implementation research, initially applied a rational model approach equating 
policy with the setting of goals to be achieved. Thus, policy was understood 
as “a hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted consequences”, 
while implementation constitutes “the ability to achieve the predicted 
consequences after the initial conditions have been met” (ibid. xv). In other 
words, implementation was understood as entailing the meaning of policy 
accomplishment. Those actors sitting on the top of the system are 
consequently considered as controlling the most influential variables in the 
implementation process. Other variables, such as contextual variables, are not 
considered as specifically important. In their case study on environmental 
policy in Berkeley, California, the authors however show that the original 
intent of a policy formally adopted by a government can indeed be bypassed 
during implementation. 
In this line of thought, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) elaborated on 
Pressman and Wildavsky’s approach and developed a theoretical framework 
for policy implementation. Based on the conceptualization of implementation 
as a process that starts with an initial policy decision, policy implementation 
is defined as including “those actions by public and private individuals (or 
groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior 
policy decisions” (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 447). Policy 
implementation is understood as being most successful in cases where goal 
consensus is high, and the amount of change required is marginal (ibid. 461). 
Similar to Van Meter and Van Horn, Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian 
(1989; 1980) depart in their early work from the expectation that analyzing 
implementation self-evidently implies to analyse the implementation of a 
policy decision at the top level.19 Consequently, it is the policy decision made 
by government officials and its subsequent translation into practice that has 
to be scrutinized. It is then of interest to challenge the extent to which the 
implementing officials and target groups act according to the policy decision 
                                                                 
18 Prominent ‘top-down’ scholars include, amongst others, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), the so-called 
‘founding fathers’ of implementation research, as well as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975). In addition, 
included are the early works of Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian (1989; 1980). 
19 Later, in his work, Sabatier clearly turned towards a merging of top-down and bottom-up approaches as 
discussed later on in this chapter. See, for example: Sabatier, P. A. (1986). "Top-Down and Bottom-Up 
Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis." Journal of Public 
Policy 6(01): 21-48. 
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and the extent to which the objectives are achieved over time. The authors 
furthermore question the factors affecting policy inputs and outputs. Also 
acknowledged is the necessity of including a feedback process to allow for 
continuous reformulation of the policy based on the experiences gathered. 
This approach thus aimed at providing methodological tools for analyzing the 
implementation process by identifying factors potentially causing difficulties. 
In addition, policy recommendations were formulated for those officials 
sitting at the ‘top’ to enable them to control and improve implementation 
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; P. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; P. A. 
Sabatier, 1986). 
To summarize, top-down scholars consider the authoritative decision as 
the starting point of interest, while the decisive role in producing the desired 
outcomes is played by actors located at the central level. Thus, 
implementation is concerned with “the degree to which the actions of 
implementing officials and target groups coincide with the goals embodied in 
an authoritative decision” (Matland, 1995, p. 146). Besides understanding 
implementation as a top-down process, these studies share an accentuation of 
difficulties connected to implementation and an identification of key factors 
evoking the perceived ‘implementation failure’. These factors include: a lack 
of clear policy objectives that provoke an increased scope of interpretation 
and discretion; communication and coordination difficulties due to the high 
number of actors and agencies involved; differences in terms of values and 
interests among and between actors and agencies as well as limited 
administrative control due to the relative autonomy of the implementing 
agencies (Barrett, 2004; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973; Scharpf, 1978). 
2.4.2 Bottom-up Implementation 
The interpretation of implementation by top-down scholars as a one-
directional process of putting policy into effect came increasingly under 
criticism from a group of so-called bottom-up scholars. These scholars 
criticized the common understanding of a hierarchical relation between 
policy-making and policy implementation. Hence, instead of understanding 
implementation as entailing the meaning of aim accomplishment, bottom-up 
scholars aimed at developing “theory and methodology for 
exploring/understanding implementation processes as a key factor in 
explaining outcomes” (Barrett, 2004, p. 253). In this regard, they argued for 
characterizing implementation as an “integral and continuing part of the 
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political policy process (…) seen as a policy-action dialectic involving 
negotiation and bargaining between those seeking to put policy into effect 
and those upon whom action depends” (ibid.). Thus, implementation from a 
bottom-up perspective was understood as entailing the meaning of policy 
execution.  
In this context, Michael Lipsky (1971, 2010), the ‘founding father’ of the 
bottom-up approach, was the first to emphasize the crucial role played by 
implementers in policy implementation. Those implementers, also referred to 
as street-level bureaucrats, are government officials “who directly interact 
with citizens in the regular course of their jobs; whose work within the 
bureaucratic structure permits them with latitude in job performance; and 
whose impact on the lives of citizens is extensive” (Lipsky, 1971, p. 393). 
Lipsky (2010, p. xiii) further argues that “the decisions of street-level 
bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope 
with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies 
they carry out”. Thus, the importance of interlinking the decision-making 
arenas at the top of the administrative system with those arenas at the local-
level where policies are translated into action is emphasized. This approach 
furthermore opened for an investigation of the existence of discretionary 
power, or in other words, the room to manoeuvre within organizational 
settings (ibid.). 
Following this line of thought, Benny Hjern and David O. Porter (1981) 
as well as Richard F. Elmore (1979) further underline the difficulty in 
establishing a direct connection between actions taken and specific policy 
goals, due to the complexity of relationships and interactions in the 
implementation. Hjern and Porter (1981, p. 214), in this regard, introduced 
the concept of a particular ‘implementation structure’, understood as a 
framework for analyzing the purposive action of actors involved in the 
implementation of a policy or programme.  
A similar approach, termed backward mapping, was developed by 
Richard Elmore (1979, pp. 602-603) highlighting the perceived need to start 
any analysis by looking at what is happening at ‘the bottom’, meaning the 
level of the recipient where any action is delivered. From there, the question 
of ‘why’ something is happening the way it is should be explored by 
identifying factors that have an impact on both action and behaviour. Any 
assumption on an a priori causal link between the policies decided at the top-
level and the outcomes observed can thus be avoided (ibid. 604). 
To summarize, bottom-up scholars argue for a more realistic 
understanding of implementation by focusing on the policy from the view of 
the implementing actors and the targeted population (Matland, 1995, p. 148). 
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Hence, they criticize the blaming of policy-makers for ‘wrong’ policy 
decisions and ineffective government interventions as well as the accusation 
of implementing agencies for being unable or unwilling to act as short-
sighted. Hence, bottom-up scholars shift analytical attention to the “power 
relations, conflicting interests and value systems between individuals and 
agencies responsible for making policy and those responsible for taking 
action” (Barrett & Fudge, 1981, p. 4), instead of taking a managerial 
perspective that focuses on “formal organizational hierarchies, 
communication and control mechanisms” (Barrett, 2004, p. 253). Following 
this alternative understanding of the policy-action relationship, 
implementation is characterized as “a negotiating process” as well as “a 
process of action and response”, instead of treating it as “the transmission of 
policy into a series of consequential actions” (Barrett & Fudge, 1981, p. 4). 
Focusing on lessons learned in implementation studies, McLaughlin (1987) 
thus highlights the difficulty in being able to “make something happen” 
which, according to him is not only rooted in the thorniness of social 
problems but “primarily, because policymakers can’t mandate what matters” 
(p. 172). 
2.4.3 Summary 
Following the apparent polarization between top-down and bottom-up 
scholars as elaborated on in the preceding section, important questions in 
terms of the purpose of analyzing implementation and the meaning of the 
concept of implementation were raised (Barrett, 2004; cf. Matland, 1995; 
Laurence J. O'Toole, 2004). With regard to the purpose of implementation 
studies, it has been questioned what implementation studies are trying to do.  
Top-down approaches were regarded as primarily prescriptive and 
concentrated on “what ought to happen”, thus, aiming at designing better 
policy to “achieve greater control over policy outcomes” (Barrett, 2004, p. 
255). Following this understanding, implementation commonly entails the 
meaning of “accomplishing some aim” or accomplishment (Implementation, 
2015). Implementation is thus interpreted as “an end state or policy 
achievement” (Lane, 1987, p. 528). Bottom-up approaches, in contrast, aimed 
at increasing the “understanding and explanation of what happens in 
practice” to allow for prescription at a later stage (Barrett, 2004, p. 255). 
Based on the understanding that policies can indeed be executed (meaning 
implemented) without necessarily having accomplished their objectives, 
implementation is interpreted as “a process” or as “policy execution”, thus, 
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entailing the meaning of “carrying into effect” (Lane, 1987, p. 528). Hence, 
proponents of the bottom-up approach to implementation criticized the 
prescriptive approach for failing to take the complex interactions as well as 
the contextual and field variables characterizing the implementation process 
into account. Top-down scholars, in turn, criticized bottom-up approaches for 
not offering any prescriptions for practice. 
The debate on prescription versus description provoked another question, 
namely, the question of what is meant by implementation and more 
specifically, whether implementation is about achieving conformance or 
performance (Barrett & Fudge, 1981). If one follows a policy-centred 
approach comparing outcomes against objectives set a priori, performance is 
evaluated regarding whether and to what extent conformance is achieved 
with the given targets and standards. In contrast, if implementation is 
understood as an interactive and negotiated process, performance is 
understood as “the achievement of what is possible within a particular policy 
implementation environment” (Barrett, 2004, p. 256). Included in the 
implementation environment are the various actors and their interests, their 
relative bargaining power as well as the degree of change or value conflict 
involved. 
2.5 Key Issues of Implementation 
Building upon the discussion of top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
implementation in the preceding section, this section identifies key issues that 
are discussed from both perspectives as constituting implementation. These 
key issues comprise the policy content and discretion, interaction and the 
implementation environment.  
2.5.1 Policy Content and Discretion 
To enable implementing actors to understand the policy in the first place, 
implementation studies highlight that the policy content, namely, the overall 
goals of policy decisions, must be made concrete through standards and 
objectives. Standards and objectives are supposed to reveal more concrete 
aspects of the policy, moving beyond the generality of the underlying 
legislative document (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 464). The specified 
policy standards and objectives are thereby expected to fulfil several criteria, 
such as clarity, consistency and specificity. If policy standards and objectives 
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remain ambiguous, then, implementers may understand and interpret them 
differently (ibid. p. 466).  
At the same time, however, a certain flexibility of the policy goals and 
procedures is highlighted as desirable and necessary. This understanding is 
linked to a positive attitude towards the aspect of discretion in policy 
implementation (Laurence J O'Toole, 1986, p. 189). Such a positive 
understanding of discretion was introduced by Lipsky (1971, 2010) and 
notably shared by actors in disciplines or professions where relations with 
clients and consumers were naturally negotiated. In this context, discretion is 
considered as predominantly positive and necessary and “the space within 
which negotiation and bargaining of positive sum outcomes can take place” 
(Barrett, 2004, p. 256). Following this line of thought, room for discretion is 
understood as inevitable whenever policies have to be tailored to available 
resources and circumstances as well as in cases where implementers have to 
interpret certain policies alongside other policies (Barrett, 2004, p. 252; 
Lipsky, 1971, p. 15). This positive understanding of discretion has however 
been challenged by other scholars. Critics described discretion instead as 
anti-democratic and a way to undermine policy (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). 
Emphasizing aspects of equity and common standards in service delivery, 
social and welfare policy analysts tended to view discretion as potentially 
discriminatory. Following this understanding, implementation can for 
instance be hampered if officials are not aware of the fact that they are not 
complying with the policies or programmes. In case the policies and 
programmes are contradictory to the individual implementer’s beliefs, 
discretion can further encourage them to interpret the policies in the way they 
think the policies ought to be interpreted (Linder & Peters, 1987). 
To summarize, discretion is thus considered as having both positive and 
negative connotations. It can therefore be described as “the lubricant in the 
public policy machine” but also as “difficult to control (…) [since it] could 
easily overheat the engine” (T. Evans, 2011, p. 370). 
2.5.2 Interaction 
From a top-down perspective on implementation, a focus on the interaction 
of actors was not specifically requests. Instead, there was shared 
understanding that decisions made at the top-level were transferred in a 
straight forward manner down to the field where they were then implemented 
by field level implementers. Hence, the group of implementers and their role 
has initially not been explicitly taken into consideration. Proponents of a 
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bottom-up approach to implementation, however, started to question this 
policy-centred and “managerial’ perspective” (Barrett, 1981, p. 4). It was 
thus increasingly criticized for downplaying certain aspects such as “power 
relations, conflicting interests and value systems between individuals and 
agencies responsible for making policy and those responsible for taking 
action” (ibid.). To account for these aspects, scholars started to argue for an 
understanding of policy implementation as “a process of interaction and 
negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into 
effect and those upon whom action depends” (ibid.). Likewise, Scharpf 
(1978) asserts that “it is unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any 
significance could result from the choice process of any single unified actor” 
(p. 347). Hence, it is proposed instead to understand the formulation and the 
implementation of policies as the inevitable result of a wide range of 
individual actors who interact (ibid.). Any analysis of implementation was 
thus broadened to include a focus on the interaction taking place, both among 
implementing actors and between implementing actors and policy recipients. 
Based on the understanding that implementation involves clusters of 
public and private actors interacting, Hjern and Porter (1981, p. 211) 
criticized the prevailing focus on organizations or individuals as the basic 
unit of analysis in implementation studies. Instead, the idea of an 
implementation structure as the core unit of analysis in implementation 
consisting of “a cluster of parts of public and private organizations” was 
proposed (emphasis in original). Characteristic of such implementation 
structures, understood as being formed by “the initiative of individuals in 
relation to the programme” are less formal but more dynamic and shifting 
social structures as well as fewer authoritative relations. Individuals in such 
implementation structures do not have to be part of the organization that is 
officially responsible for programme implementation (ibid.). Being interested 
in learning more about how such implementation structures are formed and 
objecting to a top-down understanding, Elmore (1979, p. 612) proposes to 
apply a bottom-up approach to identify what is happening at the level of the 
policy recipient and to carve out those factors that have influence on action 
and behaviour. 
Hence, following the increasingly shared understanding of 
implementation as the process of policy execution and following the 
increasing appreciation of the role of the implementers, actor interaction 
became a key issue in policy implementation studies. 
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2.5.3 Implementation Environment 
In the study of policy implementation, the environment in which policies are 
implemented is identified as the third key issue to take into consideration. In 
this regard, any policy or programme is considered as presumably impacting 
on the given social, political or economic setting. Likewise, the conditions in 
the implementation context are considered as presumably influencing the 
implementing actors, in their attempts to translate policies into action 
(Grindle, 1980, p. 10; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 471). The policy 
implementation environment, including the actors and their interests and 
bargaining power, is thus expected to have an effect on any potential 
implementation achievements (cf. Barrett, 2004).  
For implementing actors, this implies more specifically that they are 
expected to “be skilled in the arts of politics and [that they] must understand 
well the environment in which they seek to realize public policies and 
programs” (Grindle, 1980, p. 13). Implementers are thus expected to be 
responsive to the needs of those affected by the policy, in order to be able to 
both serve them most adequately and to receive information and feedback on 
the policies and programmes implemented. In this regard, the opinions of 
private interest groups, the public as well as the elite vis-à-vis the policy are 
considered as significant for the organization for implementation since these 
opinions can be of a supportive, dismissive or indifferent nature (ibid.).  
By way of comparison, the implementation of policies and programmes is 
generally expected to be smoother in cases where implementers are not 
confronted with any resistance, viewed by Cleaves (1980) as “nonopposition 
to reform” (p. 291). However, non-opposition to reform may also 
“camouflage public apathy”, notably in situations where “beneficiaries feel 
little attachment or gratitude for the services rendered” depriving the 
recipients of the practical experience of having been part of policy 
implementation (ibid.). Implementers must therefore find a way to achieve 
compliance with the goals set in the policy, by acquiring support from both 
national and local political elites, the public in general and the intended 
beneficiaries. Implementing actors are furthermore expected to “turn the 
oppositions of those who may be harmed by the programs into acceptance of 
them, and they must keep those who are excluded, but who wish to acquire 
benefits, from subverting them” (Grindle, 1980, p. 12). 
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2.6 Analytical Framework 
Based on the discussions of the main theoretical underpinnings in the two 
fields of peace operations and policy implementation and based on the 
identification of key issues in the respective debates, these building blocks 
will now be integrated into a coherent framework guiding the in-depth 
analysis of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR 
Congo. The added value of drawing on implementation studies is well-
grounded in the explicit focus on the stage of policy execution and thus, the 
explicit focus on the implementing actors’ understandings and decisions 
during policy implementation. 
Since this thesis has its starting point in the troubling lack of adequate 
knowledge on the execution of peace operations, an interpretation of 
implementation as the process of “translating policy into action” (Barrett, 
2004, p. 251) will be implied. Hence, in the context of interpreting 
implementation as policy execution, Grindle’s (1980, pp. 5-6) detailed 
definition of implementation as “an ongoing process of decision making by a 
variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content 
of the program being pursued and by the interaction of the decision makers 
within a given politico-administrative context” forms the basis for the 
analysis of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the 
DRC.20  
As elaborated on in the preceding sections, both fields of peace operations 
and public policy implementation consider similar issues as being of specific 
importance to analyse, yet from slightly different perspectives. Regarding 
peace operations, the content of the policies and their context sensitivity, as 
well as aspects of actor coordination, political will and ownership are 
identified as key issues. In the field of policy implementation, similar key 
issues are identified, namely the policy content and the associated aspect of 
discretion, actor interaction and the environment in which policies and 
programmes are implemented. Drawing together these key issues and 
interpreting implementation as policy execution, the analytical framework is 
constructed around the three aspects of policy content, actor interaction and 
implementation context. In the empirical analysis, these aspects will be 
scrutinized from the implementing actors’ understanding. Hence, by 
investigating the implementing actors’ understandings, I want to avoid what 
                                                                 
20 Goggin (1986) characterizes the implementation process in a similar vein as “an action-oriented 
phenomenon that (…) unfolds over time” (p. 332). Of specific importance, in terms of influencing the 
implementation process, Goggin highlights two relatively broad overarching themes, namely 1) the policy 
itself and 2) the setting in which the policy is executed, including the various actors involved in carrying out 
the policy. 
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O’Toole (2000) cautions against, namely “research performed in ignorance of 
the understanding that implementation actors themselves have about their 
circumstances is likely to miss important parts of the explanation for what 
happens” (p. 269). 
2.6.1 Policy Content 
In view of the aim to explore the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
execution of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo, the first 
building block of the analytical framework comprises the implementing 
actors’ understanding of the content of the policies to be implemented. The 
policy content includes both the policy standards and objectives, which are 
supposed to reveal more concrete aspects of the policy, and the policy 
approaches that are thought to translate the policy standards and objectives 
into more concrete projects. 
In the scholarly discussion on peace operations, it is highlighted that the 
objectives of policies are expected to be clear, appropriate and achievable (cf. 
Brahimi, 2000, p. 10; van der Lijn, 2009, p. 52). Goals defined in mission 
mandates should however also contain some flexibility to allow 
implementers to interpret and to adjust objectives depending on the local 
circumstances in which the policies are executed (cf. Karlsrud, 2013). 
Likewise, implementation scholars highlight the necessity of making the 
policy content concrete through elaboration of standards and objectives. 
Moving beyond the generality of the underlying legislative document, these 
standards and objectives are supposed to reveal more concrete aspects of the 
policy and to facilitate similar understandings and interpretations among 
implementing actors in the process of implementation (Van Meter & Van 
Horn, 1975, p. 466). Highlighted are thus aspects of clarity, consistency and 
specificity (Laurence J O'Toole, 1986, p. 189). At the same time, however, 
under the keyword discretion, a certain flexibility of the goals and procedures 
is specified as desirable to provide implementers with some room to 
manoeuvre in their daily activities aimed at the execution of policies and 
programmes (cf. Barrett, 2004; Linder & Peters, 1987; Lipsky, 2010). Both 
fields of peace operations and implementation thus agree on the significance 
of the policy content to be clearly defined, consistent and specific. In relation 
to the aspect of flexibility, both fields further discuss questions around the 
aspect of discretion. However, while the role of discretion has only rather 
recently been addressed in the context of peace operations, discretion has 
taken a more prominent role in implementation studies.  
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In the empirical analysis of the implementation of SSR and stabilization 
policies in the DRC, I will thus analyse the implementing actors’ 
understanding of the content of the policies they are expected to implement, 
including the policy’s standards and objectives and the policy approaches 
chosen to translate the standards and objectives into more concrete projects. 
Furthermore, I will pay attention to the implementing actors’ understanding 
of discretion.  
2.6.2 Actor Interaction 
In addition to the implementing actors’ understanding of the policy content, 
the interaction of the actors involved is considered the second building block 
for analysis of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the 
DR Congo (cf. Grindle, 1980, p. 5ff.). 
In the context of peace operations, actor interaction has initially been 
discussed predominantly with a rather narrow focus on coordination issues. 
In this regard, criticism has notably been raised regarding insufficient or 
altogether lacking coordination between the diverse actors involved. The 
focus was thereby mainly on coordination among the external interveners 
who are understood as the ones determining implementation (cf. de Coning, 
2007; Lurweg, 2011; Paris & Sisk, 2007). Aiming at broadening this focus, 
Barnett and Zuercher (2008, p. 25) examine interaction that takes place 
between external actors, state elites and sub-national elites. This form of 
interaction is described as strategic since goal achievement for each actor is 
considered dependent on the strategies and behaviour of the other two.  
In the context of implementation studies, aspects of interaction and 
negotiation both among implementing actors and between implementing 
actors and policy recipients became increasingly significant, following the 
spreading of bottom-up approaches to implementation (cf. Barrett, 1981, p. 
4). In this context, and as elaborated on earlier, Hjern and Porter (1981, p. 
211) advance the view of analysing implementation structures, consisting of 
parts of public and private organizations, which are understood as reflecting 
the dynamic and shifting social structures more accurately compared to a 
rather narrow focus on organizations per se. To learn more about the 
formation of such implementing structures in which actors interact, Elmore 
(1979, p. 612) suggests departing from a focus on what happens at the level 
of the policy recipients in any analysis. From there, factors understood as 
influencing any action and behaviour of the actors involved should then be 
carved out. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
43 
In the empirical analysis, I will thus explore the implementing actors’ 
understanding of interaction taking place during the execution of SSR and 
stabilization policies in the DRC. 
2.6.3 Implementation Context  
The third building block constituting the analysis of the implementation of 
SSR and stabilization in the DR Congo is the context in which 
implementation is pursued. The motivation to include the implementing 
actors’ understanding of the implementation context is based on the fact that 
conditions in the implementation context are considered as potentially 
affecting the implementing actors in their endeavours to execute policies and 
programmes (Grindle, 1980, p. 10; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 471). 
As elaborated on previously, context sensitivity, political will and 
ownership have been identified as key issues in the field of peace operations 
and can be subsumed under the header of implementation context. Context 
sensitivity is pointed out as calling for “society-specific expertise” and 
context-tailored strategies to avoid blueprint approaches to peace operations. 
To support rather than to supplant national and local actors in reform 
processes, international actors thus need to be knowledgeable about local 
circumstances (Call & Cousens, 2008, pp. 14-15). Furthermore, political 
elites’ opinions vis-à-vis the policies are highlighted as a determining factor 
in implementation since political elites in the receiving country are 
understood as bearing the ultimate responsibility for any reform processes. 
Hence, the political will is considered as playing a significant role regarding 
the implementation of peace operation policies (Riis Andersen & Engedal, 
2013, p. 239). In this context, repeatedly addressed in the literature are also 
the aspects of capacity and ownership. More concretely, an apparent lack of 
capacity on behalf of the government and unwillingness to take ownership is 
commonly viewed as a justification for implementation failures (cf. 
Chesterman, 2007; The World Bank, 2017). 
Similarly, in implementation studies, knowledge of the implementation 
context is considered inevitable for implementers to realize the standards and 
objectives outlined in public policies and programmes (cf. Barrett, 2004; Van 
Meter and Van Horn, 1975). To receive feedback and information, 
implementers are expected to be responsive to the policy recipients. Also, 
implementers are expected to be aware of the opinions that private interest 
groups, the public as well as political elites may have vis-à-vis the policies 
since these opinions can be supportive, dismissive or indifferent to the 
CHAPTER 2 
 44
policies and thus affect implementation. Support from political elites, the 
public in general and policy recipients is thus considered inevitable for 
achieving the goals set in the policy (Grindle, 1980, p. 13). 
In terms of implementation context, both fields of peace operations and 
public policy implementation highlight the availability of adequate financial, 
material and human resources. These resources are understood as shaping the 
general conditions under which policies and programmes are implemented. It 
is therefore assumed that the overall resources available within the 
implementing organization have to be sufficient, and an appropriate 
combination of resources has to be available at each stage of implementation 
(Hogwood & Gunn, 1984, p. 200). If only insufficient resources were 
available to implement oftentimes quite complex policies or programmes, 
implementers “could expect to face defeat” (Cleaves, 1980, p. 290). 
Similarly, inadequate availability of resources is commonly pointed out as a 
major challenge in the field of peace operations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; 
Thakur, 2005).  
In the empirical analysis of the implementation context, I will thus 
explore the implementing actors’ understanding of the aspect of context 
sensitivity, including the implementers’ understanding of the local 
circumstances. In this context, I will also explore the implementing actors’ 
understanding of those who are affected by the policies and focus on 
understandings of the aspects of political will, capacity and ownership. The 
implementing actors’ understanding on of the role of resources available will 
furthermore be scrutinized. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter was set up to first review and explore the theoretical discussions 
in the two policy fields of peace operations and policy implementation. Both 
areas of scholarship are considered as providing important analytical insights, 
aiming at exploring what emerges as peace operation policies are executed. 
In terms of policy content, both fields highlight the necessity that policy 
standards and objectives have to be clear, consistent and specific while they 
further have to allow for certain flexibility of goals and procedures (cf. van 
der Lijn, 2009; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Both strands of literature, 
albeit to a different degree, furthermore focus on the role adopted by and the 
relevancy of the various actors involved in policy implementation (Pouligny, 
2006; Scharpf, 1978; Sending, 2011). In implementation studies, 
implementers, so-called street-level bureaucrats, are pointed out as being of 
particular importance; moreover, under the keyword of discretion, the aspect 
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of policy flexibility has been directly linked to their daily activities (Lipsky, 
1971, 2010). Actor interaction is also recognized in both fields. While it is 
considered a key aspect constituting implementation in implementation 
studies, a narrower focus notably on coordination issues has been discussed 
in the literature on peace operations (cf. de Coning, 2007; Lurweg, 2011; 
Paris & Sisk, 2007). Finally, implementation studies highlight the importance 
of taking the context in which policies are implemented into account. Under 
the header of context sensitivity, this aspect has also been explored in studies 
on peace operations, most recently in discussions on the ‘local turn’ (Call & 
Cousens, 2008; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). 
Based on the understanding that the field of public policy implementation 
offers an interesting entry point for deepening our understanding of the 
implementation of peace operations and drawing on key issues identified in 
the respective debates as well as on Grindle’s (1980, pp. 5-6) definition of 
implementation, the analytical framework was constructed around the three 
aspects of policy content, actor interaction and the implementation context 
and will thus guide the analysis of the implementing actors’ understanding of 
the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo. 
In terms of the content, policies are expected to be clear, consistent, 
achievable, context specific and flexible. Regarding the aspect of flexibility, 
and under the header of discretion, it is understood as positive if 
implementers possess some room to manoeuvre in their daily activities aimed 
at policy execution. Since actor interaction is understood as another 
significant factor, the implementing actors’ understanding of interaction 
taking place at the stage of policy execution constitutes the second building 
block of the empirical analysis. Finally, regarding the implementation 
context, I will analyse the implementing actors’ understanding of prevailing 
conditions in the implementation environment, which is understood as 
impacting policy execution. 
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3 
3.Methodology and Methods 
 
In this chapter, which is divided into three main parts and a concluding 
discussion, I will elaborate on the methodology and methods used to examine 
the implementation of the international peace operations in the DR Congo.  
In the first section of the chapter, I will discuss and justify a few basic 
choices regarding the research design upon which this inquiry is based. This 
includes my decision to consider an in-depth single case study approach as 
the most suitable research design for the study of the implementation of 
peace operations. I will thus justify the selection of the implementation of the 
international peace operations in the DR Congo as the case to study and the 
selection of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies as the two 
sub-units of analysis.  
In the second section of the chapter, I will discuss aspects of data 
collection and material. I will thus elaborate on the data collection process, 
which resulted in 35 interviews conducted during two field research episodes 
in Goma, in October 2012, and in Kinshasa, in April 2013. In this context, I 
will highlight the advantages of conducting semi-structured interviews and 
illustrate the selection process of the interviewees targeted. Understood as 
complementing the interview material, I will further elaborate on the use of 
additional primary and secondary data. Hence, as it is common regarding in-
depth single case studies, multiple sources will be used in this study to gather 
evidence while the collection of data is not limited to a single method. I will 
furthermore elaborate on both practical and ethical challenges I was 
confronted with during my field work, notably in terms of the deteriorating 
security situation in Goma.  
Subsequently, in the third part of the chapter, I will illustrate the process 
of data analysis. This implies a discussion on the researcher’s ability to 
demonstrate the credibility of the findings. Hence, I will discuss aspects of 
reliability and validity, and I will further elaborate on the possibility to 
generalize from the findings presented in this inquiry. Finally, the chapter 
will be rounded off with a concluding discussion. 
CHAPTER 3 
 48
3.1 A Single Case Study: The Implementation of 
Peace Operations in the DRC 
An in-depth single case study approach is considered the most suitable 
research design aiming at gaining a deeper understanding of the 
implementation of peace operations. This choice is motivated by the fact that 
a case study approach allows the researcher to empirically investigate “a 
contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world 
context” (Yin, 2014, p. 16). The case thus connotes “a spatially delimited 
phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period 
of time” (Gerring, 2007, p. 19). Focusing on a single case enables me to also 
explore multiple perspectives rooted in a specific context (Lewis & 
McNaughton Nicholls, 2014, p. 66). In addition, unexpected aspects can be 
observed inductively (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 21; Stark & Torrance, 
2005). 
Regarding the case selection procedure, it is commonly stressed that the 
case to be studied has to be clearly identified and defined (cf. Yin, 2009, p. 
29). This definition should provide an answer to the question: what is the 
case? Moreover, it should be clarified what the chosen case of interest 
represents, in terms of a social phenomenon or a process to provide an 
answer to the question on: what is it a case of?  
Considering the puzzling knowledge-gap on what happens when peace 
operations are executed, the case upon which this study is built is the 
implementation of international peace operations in the DR Congo which is 
thereby considered as an exemplifying case of the international community’s 
long-term, continuously developing and diversifying commitment to 
implement increasingly complex peace operations worldwide. 
An exemplifying case can be selected based “upon a set of descriptive 
characteristics”, before probing for causal relationships (Bryman, 2012, p. 
70). To begin with, peace operation efforts in the DRC are carried out by a 
multitude of diverse actors, above all the United Nations. As early as in 1999, 
the UN established a peacekeeping mission that is still ongoing, and to this 
day the world’s largest peacekeeping mission with more than 20,000 
personnel provided by 55 countries (MONUSCO, 2017).21 Besides various 
UN agencies, such as UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR, a dazzling array of 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations have 
become active players in the DRC performing multiple tasks, either as joint 
                                                                 
21 Interestingly, most of the current peace operations, for instance, eight out of 16 UN peacekeeping missions, 
are deployed on the African continent; DPKO: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate, accessed 
2017-12-03. 
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efforts or individually. In this context, the mandate of MONUSCO, the UN 
stabilization mission, provides a framework for the international efforts in the 
DRC emphasizing the three priorities of protecting civilians, stabilizing the 
country, and supporting the Congolese government in its peace consolidation 
efforts (UN Security Council, 2017). 
Having decided on the single case study approach, one can either choose 
to apply a holistic or an embedded case study design (Yin, 2014, pp. 50-56). 
A holistic design is favourable if no sub-units of analysis can be identified or 
if the theory upon which the case study is built, is of a holistic nature (Yin, 
2009, p. 50). Having touched upon the variety of tasks performed by a huge 
number of actors involved over a long period of peace operation efforts in the 
DRC, it appears implausible to choose a holistic case-study design. Hence, to 
deepen the analysis and to focus the case study inquiry, I decided to apply an 
embedded case study design. The inclusion of sub-units thus enables me to 
analyse data both within and between the sub-units before relating those 
findings back to the overarching case which will be better illustrated. The 
two sub-units of analysis selected for this inquiry comprise the international 
support to SSR as well as to stabilization, which will be explored in more 
detail in the following section.  
3.1.1 Security Sector Reform and Stabilization 
Security sector reform and stabilization are identified as key aspects of 
contemporary peace operations. At the same time, critique is raised that both 
policy areas remain insufficiently studied, notably regarding aspects of 
practice and implementation. This inquiry therefore intends to contribute 
empirical knowledge on the stage of policy implementation, focusing on 
what happens when SSR and stabilization policies are executed.  
The motivation to choose SSR and stabilization as the two sub-units of 
analysis is thus based on several aspects. To begin with, both SSR and 
stabilization have become critical elements, in terms of international peace 
interventions (Mobekk, 2009, p. 237; Muggah, 2014c). As elaborated on in 
chapter 2.1, following UNSC Resolution 2086(2013), support for national 
SSR initiatives has become an explicit part of multidimensional UN peace 
operations (ibid. paragraph 8). Although stabilization, in contrast to SSR, is 
not explicitly mentioned, the resolution’s silence on the relationship between 
democratic governance and lasting peace has been interpreted as a likely shift 
from conflict transformation to stabilization (cf. Riis Andersen & Engedal, 
2013, p. 21). 
CHAPTER 3 
 50
Both policy fields of SSR and stabilization are furthermore understood as 
being closely linked to and affecting each other. While stabilization 
operations are typically launched in zones characterized by ongoing conflict, 
SSR activities are instead implemented in post-conflict situations. Hence, 
“SSR should follow stabilization as a logical sequence at the strategic level” 
(Fitz-Gerald, 2010, p. 159). Progress achieved in terms of stabilization 
operations is thus understood as directly influencing the range of SSR 
activities to follow. In practice however, stabilization approaches and 
activities to support SSR tend to overlap since problems in the security 
sector, for instance, regarding the armed forces, must commonly be tackled 
already during the phase of stabilization. Moreover, both policy fields share 
several common features. Expertise in the areas of diplomacy, development 
and defence is, for instance, needed in both SSR and stabilization. 
Furthermore, both fields are part of the wider state-building agenda and play 
an increasingly critical though insufficiently studied role in terms of peace 
operations (ibid). 
Differences between the two policy fields nevertheless prevail, for 
example regarding time frames, tasks and responsibilities. This creates 
sufficient diversity to focus on both SSR and stabilization as sub-cases of the 
broader peace operations efforts in the DRC. While SSR implies long-term 
strategies constituting a more holistic process focusing on governance aspects 
and including the engagement with key actors at ministries, legislatures and 
civil society (Fitz-Gerald, 2010, p. 163), stabilization operations usually have 
a short-term focus including diverse approaches ranging from counter-
insurgency operations and protection of safe areas to the building of roads 
(ibid. 162). The two sub-units of analysis of SSR and stabilization as part of 
the broader peace operations are thus understood as sharing some common 
features. At the same time, they are nevertheless diverse enough to account 
for discrete sub-units of the broader case (Yin, 2009, p. 50). 
Focusing more specifically on security sector reform, it has been 
identified as one of the most important challenges for the Congolese 
authorities since the end of the Congo Wars in 2002 since it plays a key role 
in the country’s overall reconstruction efforts.22 Many of the international 
actors involved in the broader peace operation efforts, such as the UN, the 
EU as well as several nation-states have thus become involved in SSR efforts 
considered as an essential component of the state-building initiatives aiming 
at strengthening democratic principles, state legitimacy and governance in the 
                                                                 
22 For a detailed overview of the role and embodiment of SSR applied in different contexts, including the 
developmental, the post-authoritarian and the post-conflict context, see Hänggi, H. (2004). "Conceptualising 
Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction". In: A. Bryden and H. Hänggi. Reform and Reconstruction of the 
Security Sector. Münster: Lit Verlag, pp. 5-6. 
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Congo (More & Price, 2010, p. 6). Until today, however, progress regarding 
the reform of the Congolese security sector remains insufficient (cf. Dixon, 
2012, p. 30). 
In the academic debate on SSR, a critical examination of the factors 
explaining the process and outcome of SSR has so far however been missing. 
Identified is thus “an important gap between research on the principles and 
norms of SSR on the one hand, and studies of the practice and 
implementation phases of SSR on the other hand, with the latter being 
understudied” (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012, p. 145). This 
implies that coherent SSR strategies as well as instruments to implement SSR 
activities have not yet been identified, although SSR initiatives have 
increasingly become integrated parts of peace operations. While national and 
international authorities are confronted with these challenges and dilemmas 
in supporting SSR in all parts of the world, they become clearly observable in 
the DRC (Justaert & Keukeleire, 2010; Spence & Fluri, 2008).  
Given the overarching aim of this inquiry, which is formulated as to 
investigate the implementation of peace operations in the DRC, this study 
thus focuses on the international SSR efforts aiming at supporting the 
Congolese government in its activities to provide security more effectively 
and more efficiently and to increase justice. Hence, the first sub-unit of 
analysis regarding SSR is limited to activities implemented by the 
international community in support of the Congolese government. 
Based on the quickly increasing significance of stabilization despite the 
concept’s novelty and the fact that stability operations are still a rather new 
category to respond to so-called fragile, failed or collapsed states, the 
international support for stabilization, consolidated under the ISSSS, has 
been selected as the second sub-unit of analysis (cf. Riis Andersen & 
Engedal, 2013). Exploring the implementation of stabilization policies in the 
DR Congo, with an explicit focus on the first phase of stabilization between 
2008 and 2012, offers an interesting case to study. First, little research has so 
far generally dealt with the policy, the practice and potential outcomes of 
stabilization strategies and their relation to peace- and state building efforts.23 
Second, stabilization efforts under the ISSSS have been introduced into an 
ongoing UN peacekeeping operation for the first time, thus, modifying the 
mission’s focus towards stabilization. Third, the ISSSS is furthermore an 
                                                                 
23 A very interesting analysis in this regard is the edited volume by Muggah, R. (ed.) (2014). Stabilization 
Operations, Security and Development: States of Fragility. London: Routledge. For a focus on stabilization in 
the context of the DR Congo, see: de Vries, H. (2015). Going around in Circles. The Challenges of 
Peacekeeping and Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Hague: Clingendael; or from a 
practitioner’s perspective: Quick, I. D. (2015). Follies in Fragile States. How International Stabilisation 
Failed in the Congo. London: Double Loop. 
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attempt to unite an array of different actors sharing the objective of 
supporting stabilization since stabilization efforts in the DRC, despite having 
become part of MONUSCO, are not exclusively implemented by UN actors 
and entities (Froitzheim, 2014, pp. 190-191).  
Finally, a few words on the temporal boundaries of the case are needed. 
While temporal boundaries must be assumed, Gerring (2007, p. 19) observes 
that they are oftentimes less apparent compared to the spatial case 
boundaries. Focusing on the inquiry at hand, I deliberately decided to 
determine the space of time from 2008 to 2012 as constituting the temporal 
boundaries. During this period, the first phase of the ISSSS was 
implemented. This specific period is thus understood as providing 
appropriate and somewhat natural temporal boundaries for the study of 
stabilization as one of the two sub-units of analysis. In terms of the 
international efforts in support of the reform of the Congolese security sector, 
there are no such clear temporal boundaries given. However, one can assert 
that support for SSR accelerated during the first phase of the ISSSS. This 
becomes, for instance, visible regarding the increasing EU engagement, in 
terms of the two by then ongoing EU missions of EUPOL RD Congo and 
EUSEC RD Congo. Notably, EUPOL became fully operational from 2008 
onwards following the extension of the mission’s area of operations from 
Kinshasa to other parts of the Congo in 2007. Since SSR and stabilization 
efforts are understood as being interdependent, it appears consequential, in 
view of the purpose of this study, to apply the same temporal boundaries to 
the two sub-units of analysis and thus, to the broader case of the 
implementation of the international peace operations in the DRC. 
3.2 Data Collection and Material 
As Yin (2014) highlights, case study inquiry is characterized by the existence 
of “many more variables of interest than data points” (p. 17). This implies 
that case study inquiry relies “on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion.” Moreover, data collection 
and analysis are facilitated if theoretical propositions have been elaborated 
prior to this (ibid.). In terms of data collection, semi-structured interviews 
constitute the main primary source for this inquiry and will be discussed in-
depth in the next section. Additionally, I resort to an extensive amount of 
secondary literature on peace operations, in general, and on international 
interventions in the DRC, in particular, including the two policy fields of 
SSR and stabilization. I will thus exemplify how other primary and 
secondary sources are included in the analysis. I will also elaborate on 
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challenges I was confronted with during the field work, notably regarding the 
difficulty of conducting research in Goma in fall 2012 due to the by-then 
ongoing M23 rebellion throughout the province of North Kivu.  
3.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
As a general benefit of conducting interviews, Rubin and Rubin (2005) 
highlight that interviews allow the researcher to “talk to those who have 
knowledge of or experience with the problem of interest” (p. 3). Through 
such interviews, researchers are thus enabled to “explore in detail the 
experiences, motives, and opinions of others and learn to see the world from 
perspectives other than their own” (ibid.). Based on my interest in the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the implementation of SSR and 
stabilization policies in the DRC, conducting interviews with implementing 
actors is considered the most promising way to gain first-hand insight into 
the complex process of policy implementation. 
The interviews conducted were of a semi-structured nature. As the name 
suggests, semi-structured interviews are something in-between structured and 
unstructured interviews. Unstructured interviews are oftentimes started by the 
interviewer asking a single question before allowing the interviewee to 
respond freely. In the conversation that is then developing, the interviewer 
basically picks up points of interest that he or she would like to follow up 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 470). Structured interviews, in contrast, are predominantly 
applied in quantitative research. They are designed to both “maximize the 
reliability and validity of measurement of key concepts” and to provide 
answers to a specific set of research questions (ibid.). Aiming at gaining a 
better understanding of the implementation of peace operation policies 
through the implementers’ understanding of the policy content, actor 
interaction taking place, and the implementation context, a semi-structured 
approach was chosen to ascertain that those specific aspects were covered in 
the interviews. In practical terms, this implied that I had an interview guide, 
which consisted of a list of questions and topics that I wanted to cover in the 
interview. The interview guide was derived from the analytical framework, 
which was developed following the theoretical discussions on peace 
operations and public policy implementation. Furthermore, I chose a flexible 
interview structure to be able to raise and look more in depth at certain issues 
and to adapt the content of the interview to the individual interviewee and the 
course of the interview. This allowed me to further probe and explore 
responses as well as to ask questions in an order that suited the interviewee 
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most (Bryman, 2012, p. 471; Yeo et al., 2014, p. 184). To be able to relate the 
responses to each other, I made sure to pose the questions in a similar 
wording throughout all interviews conducted. 
Based on the assumption that implementing actors play a decisive though 
understudied role in peace operations, I take an actor-oriented approach 
aiming at exploring the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the DRC. Hence, being 
interested in understandings voiced by implementing actors, the interviewees 
for this study were purposively selected. Purposive sampling, implies to 
sample participants “in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to 
the research questions that are being posed” (Bryman, 2012, p. 418). 
Broadly speaking, I will focus on external interveners being responsible 
for the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies. Based on the 
understanding that the site of implementation is dictated by the content of a 
policy (Grindle, 1980, p. 9; Matland, 1995), implementers can generally be 
located at different levels. Since the implementation of SSR and stabilization 
is not bound to a specific administrative level, I deliberately decided not to 
focus on either the capital- or the field level but interviewed actors in 
Kinshasa as well as Goma. At these two levels, thus, I targeted four broader 
categories of implementers: UN Officials (MONUSCO staff, representatives 
of UN agencies and people working for the Stabilization Support Unit), EU 
officials (EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo mission staff and 
representatives of the EU Delegation), nation state representatives (embassy 
staff) and staff of local and international non-governmental organizations. 
While most of these implementers can be based either at capital-level, where 
most headquarters are located, or in corresponding field offices, regular 
embassy staff and members of the EU Delegation are exclusively based in the 
capital. Furthermore, I interviewed staff from a Congolese research institute 
and one EU Official based in Kigali, Rwanda. 
Focusing on actors based at field level, I deliberately decided to focus on 
implementers working in Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu. Several 
aspects motivate this choice: To begin with, MONUSCO has a large presence 
in Goma. It is also the base of the Stabilization Support Unit (SSU), which is 
directly responsible for the implementation of the ISSSS. In addition, the two 
EU SSR missions, EUPOL and EUSEC RD Congo, had mission antennas in 
Goma, and basically all major local and international NGOs have field 
offices in the provincial capital. In short, and apart from the capital city of 
Kinshasa, Goma has the highest density of international actors implementing 
SSR and stabilization policies in the DRC. 
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In the process of identifying potential interviewees, I benefitted from 
previous research, in terms of contacts that I had already established with 
international actors based in Goma. Colleagues in academia also supported 
me to establish contact with both capital- and field-based implementers. 
Besides my own efforts to purposively select respondents, during the 
interviews, I further asked whether the interviewee could provide me with 
other contacts of interest in relation to my research project. This approach 
proved to be worthwhile in both Kinshasa and Goma and enabled me to 
interview actors holding different positions regarding the implementation of 
SSR and stabilization policies. 
In contrast to the identification of actors implementing SSR, identifying 
potential interviewees working on stabilization proved to be more 
challenging since different actors are involved in each of the five objectives 
outlined in the ISSSS (United Nations, 2009, p. 2). These actors can vary 
from military and police personnel to diplomats, development experts and 
humanitarian workers (Muggah, 2014b, p. 57). In this context, I managed to 
interview implementing actors, focusing on stabilization at both Kinshasa- 
and Goma-level, working for MONUSCO, the SSU and different UN 
entities, such as the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHABITAT and the United Nations 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as well as for international NGOs. 
Similarly, in terms of actors exclusively implementing SSR, I targeted UN 
Officials notably within MONUSCO as well as staff working for the two EU 
SSR missions, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo.  
Both in the capital and in Goma, several interviewees worked with the 
implementation of SSR as well as stabilization. In Kinshasa, these 
interviewees were notably diplomats based in national embassies and staff 
working for the EU Delegation to the DRC. In Goma, I was also able to 
interview staff of the EU Delegation as well as of several national embassies, 
who were, due to the specific interest in the Kivu provinces, based 
temporarily ‘on mission’ in Goma.24  
Besides experiencing typical interview situations, I also met some 
implementers, notably in Kinshasa, more informally. The information 
gathered during these meetings will further inform the empirical analysis. 
Moreover, I can resort to interview material collected during two previous 
field trips to North and South Kivu in 2010. While this material does not 
explicitly deal with the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
implementation of SSR and stabilization policies, it nevertheless provides me 
                                                                 
24 While it is not permitted to have regular embassy staff based permanently outside the capital, such 
temporary solutions of seconding staff ‘on mission’ to Goma seems to be permitted. 
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with valuable background information, notably regarding the EU’s role as a 
security actor in the DRC. 
Following this sampling approach, I conducted 35 semi-structured 
interviews. Out of these interviews, 19 interviews were conducted in 2012. 
Eighteen of the interviewees were based in Goma, North Kivu, and one in 
Kigali, Rwanda. The remaining 16 interviews were conducted in Kinshasa in 
April 2013.25 The length of the interviews varied between 30 and 90 minutes. 
In this context, one may ask why 35 interviews were conducted, and not 
more or less. One could further question whether these 35 interviews 
provided me with enough data to follow my research aim. According to 
Seidman (2006, p. 55), two criteria can be highlighted which establish 
whether ‘enough’ interviews were conducted, namely sufficiency and 
saturation. To begin with, sufficiency refers to the aspect of whether the 
number of interviews conducted is sufficient “to reflect the range of 
participants and the sites that make up the population” (ibid.). Based on the 
focus of this study, I primarily targeted implementing actors being directly 
involved in the implementation of SSR and/or stabilization under the ISSSS. 
As elaborated above and as listed in the Appendix, I included actors at 
capital- and field level, having different backgrounds and working for 
different agencies and authorities. Hence, the sample for this study is rather 
varied, including informants possessing a wide range of expertise and 
responsibilities at different levels. Hence, in view of the study’s aim and 
purposes, the sample is considered sufficient. Focusing on the second 
criterion, the saturation of information, I argue that this point was reached 
when there was no longer much variety in the responses received and when 
the themes taken up by implementing actors kept repeating themselves. This 
became, for example, obvious when the lack of clarity, understood as leaving 
room for diverging understandings, was once again brought up by 
interviewees who were asked about their understanding of the content of SSR 
and stabilization policies (see Chapter five). In short, the point of saturation 
was reached when I did not learn anything new or remarkable from the 
interviews. 
In terms of language, 29 interviews were conducted in English, four in 
French and one in German. Since neither French nor English is my mother 
tongue, I am aware of the eventuality that the interviews may have been 
                                                                 
25 Out of the 18 interviews conducted in Goma, three interviewees worked exclusively on SSR and eight on 
stabilization. Seven interviewees focused on both SSR and stabilization policies. Two of the interviewees were 
diplomats; five were EU Officials, eight worked for the UN, two for international NGOs and one informant 
worked at a Congolese research institute. Of the 16 capital-based interviewees, four focused exclusively on 
SSR, four on stabilization and eight were involved in both policy areas. Four of the Kinshasa-based 
interviewees were diplomats, six worked for the European Union, five for the UN and one for an international 
NGO. 
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influenced by language. It may have furthermore led to inevitable 
misunderstandings. Hence, being aware of this challenge, I tried to verify 
potentially unclear aspects either still during the interview or directly 
afterwards to minimize the risk of misunderstandings. 
Throughout the thesis, all interviewees are anonymised; the only 
information provided regarding the interviewee is the interviewee’s employer 
as well as the place and date of the interview. I deliberately made this 
decision since interviewees were consistently sceptical about expressing their 
thoughts and understandings on tape. Especially in Goma, the number of 
people working on SSR and stabilization is very limited. Interviewees thus 
voiced their concerns that they may lose their job if any statements could be 
traced back to them. Several actors nevertheless offered for me to tape the 
interview but that the recording would imply that they would basically repeat 
the content of official documents instead of elaborating on their own 
understandings. Following my research interest underlying this inquiry, I thus 
deliberately decided to not record any conversation and to anonymise all 
interviewees throughout the thesis. Bearing in mind that unrecorded 
interviews pose specific demands on the interviewer and that information 
may potentially be misinterpreted or even get lost, I made sure to write 
detailed interview reports immediately after the interview to reduce the 
probability of missing important aspects.  
3.2.2 Primary and Secondary Sources of Data 
As discussed above, the semi-structured interviews conducted with 
implementing actors in both Kinshasa and Goma constitute the main source 
of data. This decision to build the analysis predominantly on the interview 
data is motivated by the underlying interest in investigating the 
implementation of peace operations through the implementing actors’ 
understanding. Other primary and secondary sources are nevertheless 
included in the research to complement the empirical material collected 
throughout the interviews. Combining my own empirical data with other 
primary and secondary sources thus allows me to present a substantial image 
of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo. 
In terms of primary sources, I will resort to different types of official 
documents. These include, amongst others, legal documents, such as the UN 
Security Council Resolutions authorizing MONUSCO, and Council 
Decisions as well as Joint Actions establishing the EU SSR missions in the 
DRC. In addition, press releases and more general policy documents will be 
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analysed. The latter include, for instance, reports, communications and 
strategy papers from the UN Security Council, the European Commission, 
the Council of the European Union or individual nation states.  
The motivation to include these primary sources is based on several 
aspects: To begin with, the data derived from primary sources provide 
important information on the specific policies the international community 
has formulated to support transition in the DR Congo. These data are thus 
understood as providing me with essential information for conducting 
informed interviews. Being interested in, for example, the implementing 
actors’ understanding of the content of policies and programmes targeted at 
SSR and stabilization, it is of utmost importance to know how the policies 
are formulated, which goals they set out to achieve and how they are 
embedded in the overall strategies. In short, I have to look into the official 
language behind the various policies before being able to dig into the 
implementers’ understanding of them. In the empirical analysis of the 
interviews, this knowledge will then allow me to classify data derived from 
the interviews, for instance, the implementing actors’ understanding of policy 
standards and objectives (cf. chapter 6.1) in relation to the standards and 
objectives as officially specified. 
In addition to the interview data and primary sources, the research is 
based on secondary sources, such as the continuously growing scholarly 
literature on peace operations in the DR Congo. These published sources 
have been used as sources of evidence to support the case selection and case 
description. In addition, they complement the data collected throughout the 
interviews as well as validate claims made by the interviewees. In this regard, 
I investigated, for example, whether other scholars had experienced similar or 
different understandings in relation to the international peace operations in 
the DRC. The data derived from secondary sources are furthermore used to 
fill gaps regarding aspects that I did not manage to cover sufficiently during 
the interviews or in cases where I was not able to talk in person to specific 
implementing actors. The works published by several scholars and 
practitioners, which are based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork or even 
direct involvement in the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies, 
further provide me with valuable in-depth knowledge of the situation in the 
DRC (cf. Autesserre, 2010, 2012, 2014; Quick, 2015).26  
While these primary and secondary sources contribute extremely valuable 
data to the first-hand empirical material collected during the interviews, I am 
aware that secondary sources are always interpretations and analyses made 
                                                                 
26 Not least due to limitations based on time and financial resources but also based on my role as an ‘outside’ 
researcher, I would not have been able to acquire such in-depth knowledge by myself. 
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by other scholars. Throughout the thesis, I will thus consistently reflect upon 
and validate the claims made and the understandings expressed in these 
additional sources. 
3.2.3 Challenges connected to Field Work 
Conducting field work in conflict areas has increasingly been discussed, in 
terms of potential ethical, methodological and practical challenges (see, for 
example, Goodhand, 2000, p. 12). In terms of ethical challenges, researchers 
are urged to stick to a ‘do no harm’ approach. This approach demands that 
interviewees give their informed consent to the research project, that 
politically sensitive data is protected, and that the researcher makes a 
conscious decision on the material published (Wood, 2006, p. 379). 
Methodological challenges are oftentimes related to sampling procedures. 
Since populations in conflict environments are commonly marginalized and 
attitudes of distrust and suspicion are prevalent, collecting data can become 
problematic (Cohen & Arieli, 2011, p. 423).  
Based on the focus of this study, and as elaborated on above, I primarily 
aimed at conducting interviews with international actors being involved in 
the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies. The actors I targeted 
were thus not as such shaped by the conflict environment. Nevertheless, and 
as mentioned in the preceding section, notably field-based interviewees were 
concerned about being potentially identifiable due to the limited number of 
actors working on SSR and stabilization in Goma. To guarantee that none of 
my interviewees would get into difficulties, I deliberately decided to 
anonymise all actors interviewed in any publication.  
Further challenges I was confronted with during my field work were of a 
more practical nature. During the first period of field work, conducted in 
Goma in October 2012, I experienced a very specific situation in which the 
M23, a Congolese rebel group, had taken over large parts of the province of 
North Kivu. While I was staying in Goma, it was reported that the M23 were 
advancing towards the town, which they finally captured in mid-November. 
Due to seemingly random grenade attacks and huge numbers of Congolese 
soldiers that had fled from the M23 to seek shelter in town, the situation in 
Goma was very unstable. This situation had two different impacts on my 
field research. First, instead of staying for more than a month, I deliberately 
decided to stay for only about two weeks. Although I had been to Goma 
before during two previous field trips, this very specific situation in 2012 
made me feel uncomfortable and insecure. Specifically, it meant that I was 
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not allowed to leave the hotel on my own but always had to have a driver.27 
Second, the accessibility of interviewees was somewhat limited, notably 
regarding more informal meetings. I was unable to join social gatherings 
during the evenings if any were taking place and not cancelled following the 
curfew introduced for international actors. As experienced in previous 
periods of field research, my aim was to get more background information on 
the implementing actors’ understanding of their daily work activities in 
eastern DRC and to be able to discuss preliminary findings through 
conversations in rather informal settings. 
In sum, the specific context of widespread instability in the province of 
North Kivu, specifically in Goma in late 2012, had an influence on the length 
of my research stay and thus, the number of interviews conducted, the choice 
of interviewees and the collection of information beyond the typical 
interview situation. As discussed under the header of saturation, I 
nevertheless argue that the data collected provided me with sufficient 
material to carry out the study as planned. 
In contrast to my research stay in Goma, the challenges I experienced in 
Kinshasa were of a different nature. Although I also needed to have a driver, 
my stay there was not affected by ongoing conflict. In Kinshasa, however, it 
was much more difficult to schedule interviews with implementing actors. 
While implementers in Goma seemed to appreciate that I, in my role as a 
researcher, had come to eastern Congo to find out more about their 
understandings of policy implementation, capital-based actors were much 
more tied up with their daily routines and countless meetings. The biggest 
challenge in Kinshasa was thus to convince implementing actors to make 
time available for interviews. Since the number of implementing actors in 
Kinshasa, compared to Goma, is however considerably higher, I had a larger 
pool of potential interviewees to contact. I thus managed to collect the data 
desired by interviewing a sufficient number of different implementers. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
In this inquiry, and as elaborated on before, I take an interpretative approach 
aiming at providing an interpretation of the implementing actors’ 
understanding of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the 
DRC. The analysis is thereby driven and guided by the theoretical 
foundations and the analytical framework, which draws upon discussions 
                                                                 
27 Due to security concerns, the very friendly staff of the Ishango Guesthouse I stayed at would not even allow 
me to buy water at a neighbour’s place. Instead, they offered to do my shopping. 
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from the two policy fields of peace operations and policy implementation. In 
terms of data analysis, I will apply a substantive approach, which means that 
I am predominantly interested in “capturing and interpreting meanings in the 
data, focusing on what the text says”(Spencer, Ritchie, Ormston, O'Connor, 
& Barnard, 2014, p. 272). This approach stands in contrast to structural 
approaches, including discourse analysis, where the researcher’s interest is to 
explore what the text does, thus, focusing on language or on how the talk is 
constructed and structured (ibid.). 
The analysis of data is based on the interview protocols, on more general 
field notes and background information. As stated in the preceding section, 
data from other primary and secondary sources is furthermore factored into 
the analysis. In terms of the formal process of data analysis, I will first 
familiarize myself with the empirical material from the interviews as well as 
the other primary and secondary sources. Second, I will interpret and analyse 
the data in order to identify the main findings from the research (Spencer et 
al., 2014, p. 279).  
To begin with, I will carefully read the interviews to familiarize myself 
with the thoughts and statements of the different implementing actors. I will 
then organize the implementing actors’ understandings, according to the three 
analytical themes: policy content, interaction taking place between the 
various actors involved and the implementation context. By doing so, 
similarities and differences in the implementing actors’ understandings will 
be highlighted and explored. Building upon this, I will analyse the 
interviewees’ responses to identify the main findings. More specifically, I 
will try to show similarities and differences in the interviewees’ responses 
regarding the different themes. I will also explore whether and to what extent 
the implementing actors’ understandings vary. Direct quotations will be 
carefully selected and embedded in the text to provide important pieces of 
evidence and to support claims. Simultaneously, I will resort to the primary 
and secondary sources, to both complement the interview material and to 
validate or challenge claims made by the interviewees.  
Throughout the process of data analysis, the empirical findings will be 
used to refine and to develop the analytical framework further. As 
appropriate, I will furthermore provide space and explore findings, which are 
derived from the empirical material but as such not incorporated in the 
analytical framework. In a similar vein, I will elaborate on whether aspects 
highlighted in the analytical framework are not retrievable from the empirical 
data.  
As far as the value of the research is concerned, treated as essential is the 
researcher’s ability to demonstrate the credibility of the findings. In this 
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context, the aspects of reliability and validity are commonly addressed. In 
short, reliability is concerned with the “replicability of scientific findings”, 
while validity is concerned with the “accuracy of scientific findings” 
(LeCompte & Goetz, 1982, p. 32). 
Reliability, to begin with, basically requires that a researcher who applies 
the same methods can obtain the same results as those of a prior study. The 
goal of reliability is thus “to minimize the errors and biases in a study” (Yin, 
2009, p. 45). A 
However, as LeCompte and Goetz (1982, p. 35) rightly observe, this can pose 
a “herculean problem” for researchers studying unique or complex 
phenomena. It is, for instance, understandably viewed as impossible to 
“freeze” a social setting and/or the circumstances of an initial study that 
would allow for replicability at a later stage (Bryman, 2012, p. 390). In this 
context, Yin (2009, p. 45) proposes to approach and limit the reliability 
problem by making as many steps of the research process as operational as 
possible. More specifically, this implies “to conduct research as if someone 
were always looking over your shoulder” (ibid.). As far as reliability is 
concerned in this study, I will throughout the thesis reveal the methods 
applied and the materials used. Furthermore, I have securely saved the 
interview reports. Nevertheless, I am aware of several aspects that impact on 
the study’s reliability. The very specific situation of ongoing rebellion in 
North Kivu at the time of my field work is, for instance, expected to have 
influenced the interviewees and their understandings at that specific point in 
time and thus the data collected from the interviews. My conscious decision 
to not record the interviews, forming the bulk of the empirical data, and to 
anonymize the interviewees is further understood as limiting the study’s 
reliability since this makes it more difficult for other researchers to repeat the 
procedures and thus to verify my data through arriving at similar results. 
Nonetheless, these delimitations have been deliberately accepted since this 
research, with its specific aim, would have basically been impossible to 
conduct otherwise. Yet, I would nevertheless argue that someone who is 
well-prepared and has an in-depth understanding of the aims of this research 
could travel to the same places and would probably get sufficiently similar 
responses when interviewing implementing actors. 
In addition to questions of reliability, questions of internal and external 
validity are considered crucial throughout the process of data analysis. 
According to Cresswell (2009), validity generally establishes “whether the 
findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participants, 
or the readers of an account” (p. 191).  
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Internal validity, more specifically, refers to the question of whether the 
research results have precisely addressed the research questions (Somekh & 
Lewin, 2005, p. 349). In other words, it challenges whether “you are 
observing, identifying or measuring what you say you are” (Mason, 1996, p. 
24). While it is not self-evident to choose the three themes of the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the policy content, interaction taking 
place and the implementation context, these three aspects have been distilled 
from the theoretical discussions in the two fields of peace operations and 
public policy implementation. Thus, aiming at providing answers to the 
underlying research question on how the implementation of peace operations 
is understood by implementing actors, investigating their understanding of 
the policy content, actor interaction and the implementation context is 
understood as yielding the intended results. 
To increase validity, multiple sources of evidence were used in this study. 
Through triangulation, which allows for a cross-check of the research 
findings through the use of “more than one method or source of data in the 
study of a social phenomenon” (Bryman, 2012, p. 717), evidence from the 
interviews, such as the interviewee’s understandings of the policy content, 
was thus set in relation to evidence from both primary and secondary sources, 
such as perspectives presented in official policy statements and scholarly 
work on peace operations. Moreover, informal meetings with implementing 
actors were used to probe into whether my interpretations of understandings 
voiced in the official interviews were comprehensible and shared. To discuss 
and enhance the accuracy of the research, I have furthermore repeatedly 
presented my (preliminary) findings at academic conferences and 
workshops.28 At the same time, following the overarching aim of this thesis, 
the objective is not to reach an objective and shared ‘truth’. Instead, the 
intention is to learn more about the implementing actors’ individual 
understanding of the implementation process. 
Of further interest regarding the study at hand is the aspect of external 
validity, which questions whether the results of a study can be generalized 
beyond the specific research context (Bryman, 2012, p. 47). In this context, 
Yin (2014) suggests to distinguish between analytical and statistical 
generalization. While the latter makes an inference about “a population (or a 
universe) based on empirical data collected from a sample of that universe” 
                                                                 
28 A book chapter on the implementation of the ISSSS in eastern DRC is for instance the outcome of a 
conference in Zurich, Switzerland, in 2012, where I presented and discussed the preliminary findings of my 
previous field work in Goma. See: Froitzheim, M. (2014). The Democratic Republic of Congo: A Laboratory 
for International Peace Operations. In T. Tardy & M. Wyss (Eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa. The Evolving 
Security Architecture (pp. 190–207). London and New York: Routledge. 
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(p. 40), analytical generalization implies to think of a case as “the opportunity 
to shed empirical light about some theoretical concepts or principles” (ibid.). 
Given the overarching aim and the research design of this thesis, my goal 
is not to generalize statistically. The case study method, however, allows me 
to generalize from the specific level of this case study to a more general 
theoretical level. The aim of the analytical framework developed in this thesis 
is thus to provide an approach that enables the exploration of the 
implementing actors’ understanding of policy implementation in the context 
of international peace operations. While the framework applied in this thesis 
serves the aim to study the implementers’ understanding of the 
implementation of SSR and stabilization policies as part of the broader 
international peace operations in the DRC, the framework is not bound to this 
specific case. I thus argue that the framework can possibly be applied more 
widely to also increase our understanding of the implementation of peace 
operations in other parts of the world. In addition to the applicability of the 
framework, I argue that the peace operations in the DRC, as the case chosen, 
may also be representative of other peace operations deployed worldwide. 
Hence, some of the more specific findings may not only be valid in the 
specific context of the international peace operations in the DRC. Of course, 
to increase validity, the framework has to be applied to other cases and 
developed further. This thesis should thus primarily be understood as a first 
step towards the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the 
implementation of peace operations by the international community in third 
countries. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I elaborated on the methods applied relating to the empirical 
ambitions of this study, that is, the analysis of the implementing actors’ 
understanding of the implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo. 
This chapter thus started with a discussion of my decision to consider an 
in-depth single case study approach as the most suitable research design for 
this inquiry. In this context, the implementation of the international peace 
operations in the DR Congo was identified as the case to study. Since an 
embedded case-study design is considered more useful relating to the aim of 
this inquiry, I further elaborated on my choice to identify the implementation 
of SSR and stabilization policies as two sub-units of analysis, aiming at 
focusing the case study inquiry. While both policies are more and more often 
identified as key aspects of contemporary peace operations, notably the 
implementation of SSR and stabilization remains insufficiently studied. This 
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inquiry is therefore set up to deepen our understanding of what happens when 
SSR and stabilization policies as part of international peace operations are 
executed. 
Following this discussion, I elaborated on the process of collecting 
empirical data. While semi-structured interviews primarily conducted in 
Goma in 2012 and in Kinshasa in 2013 clearly form the bulk of the data, 
other primary and secondary sources are included in the analysis to 
supplement and validate the empirical information derived from the semi-
structured interviews. Hence, the evidence is built upon multiple sources, and 
the process of data collection, as it is common regarding in-depth single case 
studies, was not limited to a single method. Moreover, the chapter 
investigated challenges faced during the field work. Specifically, my research 
period in Goma, in fall 2012, was characterized by a situation of increased 
insecurity due to the by-then ongoing M23 rebellion. Finally, the formal 
process of data analysis was targeted. Apart from illustrating how I 
familiarized myself with the material before interpreting and analyzing it, I 
further elaborated on questions of reliability and validity and discussed in this 
context the issue of generalizability. 
In the following chapter, which is mainly informed by secondary sources, 
I will provide some background knowledge on the history of war and conflict 
in the DR Congo. More specifically, I will elaborate on the international 
response to tackle these crises by focusing on the international efforts 
regarding SSR and stabilization. The chapter thus aims at providing 
knowledge to readers who are not particularly familiar with the Congolese 
context. It also aims at situating the subsequent analysis of the implementing 
actors’ understanding of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies 
in the DRC. 
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4.Background: Responses to War and 
Conflict in the Congo 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (…) is a leading laboratory of civil wars. 
Since it became independent on 30 June 1960, secessions, insurrections, 
rebellions, mutinies, invasions (…), revolts, and ethnic wars have been part of the 
political landscape of the DRC (Kisangani, 2012, p. 1). 
This chapter provides a condensed overview of the conflicts in the DR 
Congo, including the international response. It thus serves two purposes: 
First, it provides background knowledge to readers who are not particularly 
familiar with the Congolese context. In this regard, I will provide an 
overview of the conflicts and general insecurity in the Congo, with an 
emphasis on the developments following the two Congo Wars lasting from 
1996 until 1997 and 1998 until 2002. Second, the chapter situates the 
empirical analysis of the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo. I will thus explore the 
international response to tackle these crises. More specifically, I will 
highlight the international support to SSR as well as to stabilization as part of 
the broader peace operations. Hence, the scope of this chapter in terms of 
elaborating on the conflict situation and the international response is broader 
compared to the specific period from 2008 and 2012, which is the focus of 
the inquiry’s underlying case study. A summarizing discussion will be 
provided in the final part of the chapter.29 
                                                                 
29 Some parts of this chapter are taken from a book chapter and revised to fit the purpose of this thesis. See: 
Froitzheim, M. (2014). "The Democratic Republic of Congo: A Laboratory for International Peace 
Operations". In: T. Tardy and M. Wyss. Peacekeeping in Africa. The Evolving Security Architecture. London 
and New York: Routledge. 190-207. 
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4.1 Armed Conflict and General Insecurity 
The DR Congo is the twelfth-largest country in the world, covering over 2 
million square kilometres (CIA, 2010). Despite its abundant resources, it is 
among the world’s poorest countries and was ranked 176 out of 188 countries 
in the 2016 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016, p. 200). The history 
of the DRC can be best described as a history of plunder, predation and 
pillaging, and the country has experienced “epileptic shifts between war and 
relative stability” over the last twenty years (More & Price, 2010, p. 1). 
During the First and Second Congo War, alone, more than five million 
people lost their lives, untold numbers became refugees, and millions were 
injured, raped and orphaned (Turner, 2007, pp. 1-3). Currently, the situation 
in the Congo is still pictured as one of “intractable armed conflict, poor 
governance, pervasive poverty, and massive humanitarian suffering, 
including widespread human rights violations and large-scale population 
displacement” (Paddon & Lacaille, 2011, p. 5). The country is thus home to 
one of the world’s most complex and long-standing humanitarian crisis. Up 
to date, out of a total population of approximately 77 million people, divided 
among 200 ethnic groups, 4.1 million people are internally displaced (CIA, 
2010; OCHA, 2017). Congolese political space still remains characterized 
“by those who bear arms and money”, and four inseparably linked factors are 
identified as perpetuating continuing instability, namely the absence of a 
functioning state, the fragility of state power, continued tensions over land 
connected to citizenship, and the externalization of neighbouring instability, 
particularly in relation to Rwanda (ibid.)30 
4.1.1 From Independence to the First Congo War 
In mid-1960, after 52 years of colonial rule, the Belgian Congo became 
independent and was turned into the Democratic Republic of Congo on 1 
August 1964.31 Through a policy of divide and rule, President Mobutu Sese 
Seko, who came to power as a result of a military coup in 1965, tried to 
incorporate opposition groups into the existing state. Thus, armed rebellions 
were at first comparably few and rather insignificant. Mobutu, however, 
interpreted and exploited the Congo as if it was his personal property, 
                                                                 
30 An absent state can generally be defined as “a state where the government is not able or willing to deliver 
core functions to the majority of its population, i.e. controlling the territory and providing security” (DFID, 
2005, p. 7). 
31 From 1971 until 1997, the DRC was named Zaire. This change of name was initiated by Mobuto but taken 
back in 1997 by the then President Laurent Kabila (Trefon, 2011, p. 19). 
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causing a constant deterioration of the state apparatus and the country’s 
economy. Despite the economic decline, Mobutu managed to maintain 
control over the state for about thirty years (Eriksen, 2009, p. 654). 
Following the end of the Cold War, however, the Congo became strategically 
insignificant, and Mobutu lost the unconditional support previously received 
by the West. Mobutu was thus forced to accept democratic transition, and his 
regime lost influence. In this context, a rebellion in eastern Congo emerged in 
1995. It was spearheaded by Laurent Kabila, the leader of the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) and triggered the 
First Congo War, the “war of liberation”, which lasted from 1996 until 1997. 
This First Congo War was not a mere internal rebellion but fuelled by the 
genocide against Rwandan Tutsi by a Hutu dominated regime in 1994. When 
the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) came into power following the 
genocide, hundreds of thousands of predominantly Hutu refugees fled to the 
provinces of North and South Kivu in eastern Congo. Most of them 
regrouped in refugee camps controlled by the authorities of the former Hutu 
regime and its armed forces. Attacks were launched from these camps, both 
against Rwanda and Tutsi living in the Congo (Turner, 2007, p. 1). The 
genocide thus “spilled over in the Congo” (Vinck, Pham, Baldo, & 
Shigekane, 2008, p. 10). In May 1997, the AFDL, extensively supported by 
Uganda and Rwanda and with tens of thousands of child soldiers recruited 
from local communities in eastern Congo, took Kinshasa, toppled the regime 
and made Mobutu flee the country (Vinck et al., 2008, p. 10). While Kabila’s 
AFDL was marching towards the capital, Rwandan forces took advantage of 
the situation and concurrently pursued fleeing perpetrators of the genocide. In 
the crossfire, thousands of civilians, mainly Hutu refugees but also local 
Congolese, were killed (Human Rights Watch, 1997, p. 13). Further along 
the line, Hutu extremist leaders and commanders who survived the chase 
formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Even 
today, the FDLR contributes to general insecurity by threatening civilians in 
North Kivu (Vinck et al., 2008, p. 10). 
4.1.2 The Second Congo War and the Transition Phase 
Already during his first year in power, Kabila tried to narrow down the 
influence of his former allies, in particular, the governments of Rwanda and 
Uganda, and finally commanded all foreign troops to leave the country in 
August 1998 (Eriksen, 2009, p. 656; Reyntjens, 1999, pp. 245-246). In 
response to this decision, Rwanda supported the Congolese Rally for 
CHAPTER 4 
 70
Democracy (RCD) movement, which was fighting to overthrow Kabila. The 
conflict that unfolded thereupon turned into the Second Congo War, the “war 
of occupation”, lasting from 1998 until 2002. Due to the involvement of 
several African countries, including Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, which 
supported Kabila, and Rwanda and Uganda, which backed rebel movements 
such as the RCD, the conflict has often been referred to as “Africa’s world 
war” (Prunier, 2009). During the war, local disputes over land and resources 
in areas held by the rebels were exacerbated. The conflict increasingly 
evolved along ethnic lines since all belligerents, including the national and 
foreign armies, used ethnic rebel groups, such as the “Mai Mai”, and self-
defence militias as surrogates (Reyntjens, 2001, p. 311).  
In July 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed, which was an 
attempt to end the Second Congo War through a ceasefire, a declaration of 
attempt to address the security concerns in the DRC and its neighbouring 
countries, through the deployment of an international UN-led peacekeeping 
force. Ugandan and Rwandan troops, however, remained in the DRC for 
another three years until they eventually withdrew. In January 2001, Laurent 
Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Due to his 
greater willingness to cooperate with the international community and to 
negotiate with the rebels, peace negotiations were continued (Eriksen, 2009, 
p. 656). In April 2002, all Congolese belligerents and political parties signed 
the so-called Sun City Peace Deal marking the beginning of the transition 
phase.32 The transition phase was then characterized by large international 
influence, provoking Congolese political leaders, international actors as well 
as journalists to compare the situation in the Congo with a “protectorate” 
(Autesserre, 2010, p. 3). With extensive support from a wide range of 
external actors, the transition phase resulted in a first round of parliamentary 
and presidential elections in 2006. With 58 per cent of the votes in the second 
round and a clear majority in parliament, Joseph Kabila was elected as 
President (Eriksen, 2009, p. 656). The massive and largely nonviolent 
participation of the Congolese during the electoral process was interpreted as 
a clear sign that the population demanded democratic transformation and the 
implementation of genuine reforms (Vinck et al., 2008, p. 13).  
Until today, however, many of these reforms have not yet materialized. 
And while the Congo was officially at peace in 2007, violence still persists, 
notably in the eastern provinces. Rebel groups, including foreign militias, 
such as the Rwandan Hutu rebellion of the FDLR, as well as local Mai Mai 
                                                                 
32 The Sun City Peace Deal was reached on 19 April 2002 between the Mouvement pour la libération du 
Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and the Government of Joseph Kabila (International Crisis Group, 
2002). 
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groups, continue to fight for land and resources.33 In the second half of 2008, 
following an offensive launched by rebel leader Laurent Nkunda who 
officially proclaimed to intend to seize power in Kinshasa, conflict and 
instability in North Kivu escalated once again. Following extensive 
diplomatic efforts by the international community, in combination with 
strong military operations carried out by the UN peacekeeping troops of 
MONUC, the rebellion was contained. At the end of 2008, following the 
historical rapprochement between Kigali and Kinshasa, regional relations 
were realigned and a new peace deal, the 23rd of March 2009 Agreement, was 
signed by the Congolese Government and the Tutsi-led National Congress 
for the Defence of the People (CNDP). While the signing of this peace 
agreement was at that time understood as finally constituting a security shift 
in the Kivu provinces, the rebellion had once again led to hundreds of 
casualties and resulted in more than half a million people fleeing their homes 
(Autesserre, 2016, pp. 36-37). Hence, despite continued peace talks and a 
number of agreements made between opposing factions, the situation, 
particularly in the eastern provinces, did not calm down.  
In spring 2012, a group of soldiers, under the leadership of General Bosco 
Ntaganda, mutinied from the FARDC over poor living conditions and 
insufficient pay, and formed the March 23 Movement (M23), sparking new 
violence in North Kivu.34 Most of those who joined the M23 had previously 
been members of the CNDP, a pro-Tutsi armed group. The mutineers 
claimed that the government in Kinshasa had not fully implemented the 23rd 
March 2009 Agreement between the CNDP and the government (IRIN, 
2016). Following the fighting between the M23 and the FARDC, hundreds of 
thousands of civilians were once again displaced in North Kivu, and gross 
human rights abuses were conducted by both M23 and FARDC soldiers. The 
rebellion culminated in the brief occupation of Goma, the provincial capital 
of North Kivu, in December 2012, before it was put down through an 
intervention by the UN-backed Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) during 
2013. General insecurity and time and again heated conflicts nevertheless 
continue to shape everyday life.  
                                                                 
33 For an extensive overview on armed groups in eastern DRC, see for example: Stearns, J. K. and C. Vogel 
(2015). The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo. New York: Congo Research Group/Center on 
International Cooperation; or see the Kivu Security Tracker, which maps violence by armed groups and 
Congolese security forces in the eastern provinces of the DRC: https://kivusecurity.org/map (accessed: 2017-
12-16). 
34 Although the M23 has renamed itself on 20 October 2012 into ‘Armée Révolutionnaire du Congo’ (ARC), 
this paper will consistently refer to the ‘M23’. For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the M23, see: Stearns, 
J. K. (2012). From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo. London: Rift 
Valley Institute (RVI). 
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At the time of writing, President Joseph Kabila is in his seventh year of a 
five-year term. Constitutionally, he is bared from standing for election again 
and he was supposed to hold elections in 2016. These were however delayed 
over and over again, and while Kabila’s legitimacy and authority are 
increasingly constricted, protests against him are regularly broken down 
forcibly. While the elections are now scheduled for December 2018, the 
situation in the DR Congo remains precarious (Congo Research Group, 2018; 
"Congo. Waiting to Erupt," 2018). 
4.2 The International Response 
The devastating situation of the population provoked not only extensive 
humanitarian interventions, but the international community also became 
increasingly engaged in peace- and state-building as well as stabilization 
efforts. The following section thus elaborates on the international response to 
armed conflict and general insecurity in the DRC, particularly focusing on 
support for security sector reform and stabilization initiatives. 
Following the ongoing conflict situation in the DRC, the initial reaction 
of the UN was to establish a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), in November 1999.35 
MONUCs initial task was to monitor the implementation of the peace process 
and to establish a minimum of security in the DRC. Following several 
Security Council resolutions, the mission’s mandate became stronger 
including the task to protect civilians, while the number of troops was 
consistently increased. In 2004, consisting of around 17,000 troops, MONUC 
became the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. In line with the 
troop extensions, the mandate was further expanded to include support for 
security sector reform as well as the disarmament of foreign combatants and 
the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
programme (Eriksen, 2009, pp. 657-658).  
Besides the UN, an array of other actors became active players in the 
Congo. Several donors, such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) or the British Department for International 
Development (DFID), have continuously supported peacebuilding and 
stabilization initiatives bilaterally; these initiatives are implemented by NGOs 
and focus, among other things, on establishing community-driven conflict 
                                                                 
35 MONUC was not the first UN peacekeeping mission deployed in the Congo. Marking a milestone in UN 
peacekeeping activities, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, 
ONUC) was deployed in the country between 1960 and 1964. By that time, it was the largest, most complex, 
costly and multifaceted operation the UN had ever initiated (Bellamy & Williams, 2010, p. 86).  
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resolution mechanisms and governance activities.36 In terms of regional 
organizations, the EU, for instance, deployed its first military mission ever 
outside the European continent in the DRC in 2003. The mission, code-name 
‘Artemis’, aimed at contributing to the stabilization of the security conditions 
and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, in the province 
of Ituri, after the UN had failed to contain the clashes (Council of the 
European Union, 2003; Froitzheim, 2014, p. 193; cf. Ulriksen, Gourlay, & 
Mace, 2004). Following Artemis, the EU deployed another four civil and 
military missions in the DRC, notably providing support for the reform of the 
security sector.  
4.2.1 International Security Sector Reform Efforts 
To recap, security sector reform is aimed at enhancing the security of states 
and societies through a wide range of activities fostering the creation of more 
effective and accountable institutions in the security and justice sector (cf. 
OECD, 2005). In the DR Congo, international actors involved in SSR are 
sections of MONUSCO (i.e. Political Affairs, SSR, UNPOL, SSU, Justice 
Support and Civil Affairs), UN agencies (i.e. the SSR Inter-Agency Task 
Force (IASSRTF)) as well as bilateral and multilateral actors (i.e. Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, the UK and the EU). 
Focusing on UN efforts regarding SSR in the Congo dating back to 2003, 
the UN initially assisted the Congolese Government with the implementation 
of the Global and All-inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, 
including activities regarding powersharing in the armed forces.37 Five years 
later, in 2008, an SSR Unit was established within MONUC. While the 
overall priority for MONUSCO remains the protection of civilians, Security 
Council resolutions from 2012, 2013 and 2014 indicate that SSR has to be a 
primary focus within MONUSCOs mandate fostering stabilization and peace 
consolidation (UN Security Council, 2012, 2013b, 2014). In this context, 
MONUSCO was tasked to “prioritize possible new approaches to support 
Congolese authorities to improve the capacity of the military, police, justice 
                                                                 
36 See, for example, the USAID approach under the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance theme: 
USAID, Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (last updated: 25 February 2013), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/democracy-human-rights-and-governance (accessed 14 
March 2018); and the DFID project TUUNGANE (Let's unite) - Community Driven Reconstruction 
Programme in DRC, available at https://www.rescue.org/resource/tuungane-community-driven-reconstruction-
program-democratic-republic-congo (accessed 14 March 2018). 
37 In short, the aim of this so-called ‘Pretoria-Agreement’ was to provide the power sharing formula and the 
transitional arrangements until elections were held. The Agreement furthermore renewed the commitment of 
the signing parties to end hostilities while simultaneously calling for establishing an international committee to 
monitor the implementation of the agreement (Pretoria Agreement, 2002). 
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and other security institutions in order to consolidate the overall Congolese 
State authority” (Svartefoss, 2013, p. 1). 
In addition to the UN, and from early 2000 onwards, the EU has 
continuously developed its role as an active player in the Congo, notably 
regarding security sector reform. In terms of SSR, three priorities have been 
identified: the defence sector, including DDR activities, the police, and the 
law and judicial system. SSR is further understood as including the reform of 
the management of the security sector and is consequently closely linked to 
the principles of ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy promotion’ (Keane, 
2008, pp. 220-224). In terms of SSR instruments, the European Commission, 
to begin with, possesses several resources and instruments to deploy SSR 
initiatives, including the European Development Fund (EDF), the Instrument 
for Stability (IFS) and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR). Development aid with a SSR focus is predominantly 
provided in the justice sector (cf. Davis, 2009; Justaert, 2012).38 Until 2011, 
the EU had furthermore deployed a Special Representative for the Great 
Lakes Region who advised EU member states on SSR issues and who 
provided insights from a regional perspective (Council of the European 
Union, 2010). Most visible, however, was the Union’s presence in terms of 
its civilian and military missions deployed under the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) (cf. Hoebeke, Carette, & Vlassenroot, 2007).  
The first EU civil police mission deployed in the DRC, called EUPOL 
Kinshasa, operated from 2005 until 2007, aiming at helping the Congolese 
National Police to keep order, particularly during the electoral period in 2006 
but also more generally in the DRCs transition to democracy (EU Council 
Secretariat, 2005).39 In July 2007, the EUPOL Kinshasa mission was 
replaced by EUPOL RD Congo, and the scope of the mission was expanded 
from Kinshasa, notably to the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. 
Until EUPOL RD Congo was closed in December 2014, the purpose of the 
mission was to support the reform of the security sector in the field of the 
police and its interaction with the justice system. Thus, through restructuring 
                                                                 
38 From 2007 until the end of March 2010, the European Commission conducted (in collaboration with the 
Belgian, British, Dutch and Swedish development agencies) the so-called REJUSCO programme (Programme 
de Restauration de la Justice à l’Est de la République Démocratique du Congo). The programme was targeted 
at the eastern provinces of the DRC with the aim to fight against impunity as well as ordinary crime through 
capacity building activities in the justice sector (Rejusco, 2010). As a follow-up of REJUSCO, the European 
Commission, in collaboration with Sweden and Belgium established in 2012, for a period of three years, the 
so-called PARJE/Uhaki Safi programme (Programme d’Appui au Renforcement de la Justice à l’Est). The 
programme aims to contribute to the consolidation of the rule of law and the fighting against ordinary 
impunity as well as those related to wars in North and South Kivu as well as in Ituri. In addition to these 
aspects, the "Uhaki Safi" program focuses on gender aspects and respect for human rights (COFED, 2012). 
39 In addition and to support MONUC during the first democratic electoral process in the DRC since gaining 
independence, another military mission, code-named EUFOR RD Congo, was launched (Delestre, 2006). 
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the Congolese police, the aim was to establish a viable, professional and 
multi-ethnic police force as well as to improve the interaction between the 
police and the criminal justice system (EU Council Secretariat, 2010b).  
Between June 2005 and June 2016, and parallel to EUPOL, the EU 
deployed another mission, code-named EUSEC RD Congo, focusing on the 
reform of the defence sector.40 EUSEC thus aimed at supporting the 
Congolese authorities in rebuilding the FARDC into an army, which could 
guarantee security across the country. Security, in turn, is understood as a 
necessary condition for any social and economic development. Of specific 
importance was therefore the modernization of the FARDCs administration 
and the human resource management. In this context, EUSEC supported the 
biometric census of the FARDC, the distribution of military identity cards as 
well as the revision of the chain of payments to allow for correct wage 
payment (EU Council Secretariat, 2010a). The DR Congo thus became “a 
focal point in the EU’s new security and defense policy since its inception” 
(Justaert & Keukeleire, 2010, p. 1) and, based on the huge variety of means 
invested, characterized as “the largest laboratory for EU crisis management, 
together with the Western Balkans” (Grevi, 2007, p. 114). 
Beyond efforts provided by the EU, several member states foster bilateral 
support for the reform of the security sector (More & Price, 2010, p. 11). The 
British Department for International Development (DFID) has, for instance, 
taken on a significant role in supporting police reform, both financially and 
politically (Justaert & Keukeleire, 2010, p. 17). France also became active in 
the field of police and furthermore provides support for the reform of the 
justice sector by supporting rule of law programmes. Moreover, military 
advisors are provided and training academies are established to assist the 
development of the defence sector, while the Netherlands have a more 
specific focus on supporting military justice (More & Price, 2010, pp. 17-18). 
4.2.2 International Stabilization Efforts 
Despite the international objectives to support the Congolese peace 
consolidation efforts, armed conflict and general insecurity persist in many 
parts of the Congo until today. In response, the UN, in collaboration with 
several other actors, has become, active in efforts to stabilize the DR Congo 
from 2006 onwards. At the end of the transition phase and following the 
elections, MONUC formulated a first stabilization strategy, the so-called UN 
                                                                 
40In this thesis, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo will be abbreviated as EUPOL and EUSEC 
respectively. 
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Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS), aiming at facilitating 
“the transition of the UN’s role from peacekeeping to supporting 
peacebuilding and development, laying the groundwork for the mission’s 
eventual ‘hand over’ of security tasks to the government and withdrawal 
from the country” (ISSSS, 2012, p. 4). This strategy was however put on hold 
due to the re-emergence of rebellion in the Kivu provinces in 2008. With the 
signing of the 23rd of March 2009 Agreement, hope for a more peaceful 
future was once again raised. Furthermore, this paved the way for the launch 
of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) in 
2008/2009.41 The ISSSS was thought to become the primary strategy, tying 
the international strategy to the national ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Plan for Eastern DRC’ (STAREC) (Gouvernement de la République 
Démocratique du Congo, Juin 2009). In this context, stabilization efforts, 
alongside the protection of civilians, became part of the mandate, and 
MONUC was renamed MONUSCO, introducing an ‘S’ for ‘Stabilization’ 
into the mission’s name (ISSSS, 2012, p. 5). 
The overall aim of the ISSSS was defined as “to address specific root 
causes and consequences of conflict, support the implementation of peace 
initiatives at local level, and help stabilize areas where conflict has recently 
ceased” (United Nations, 2009, p. 7). Five objectives were outlined in 
support of this aim: improving security; supporting political processes; 
strengthening state authority; facilitating return, reintegration and recovery; 
and combating sexual violence (ibid. 2). To implement these objectives, each 
component involves different actors, including MONUSCO, as well as 
various UN agencies such as UNDP, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the 
UN Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT) and the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, international NGOs, 
such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), OXFAM and 
International Alert, as well as national partners, namely NGOs and private 
contractors, are involved. The funding of the ISSSS consists predominantly 
of bilateral donor support and mission resources. For the first phase of 
stabilization between 2008 and 2012, the total budget requested for the 
ISSSS was roughly US$ 835 million. As of April 2012, the ISSSS had US$ 
338.41 million in resources, out of which US$ 203.88 million had been spent 
                                                                 
41 Between 2008 and 2009, the international stabilization strategy was still termed UNSSSS. When STAREC 
was launched in 2009, it was adapted to become the ISSSS. Strictly speaking, the first phase of the ISSSS was 
between 2009 and 2012. As the strategies were however practically the same, and to prevent confusion, 
references throughout this chapter are to the ISSSS and of interest is, as elaborated on before, the period 
between 2008 and 2012. 
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in the first three years.42 Hence, the resources provided for the first phase of 
the ISSSS were significantly lower than the costs estimated. 
After the first four years of fostering stabilization under the ISSSS, the 
achieved impact in the eastern provinces of the DRC was questioned by both 
internal assessments and external evaluations (cf. MONUSCO, 2011; 
OXFAM, 2012). Consequently, the partners of the ISSSS reviewed the 
strategy. The main focus of the revision was placed on several key issues 
including: the definition of the stabilization concept applied under the ISSSS 
as well as the definition of the goals and objectives of the stabilization 
programme; questions around the sustainability of investments made by the 
international community, and the link between efforts at field level and 
reform processes at the national level (Stabilization Support Unit, 2013). The 
intention was thus to draw lessons learned from the first four years of the 
ISSSS, aiming at fostering stabilization more effectively during the second 
phase of the ISSSS between 2012 and 2015. 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter served two purposes. First, it provided a brief overview of the 
conflicts in the DR Congo, including the international response to give 
readers who are not particularly familiar with the situation in the Congo an 
understanding of this study’s context. Until today, following two Congo 
Wars and after almost two decades of extensive international efforts to foster 
peace and security in the Congo, the situation, notably in the country’s 
eastern provinces, is still marked by armed conflict and general insecurity. 
Moreover, the political situation remains precarious, not least due to 
President Kabila who has continuously delayed elections, thus latching onto 
power. Second, by providing an overview of the international peace 
operations efforts, the chapter situated the empirical analysis of the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the implementation of peace 
operations in the DR Congo. These efforts range from peacekeeping to 
peacebuilding and stabilization. In this context and in view of the aim of this 
inquiry, international efforts to support SSR and stabilization were 
specifically highlighted. 
This chapter has thus provided the background for better understanding of 
the circumstances under which the international community has become 
active regarding its peace consolidation efforts in the DRC. Building upon 
                                                                 
42 The largest bilateral donors are the US (US$ 95.1 million), followed by the Netherlands (US$ 72.44) and the 
UK (US$ 57.24 million) (Stabilization Support Unit, 2012, p. 3). 
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this, the following three chapters will provide in-depth analysis of the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the execution of SSR and stabilization 
policies to improve our understanding of what happens when peace 
operations are implemented in the DR Congo. 
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5.Policy Content 
Nobody knows what we’re doing here. I am fed up with all this (UN Official, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
This chapter constitutes the first of three empirical chapters investigating how 
international peace operations, and more specifically SSR and stabilization 
policies, are executed in the DR Congo. In this chapter, I will investigate the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the policy content. Since 
implementing actors are the ones who are responsible for implementation, 
their understanding of the policy content is considered a crucial factor at the 
stage of policy execution. Considering the analytical framework, several 
aspects are identified as being of relevance in relation to the policy content, 
including problem-orientation, clarity, consistency, specificity and flexibility 
of the standards and objectives outlined in the policy. 
This chapter is divided into two parts and a chapter conclusion. The first 
part of the chapter investigates the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
policy standards and objectives of SSR and stabilization, which are supposed 
to reveal more concrete aspects of the policies. Building upon this 
elaboration, the second part of the chapter discusses the implementers’ 
understanding of the more concrete policy approaches chosen, which 
translate the standards and objectives of SSR and stabilization policies into 
more concrete projects. Since the empirical material reveals an apparent 
discrepancy between claims of pursuing political objectives and a de facto 
technical orientation of these projects, I will first explore the implementing 
actors’ notion of ‘becoming realistic’, before investigating the perceived 
requirement of the donor community to achieve publicity and visibility 
through project implementation. Against this background, I will then discuss 
the explicitly voiced demand by one group of implementers to change the 
focus towards more politically-oriented approaches. 
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Finally, in the concluding section, I will briefly summarize and 
contextualize the main findings of this chapter.43 
5.1 Policy Standards and Objectives 
Following implementation theory, policy decisions have to be made concrete 
through the elaboration of specified standards and objectives that are 
supposed to display more concrete aspects of the policy (Van Meter & Van 
Horn, 1975, p. 466). These standards and objectives should furthermore 
comply with several criteria, including the aspects of clarity, consistency and 
specificity. In addition, stated objectives should be problem-oriented, 
achievable and based on understanding of the prevailing conditions in the 
environment in which they are to be implemented (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 
p. 52; Laurence J O'Toole, 1986, p. 189; van der Lijn, 2009, p. 52).  
However, examining the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
content of SSR and stabilization policies targeted at the DRC, a different 
picture is painted. In terms of both policy fields, interviewees concordantly 
consider the content of the policies they are tasked to implement as being 
unclear and inconsistent (EU official, Goma, 2012-10-08; UN official, Goma, 
2012-10-06). Different actors thus interpret SSR and stabilization policies 
differently. In relation to the international stabilization strategy, a senior 
Goma-based UN Official bluntly states:  
We [implementing actors] all have our own understanding of the ISSSS (UN 
Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
Focusing on the ISSSS, the strategy’s overall and ambitious aim was 
formulated as “to address the root causes and consequences of conflict, 
support the implementation of peace initiatives at the local level, and help 
stabilize areas where conflict has recently ceased” (United Nations, 2009, p. 
7). Through concentrating the international stabilization efforts in eastern 
DRC by integrating the stabilization objective into the ongoing UN 
peacekeeping mission while at the same time interlinking the external 
approach with the Congolese-owned national stabilization plan, STAREC, 
the ISSSS was at the outset understood as an innovative attempt to respond to 
demanding and ever-changing conflict situation in the DRC (cf. Froitzheim, 
2014, pp. 194-195). 
                                                                 
43 I would like to thank Carola Klöck for her constructive feedback on earlier drafts of the three empirical 
chapters. 
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However, according to the implementing actors tasked to execute 
stabilization under the ISSSS, it is not least the strategy’s innovative design 
that poses serious challenges. First, due to the relative novelty of fostering a 
stabilization approach in international interventions, international 
implementers had very few practical experiences with doing stabilization. 
Second, the stabilization approach was for the first time integrated into the 
mandate of an established and ongoing peacekeeping mission. While the 
integration of the ISSSS into MONUC became formally visible through the 
insertion of the ‘S’ for stabilization into the mission’s name, leading to the 
renaming of MONUC into MONUSCO, this process was apparently not 
accompanied by discussions leading to a clear definition of the actual content 
of stabilization projects and programmes (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-06; 
UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). Stabilization thus became a buzzword for 
the international peace operation efforts in the DRC, but the concept of 
stabilization remained very vague: 
The stabilization concept as such is relatively new. So, there are not many lessons 
learnt. And certainly not in the specific context of being incorporated into a 
peacekeeping mission (…) so what does the ‘S’ in MONUSCO mean? The ‘S’ 
must be defined. A definition of the ‘S’ would point to more clarity regarding the 
roles and activities [of the different actors being involved in implementing 
stabilization efforts] (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
The ambiguity of the ISSSS is openly criticized by a senior UN Official, 
based on the interviewee’s experiences of actively taking part in the 
strategy’s development from its very beginning:  
Everything became stabilization (…) There was the understanding that all 
problems of the Congo could be solved through the ISSSS. So, the ISSSS was 
more of a basket where donors could throw in pretty much everything that they 
wanted to throw in (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-09). 
Unsurprisingly, implementing actors developed different understandings of 
stabilization. Taking an extreme position on the one side of the spectrum, a 
high-ranked Goma-based MONUSCO Official equates the stabilization 
approach under the ISSSS with a military intervention. According to the 
interviewee, the logic of stabilization should consequently be interpreted as 
“to clear, hold and build” (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-10).44 The 
interviewee therefore considers the Congolese Armed Forces, the FARDC, 
                                                                 
44 The concept of ‘clear-hold-build’ is central to counterinsurgency campaigns. It implies the understanding 
that government legitimacy can be increased in a three-step process: first, areas of insurgents have to be 
cleared, second, those areas have to be held securely before infrastructure can be built and local development 
projects can be implemented in the third step (cf. Ucko, 2013, p. 54). 
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and MONUSCO as the main actors in stabilization, tasked to first and 
foremost clear and hold unstable areas. Once these areas are considered as 
stable, the stabilization focus could be shifted, according to the interviewee, 
towards the initiation of so-called hardware aspects, including the 
construction of buildings and roads, and software aspects, namely, the 
deployment of state officials, such as police officers and judges. Apart from 
the FARDC and MONUSCO, other UN agencies, NGOs or civil society 
actors are thus understood as playing a minor part in the overall stabilization 
efforts (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-10).  
Other respondents, in contrast, highlight that any stabilization initiative 
should have its starting point at the local level, allowing for the inclusion of 
the given local complexities (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06; Diplomat, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-16). This understanding can thus be located at the other 
extreme end of the spectrum, and the implications of such an approach are 
twofold. First, it emphasizes the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
significance of a bottom-up approach to stabilization, departing from the 
local level. In this context, UN agencies, NGOs and civil society actors rather 
than the FARDC and MONUSCO are considered to play a decisive role. 
Second, such a bottom-up approach of defining stabilization would 
specifically call for the formulation of policies driven by the needs of the 
local population: 
The starting point should be at the local level. To get a better understanding of the 
conflict and to help the people on the ground (…) what is needed is a more 
nuanced response to the needs of the population. This does not mean that the local 
communities should just give a shopping list of what they want to have. But 
support should be given to local initiatives, for example, those focusing on land 
conflicts (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06). 
This argument, according to the interviewee, is supported by the lessons 
learnt from the M23 rebellion in eastern DRC when buildings and roads that 
had been constructed as part of the ISSSS had either been taken over by the 
rebel group or were no longer accessible. Measurable outcomes of the first 
phase of stabilization, in terms of infrastructure projects supported by the 
international community, had thus been nullified (UN Official, Goma, 2012-
11-06). A Kinshasa-based diplomat takes a position in between these two 
approaches. While the interviewee generally agrees with the significance of a 
more localized approach, the diplomat nevertheless emphasizes that the 
military component should not be forgotten: 
The second phase of the ISSSS looks promising since the focus is more on the 
sub-national level, not only including local complexities but also taking those as 
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the starting point for action. But the military component to improve stability in the 
region is nevertheless of great significance (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-16).  
According to the understanding of another UN Official, the ISSSS should be 
understood as  
a useful planning tool for the mission and the international community [aiming at 
achieving] a coherent approach instead of piecemeal interventions that have taken 
place so far (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-09).  
Following this line of thought, yet another UN Official proposes to 
understand stabilization as  
a limited intervention [aiming at] creating the necessary conditions for 
development programmes to be implemented (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15).  
For the interviewee, such necessary conditions, or in other words, a minimum 
of stability, would for example include a situation in which the military is 
stationed in its barracks and in which police officers are deployed throughout 
the province. Hence, the interviewee demands to narrow down the 
stabilization focus by defining “clear boundaries” and “clear objectives” to be 
commonly pursued under the ISSSS. As to how ideal this might be, the 
interviewee is sceptical regarding the feasibility of agreeing on a joint 
definition, pointing to the “serious challenges” the international community 
would have to face (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). These challenges 
include not least the ambition to combine the so far very diverging 
understandings among implementing actors regarding the content and 
objectives of stabilization pursued under the ISSSS. 
During the time of data collection in 2012, a process aiming at revising 
the ISSSS after its first three years had been in full swing.45 Implementing 
actors repeatedly highlighted that the revision of the strategy aims at finally 
putting forward an - apparently much needed - joint definition of stabilization 
as applied in the ISSSS, including standards and objectives on how to 
achieve stabilization. According to the interviewees, such a definition would 
point to more clarity as well as simplify the implementing actors’ task of 
executing stabilization policies. Hence, while actors being responsible for 
implementing stabilization criticize that such discussions should have taken 
place much earlier, they seem to clearly appreciate the perceived progress 
made in the revision process (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
In contrast to the ISSSS, which was initiated to concentrate stabilization 
efforts pursued by a wide array of actors by integrating the stabilization 
                                                                 
45 For a detailed overview of the revision of the ISSSS, see: Stabilization Support Unit. (2013). International 
Security and Stabilization Support Strategy 2013-2017. 
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objective into a broader strategy as well as into the ongoing UN 
peacekeeping mission, policies targeted at the reform of the Congolese 
security sector remain very much bound to individual actors and entities. 
Actors involved in SSR efforts thus predominantly work on aspects related 
either to the reform of the police, reform of the army or reform of the justice 
sector. Implementing actors thus do not see themselves as being confronted 
with the struggle of having to follow a definition of SSR policies that is 
commonly agreed upon by the diverse group of actors and agencies involved. 
However, this does not mean that SSR policies are necessarily understood 
and interpreted similarly by those actors being responsible for the 
implementation. Instead, the meaning of the concept seems to shift depending 
on the actors involved (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17; EU Official, 
Goma, 2012-10-08).46  
Like criticism expressed by actors implementing stabilization policies, 
interviewees point out that SSR policies are insufficiently integrated into 
guiding policy documents. Although SSR is very well understood as being 
essential to stability, it was for instance not integrated into STAREC. It is 
furthermore remarked that SSR policies are oftentimes not sufficiently 
concrete, as stated by a senior Goma-based UN Official: 
Because of the lack of a political framework, SSR (…) is in the air; not part of a 
comprehensive project with a long-term plan (…) MONUSCO and EUPOL, yes, 
they have nice documents on what we should do, the nuts and bolts of SSR, but 
that has no framing in the political understanding. And therefore, the impact is 
zero (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
To summarize, implementing actors repeatedly point out that the standards 
and objectives of both SSR and stabilization as applied in the DRC remain 
insufficiently tangible. Different understandings of the content of SSR and 
stabilization have thus developed, creating confusion among implementing 
actors regarding expectations connected to the execution of SSR and 
stabilization policies. 
                                                                 
46 For a similar argument, see, for example: Brosig, M., & Sempijja, N. (2018). Human development and 
security sector reform: The examples of Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. African Security, 
11(1), 59-83, p. 60; and Sedra, M. (2010). Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform. In M. Sedra 
(Ed.), The Future of Security Sector Reform (pp. 102-116). Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for International 
Governance Innovation (CIGI), p. 114. 
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5.2 Policy Approaches 
This section focuses on the implementing actors’ understanding of the more 
concrete policy approaches. These policy approaches are developed to 
translate the policy standards and objectives of SSR and stabilization into 
more concrete projects. In this context, implementing actors share the 
understanding that both SSR and stabilization policies can be translated into 
both long-term politically-oriented and short-term technically-oriented 
approaches. Implementing actors furthermore commonly recognize an 
apparent discrepancy between claims of pursuing political objectives, on the 
one hand, and the de facto technical orientation of projects, on the other hand. 
This discrepancy is put in a nutshell by a senior Kinshasa-based EU Official 
acknowledging that:  
The EU has an interest in the political side, but EUPOL has become a very 
technical mission (EU Official b, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).  
Understandings among implementing actors differ, however, as to whether a 
political- or a technical interpretation of the policies is preferable. While 
several implementing actors refer to the perceived necessity of becoming 
realistic in the sense of what appears to be possible to achieve in the 
Congolese context, others remark that technical approaches basically have to 
be pursued based on the donors’ request for achieving publicity and visibility. 
Despite the given circumstances, yet another group of implementers, notably 
working on stabilization, explicitly demand that policies be translated into 
political instead of technically-oriented approaches. 
5.2.1 Becoming Realistic 
Considering the apparent discrepancy between political claims, on the one 
hand, and technically-oriented policy approaches, on the other hand, one 
group of implementing actors almost excusatory remarks under the motto of 
‘becoming realistic’ that the far-reaching political goals of SSR are de facto 
difficult if not impossible to achieve though they are certainly desired. A 
technical interpretation is thus accepted as to what is manageable, given the 
Congolese context. One reason for this is the current state and political 
situation of the DR Congo: 
You must be realistic. The Congo is too complicated, too big, with many different 
ethnicities, and there is a lack of governance. Consequently, a technical approach 
has been taken, focusing on the construction of hospitals, schools, prisons, etc. 
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That is okay, but you must be aware that you’re not addressing the political level 
(UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17). 
Similarly, field-based implementers seem to hardly question a technically-
oriented interpretation of SSR policies. In fact, the provision of hands-on 
experiences through trainings and workshops is not disputed but consistently 
understood as de facto constituting SSR. Implementing actors even frankly 
express their understanding that clearly specified and self-contained projects 
have the advantage of not only being easily understandable and illustratable 
but also being manageable: 
Reforming the PNC? I don’t really see that. Providing trainings to police officers, 
that’s a hands-on approach. If you ask me that’s all we can do here (EU Official b, 
Goma, 2012-10-08).  
Hence, like their capital-based colleagues, field-based implementing actors 
seem to have become realistic, in the sense of interpreting policies in a way 
that appears to be de facto feasible. This approach is however not necessarily 
understood as satisfactory. One senior EU Official in Goma criticizes, for 
instance, the rather limited work tasks. It has been remarked, that 
international actors who are engaged in SSR oftentimes do not do more than 
observe the status quo or develop and report ideas on how the status quo 
could be improved. According to the interviewee, implementers try to further 
provide direct and situation-specific advice but on a rather small and 
unsatisfactory scale (EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-11). 
Focusing more specifically on technically-oriented projects, and apart 
from performing trainings and capacity building workshops, EUSEC, for 
example, provided eight weapon storage cabinets to an army unit in Goma. In 
a different project, EUSEC decided to support ‘community centres’ [centres 
sociales] for the wives of the soldiers. For a very limited budget of 15,000 
USD, cloth and sewing machines were bought and delivered to the 
community centres. In addition, a school was reconstructed, and water tanks 
were renewed to improve the living conditions of the families of the soldiers 
(EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-11). 
Among implementing actors, however, it is hotly contested whether these 
very specific and to a certain extent development cooperation-oriented 
projects can and should be labelled as SSR projects at all. EUSECs approach 
to support the families of FARDC soldiers, as described above, is one such 
example that is repeatedly given during the interviews. While one Kinshasa-
based EU Official almost desperately asks, “Jesus, what are we doing?” (EU 
Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15), another Goma-based EU Official describes 
this as “hands-on civil-military cooperation” (EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-
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11). The very same example is given by a capital-based UN Official asserting 
that “the sewing machine project is definitely a SSR project” (UN Official, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-17). According to the interviewees’ understanding, 
support for SSR should include such projects because they aim to improve 
the living conditions of soldiers and their families. Another reason provided 
for including these kinds of projects under the frame of SSR is the apparent 
difficulty in finding actors who take responsibility for such approaches. 
According to several interviewees (EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-11; UN 
Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17), development actors usually shy away from 
such development-oriented projects since they are targeted at the military. In 
this regard, a capital-based UN Official illustrates that  
if an NGO hears ‘military’, they [development actors] have no interest (UN 
Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17). 
To summarize, several implementing actors argue under the motto of 
‘becoming realistic’ for consciously interpreting SSR policies in a way that 
implicates the translation of policy standards and objectives into technically-
oriented projects. The claims of aiming at pursuing political aims are thus 
subordinate to the given circumstances. While the implementing actors’ 
decisions thus become the policies they execute, disagreement prevails 
among the group of implementers as to whether these projects can de facto be 
considered as constituting SSR. 
5.2.2 Achieving Publicity and Visibility 
Trying to explain the reasoning behind the dominance of technically-oriented 
approaches towards SSR, implementing actors also refer to the needs of those 
actors providing funds for SSR activities. Implementing actors repeatedly 
highlight that short-term training and capacity building activities are more 
visible and thus more appealing to funding agencies compared to the long-
term provision of strategic advice. Implementers thus accuse donors of 
determining the policy approach based on the need to achieve short-term 
visibility and publicity. This “[s]hort-termism” in SSR, according to Sedra 
(2010), can be identified as “one of the foremost obstacles to the concept and 
one of the principal reasons for its poor impact” (p. 113). Similarly, Chanaa 
(2002) remarks that factors on the ground are only one aspect that challenges 
reform endeavours since “donors often bring with them their own set of 
concerns that can seriously jeopardise the agenda's holistic vision” (p. 55).  
In this context, a Kinshasa-based Diplomat openly admits that the 
advantage of such training and capacity building activities is the ease of 
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selling them to those who are responsible for securing the funding. The 
diplomat however quickly clarifies that the provision of training and capacity 
building activities is not only a public relations aspect but certainly 
understood as crucial regarding SSR:  
The public relations aspect is indeed a convenient side-effect of the trainings 
given. But this is certainly not the core function of and the core motivation for 
providing trainings (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-16).  
A senior Kinshasa-based EU Official working on SSR however disagrees and 
bluntly confesses that trainings are indeed provided first and foremost as a 
means to an end: 
We [EUPOL] do give trainings, but it’s mainly a marketing tool. The trainings 
provide the mission with publicity, and this publicity we need to be able to do 
what is at the heart of the mission. That is the provision of strategic advice (EU 
Official a, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
According to the interviewee, capital-based implementers predominantly 
share the understanding that support for SSR should first and foremost be 
interpreted as giving strategic political advice to top-level officials within the 
Congolese police, the FARDC and the judiciary. Hence, through by 
supporting the reforming and restructuring of the security apparatus, a 
situation should be achieved in which police and army officers are properly 
paid throughout the country, superseding bribery based on insufficient wage 
payments (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17).  
Implementers however remind about having in mind that these core 
aspects of international support for SSR cannot be pursued without the 
provision of training and capacity building activities, which provide 
measurable and more visible short-term results. The need to achieve publicly 
visible short-term results is further intensified due to the budget pressure 
under which international actors commonly work. 
Underlined as positive in this regard is the fact that the EU SSR missions, 
within the time frame of their mandates, are relieved from this pressure since 
police experts working for EUPOL in the DRC can be integrated into the 
structures of the PNC, without circumstances. Thus, these actors have room 
to manoeuvre, at least to a certain degree, in order to interpret policies 
individually. This leeway, however, is only made possible if short-term 
projects are simultaneously implemented, creating publicity and thus 
securing the funding “to keep the missions going” (EU official B, Kinshasa, 
2013-04-10). In other words, if the mission leadership can secure mandate 
extensions, there is room to manoeuvre to be able to execute more time-
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consuming aspects of police reform, which are virtually impossible to 
achieve within short time frames: 
I don’t want to spoil what we did with the trainings (…) the trainings were given 
because we needed the time to implement police reform, to allow the mission to 
follow its strategic aims. Changing the police is changing mentalities. To do that, 
one year is not enough. But our mandates are prolonged on a yearly basis (EU 
Official A, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
Hence, while implementing actors stress that SSR de facto requires a long-
term outlook and continuous supply of resources, donors instead demand 
visible approaches providing immediate and visible results.47 Implementing 
actors thus consciously, but predominantly without believing in the approach, 
decide to interpret SSR policies in a specific way in order to both satisfy the 
donors and to execute policies in a way they deem appropriate. This implies 
more concretely that implementing actors translate policy standards and 
objectives into short-term and visible technically-oriented approaches aiming 
to create room to manoeuvre, for simultaneously executing less visible and 
politically-oriented aspects of SSR. 48 
In this regard, projects targeting sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV) are understood as being de facto most attractive from a donor 
perspective. Interviewees thus feel compelled to translate policy objectives 
outlined in the mandate into SGBV projects. According to the implementing 
actors, such specific capacity-building projects, including training sessions on 
human rights, are however considered meaningless, if there is no 
comprehensive approach in SSR to first address the root causes of human 
rights abuses. Projects with a SGBV focus are thus understood as 
‘meaningless’, except for satisfying the donor community (EU Official A, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). In this context, Kinshasa-based EU Officials even 
claim that the mission antennas in the eastern provinces of North and South 
Kivu are solely based on the request of individual EU member-states aiming 
at securing presence in eastern Congo:  
We have been to Goma and Bukavu just because the Netherlands and Sweden 
asked for it. You cannot do anything in the Congo if you are not in Goma and 
                                                                 
47 For a similar argument, see Sedra, M. (2010). Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform. In M. 
Sedra (Ed.), The Future of Security Sector Reform (pp. 102-116). Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI), p. 107. 
48 A similar argument is made by Schiavo Campo (2003) who argues that post-conflict interventions may face 
a trade-off between national ownership and capacity-building on the one hand and the need to achieve short-
term results and to assure financial accountability on the other hand. 
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Bukavu and if you don’t do anything in fighting against sexual violence. What we 
did is that we hold up the EU flag (EU Official a, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 49 
The interviewee furthermore questions the overall presence of the missions in 
eastern DRC and even makes fun of having staff seconded there:  
We had to be in Goma. It’s for opportunity. It’s a good laboratory for us. (…) 
Everybody wants to be there. People need adventures. People need to be a bit 
afraid” (EU Official A, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).  
To summarize, implementing actors commonly remark that the translation of 
SSR policies into short-term technical approaches is furthermore motivated 
by the apparent need to satisfy requests by the donor community regarding 
the achievement of visibility and publicity. Through training and capacity-
building activities, implementing actors can thus secure both funding and 
room to manoeuvre, which then allows for the execution of less visible 
politically-oriented approaches that are understood as de facto constituting 
SSR. Besides the need to satisfy the donor community, capital-based 
interviewees furthermore openly criticize the apparent need to be present in 
eastern DRC and to translate SSR policies into projects on SGBV, whereby 
the intrinsic motivation is first and foremost to achieve publicity – and not to 
address and correct deficiencies (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17; EU 
Official a, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 50 
5.2.3 Demanding for Change 
In contrast to implementing actors illustrating the perceived pressure of 
translating SSR objectives into specific and visible short-term technically-
oriented approaches, actors executing stabilization policies under the ISSSS 
explicitly call attention to the perceived shortcomings of favouring 
technically-oriented approaches to stabilization. Hence, implementers openly 
criticize the predominant interpretation of stabilization as a technical 
endeavour and thus demand for a more political orientation (UN Official, 
                                                                 
49 Douma and Hilhorst analysed, for instance, how funding is allocated to address challenges in the DRC, such 
as the reform of the police, the armed forces and the judicial system, and found out that “sexual violence 
budget is nearly double the size of the budget for all security sector reform activities (SSR trust fund), and just 
under half the size of the entire peace building trust fund, which are arguably two themes geared towards 
prevention of sexual violence” (Douma & Hilhorst, 2012, p. 37). 
50 Several studies attest to this critique. See, for example, Eriksson Baaz, M. and M. Stern (2010). The 
Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Sida Working Paper on Gender based Violence. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute/Sida; Autesserre, S. (2012). 
"Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended consequences." African Affairs 
111(443): 202-222; Douma, N. and D. Hilhorst (2012). Fond de Commerce? Sexual Violence Assistance in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Wageningen: Wageningen University . 
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Kinshasa, 2013-04-09; Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-12, UN Official, Goma, 
2012-10-15).  
One concrete example commonly brought up in the interviews is the 
translation of stabilization objectives outlined in the ISSSS into infrastructure 
projects in eastern DRC. While the implementation of such technical projects 
has been presented to the international community as a success that is even 
measurable, for instance, in the number of buildings constructed and the 
kilometres of road paved, implementing actors consistently raise severe 
criticism that such infrastructure projects hardly have any or have no impact 
at all on the situation on the ground (NGO Official, Goma, 2012-10-10).  
In this context, a Goma-based UN Official openly criticizes the 
translation of the declared aim of restoring state authority into the 
controversial hands-on approach of constructing buildings, such as police 
stations and prisons:  
They were building buildings where there was no legitimacy of the actors. So, no 
work on legitimacy was done before the construction of the buildings. So, in the 
end, armed groups were taking over the buildings, there are court houses where 
there has never been a judge, etc. (…) In a country where the state is as 
dysfunctional and corrupt as it is the case in the DRC, the understanding to build 
buildings to restore state authority doesn’t and cannot work (UN Official, Goma, 
2012-11-06).  
The results of stabilization efforts, for instance, in terms of infrastructure 
projects, were described as negligible since they had almost no positive 
impact on the given situation on the ground. According to a senior UN 
stabilization expert, a political interpretation of the stabilization strategy is 
inevitable and must imply a strengthening of the political component of the 
ISSSS: 
Stabilization as such is a political exercise. But the political part of stabilization 
has been ignored so far. This is why the good stuff that has been done is not 
having any impact. We have again and again and again pointed out this problem. 
Stabilization must be understood in the political context (UN Official, Kinshasa, 
2013-04-09). 
This would include, for instance, following up on peace agreements and 
fostering of SSR and decentralization efforts. As an example, a Goma-based 
UN Official refers to the March 23 Agreement that had clearly been violated 
instead of being followed-up properly.51 As a result, the security situation in 
                                                                 
51 As elaborated on in chapter four, the M23 rebellion, which emerged in 2012, justified its formation with the 
allegation that the Congolese government had not entirely implemented the peace treaty from the 23 March 
2009 between the CNDP and the government (IRIN, 2016). 
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eastern DRC deteriorated significantly, and most efforts under the ISSSS 
were ruined (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06). 
In line with the prioritization of technically-oriented approaches, the 
prevalent focus on security issues is criticized by another Goma-based senior 
UN Official. The idea behind the first four years of stabilization efforts, 
namely, to improve the security situation before engaging in any in-depth 
discussion on political processes, is thus understood as  
a fundamental mistake [since] stabilization is ultimately [understood as] a political 
exercise (…) political processes have to be the principal component (UN Official, 
Goma, 2012-10-15).  
According to the UN Official, the persistent high levels of violence made it 
easily understandable that improving security became a top priority. The 
concentration of stabilization activities in North Kivu is furthermore 
considered comprehensible, based on the recognition of the province as “the 
centre of gravity of the whole conflict” (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
The official nevertheless criticizes the strong focus on security and the M23 
rebellion for eclipsing the fact that prevailing tensions are rooted in the 
coexistence of different ethnic groups; a phenomenon which is to be 
understood as a transversal problem and not exclusively bound to the 
province of North Kivu. According to the UN Official, however, the 
approach chosen for the first four years of the stabilization strategy, from 
2008 until 2012, rather resembled the idea of trying to develop the region of 
North Kivu as autonomous instead of tackling the overarching problems: 
That’s a remarkable shortcoming: as if the region doesn’t exist. And I would call it 
rather naïve that the Congolese Government and the donors believe that they by 
themselves can stabilize the region. Unless Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are on 
board, within a big stabilization project, we’re not getting further. It will just not 
be possible. I’m hoping that it comes in the revision, but my fear is that it will 
again be left out (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
Implementing actors, and notably those who have first-hand experiences 
working with stabilization in eastern DRC, therefore, strongly advocate for 
changing the approach during the revision of the ISSSS. Instead of focusing 
on highly or even most unstable areas, a Goma-based UN Official highlights 
that projects under the ISSSS should be targeted at zones of relative 
stability:52 
                                                                 
52 The idea behind focusing on least stable areas was, according to a UN Official, the assumption that gains in 
these areas would trickle down to other, more stable, surrounding areas. This assumption was however refuted: 
“We got it wrong. There was no multiplier effect” (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
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We do face many challenges and difficulties. But, we could be more successful 
and achieve objectives if stabilization initiatives focused on areas where there is at 
least a minimum of stabilization. We just don’t do anything sustainable in areas of 
little security. We can do more in areas with better security (UN Official, Goma, 
2012-10-26). 
Following this line of thought, specific stabilization projects under the ISSSS 
could be implemented in more peaceful areas, while MONUSCO could 
concentrate its peacekeeping activities in areas classified as less or least 
stable. According to a senior Goma-based UN Official, this allocation of 
tasks would further implicate a more explicit allocation of tasks between 
MONUSCO and all other actors working on stabilization and as such lead to 
a more concrete policy approach (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15).53 
In line with this, field-based implementers also highlight the significance 
of formulating more flexible policy strategies and projects. At present, 
however, implementing actors see themselves as being confronted with what 
they refer to as ‘the grand strategy of the international community’, which 
does not allow for adequate flexibility:  
What we need are flexible projects built upon the local context. But how can these 
be integrated in the grand strategy? (UN Official B, Goma, 2012-11-10).  
As a concrete suggestion, a senior Goma-based NGO Official advocates for 
dividing the strategy into two parts whereby one should allow for more 
flexibility. In the event that a reallocation of projects and funds becomes 
necessary, financial resources should thus be easily transferrable from one 
project in one area to another project in another area (NGO Official, Goma, 
2012-10-10). 
Against this background, it seems to be hardly surprising that 
implementing actors openly articulate feelings of dissatisfaction with the 
elaboration of the policy approaches. This dissatisfaction has also created a 
widespread feeling of frustration and resignation among them due to a 
perceived situation of having failed to increase stability:  
The ISSSS is filled with examples of failures. Just look at the buildings that were 
constructed by the international community. They remained empty since the 
government didn’t get engaged. And then they were taken over or destroyed by the 
M23 (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
One Goma-based UN Official working on stabilization refers, for instance, to 
the fact that some actors, notably field level implementers, had already at an 
                                                                 
53 The unclear allocation of tasks and responsibilities under the ISSSS will be discussed in more depth in 
chapter 6.3. 
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early stage realized that the stabilization plan would not work out as planned. 
The interviewee criticizes however that it was impossible for field level 
actors to raise their concerns at the political level, which clearly caused 
feelings of frustration: 
Some of us realized very early that the stabilization plan would not work. But we 
bought into the political logic that this was reality and that we had to do it (…) 
many of us who wanted to deliver feel disgusted to see what has happened (UN 
Official b, Goma, 2012-11-10). 
Actors implementing SSR initiatives also bring up similar feelings of having 
failed to have any impact. One Goma-based EU Official, for instance, raises 
concern regarding the adequate follow-up of projects to secure potential 
improvements achieved. Implementing actors furthermore highlight 
struggling with the short-sightedness and unsustainability as well as the site-
specificity of capacity-building trainings. It is criticized that the idea of 
training individuals who will then train their colleagues does not really work 
in practice because “when they [the trained individuals] are back at work, 
they forget what they have learned” (EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-11). The 
interviewee thus asks for comprehensive follow-up strategies. Since this 
would however imply a higher work load, the official is rather skeptical, in 
terms of prospect of success. 
In terms of a more political orientation of SSR, a Kinshasa-based UN 
Official refers to the renewed mandate of MONUSCO following Resolution 
2098 (2013) (UN Security Council, 2013b). Since this Resolution de facto 
includes a stronger focus on the political objectives of SSR, implementing 
actors consider this as an indication that that the UN Security Council at least 
formally tries to foster progress, in terms of SSR. The official is, however, 
sceptical as to whether a stronger political focus in the mandate will 
necessarily translate into stronger political orientation of SSR policies in the 
Congolese context (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17). 
To summarize, the predominant interpretation of stabilization as a 
technical endeavour and emphasis on improving security is consistently and 
openly criticized by implementing actors. Since the translation of 
stabilization objectives into infrastructure projects in the conflict environment 
of eastern DRC is understood as short-sighted and as not having any impact, 
and since political processes are understood as being of utmost significance, 
implementers demand a more political orientation of stabilization 
approaches.  
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5.3 Conclusion 
This first out of three empirical chapters investigated the implementing 
actors’ understanding of the policy content of SSR and stabilization policies 
targeted at the DR Congo.  
In relation to the policy content, the analytical framework identified 
several aspects as being of relevance, including the problem-orientation, 
clarity, consistency, specificity and flexibility of the standards and objectives 
outlined in the policy. The picture portrayed by implementing actors, 
however, looks different. Interviewees concordantly consider the standards 
and objectives of SSR and stabilization policies targeted at the DR Congo as 
being vague and inconsistent, thus, provoking diverging interpretations 
among implementing actors. 
A prime example commonly referred to is the stabilization concept upon 
which the ISSSS is developed. Besides possessing limited practical 
experiences with the execution of a stabilization approach and besides the 
novelty of having stabilization integrated into an ongoing peace operation, 
the concept of stabilization remained undefined during the first phase of its 
execution under the ISSSS. A situation thus emerged in which implementing 
actors developed diverging interpretations of stabilization ranging from 
interpreting the ISSSS as a military-led strategy to ‘clear hold and build’ 
unstable areas, to a development-oriented bottom-up approach targeted at 
areas characterized by relative stability. 
Focusing on the policy approaches chosen to execute SSR and 
stabilization, a similar picture is portrayed. Implementing actors, first and 
foremost, refer to the apparent discrepancy between politically claimed 
objectives, on the one hand, and de facto technically-oriented projects, on the 
other hand. Different understandings however prevail as to whether and why 
political or technical interpretations are considered preferable in certain 
cases.  
Under the header of ‘becoming realistic’, several implementing actors 
refer to the specific Congolese context, which is understood as delimiting 
what is de facto possible regarding policy execution. Hence, it has been 
argued to consciously interpret notably SSR policies in a way that implicates 
the execution of technically-oriented projects and thus the subordination of 
political aims to the given circumstances. Moreover, there is an apparent 
need by the donor community for visible and publicly exploitable short-term 
technically-oriented SSR and stabilization projects. This demand however 
contradicts a widely shared understanding among implementers, stressing the 
fact that SSR requires a long-term outlook instead. Implementers thus refer to 
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situations in which they consciously decide to translate SSR into short-term 
and technically-oriented projects that they do not believe in but with which 
they aim to satisfy the donors. Hence, the implementing actors’ aim is to 
create room to manoeuvre, which then allows for the execution of politically-
oriented SSR projects that are less visible, and thus less attractive from a 
donors’ perspective. Repeatedly criticized in this context is the attractiveness 
of and the necessity to translate policy objectives into projects against SGBV, 
which are basically understood as meaningless as long as the underlying 
structural problems, due to the lack of a comprehensive SSR approach, 
remain unaddressed. 
Consequently, approaches translating SSR and stabilization policies into 
projects executed in the DR Congo are deemed as as being driven by various 
interests of the donor community, in terms of creating visibility and publicity, 
rather than interests in effectively fostering the reform of the Congolese 
security sector and the stabilization of the country. While several 
implementers seem to accept these conditions, others clearly demand for a 
change in focus towards explicit politically-oriented projects. Notably, field-
based implementers executing projects under the ISSSS openly criticize that 
the political part of stabilization has so far predominantly been ignored. 
Instead, infrastructure projects have been realized, which is interpreted as not 
having any impact on stabilization and thus, as being, to a greater or lesser 
extent, meaningless in the conflict environment of eastern DRC. Hence, 
Goma-based implementers have become the driving force behind a more 
politically-oriented ISSSS. 
In sum, implementing actors commonly describe the standards and 
objectives of SSR and stabilization as vague and inconsistent, provoking 
diverging understandings among them. Moreover, a discrepancy between 
politically claimed objectives and technically-oriented projects is generally 
acknowledged by implementing actors. Yet, understandings related to the 
underlying reasons for the dominance of technically-oriented policy 
approaches differ. Furthermore, the implementing actors’ responses are also 
divergent, ranging from mere acceptance under the motto of ‘becoming 
realistic’, to taking advantage of the opportunity to create some room to 
manoeuvre in the background of visible and publicly exploitable projects, to 
the point of openly demanding a changed policy approach. 
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6.Actor Interaction 
The main challenge is: how can we [the international implementing actors] work 
together? How can we build one team? We have to work together as one team. We 
need to have clearly defined and shared objectives (UN Official, Goma, 2012-16-
10). 
This second empirical chapter focuses on the implementing actors’ 
understanding of interaction taking place in the implementation of SSR and 
stabilization policies. It thus contributes the second building block for the 
investigation of the implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo.  
As elaborated on in the analytical framework, any policy or programme at 
the stage of implementation is understood as being influenced by actor 
interaction (Barrett & Fudge, 1981, p. 4). Based on the diverging 
understandings of interaction among implementing actors tasked to execute 
SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo, this chapter is divided into 
five sections and a concluding discussion. 
To begin with, I will explore the implementing actors’ understanding of 
interaction as a way to sharpen a common understanding of vague and 
inconsistent policy standards and objectives (see chapter 5) aiming at 
aligning diverging understandings, to either achieve the goals set in the 
policies or to essentially influence and push Congolese decision-makers. The 
remaining three sections will then focus on aspects understood as restricting 
interaction, namely the impact of the spatial distance between the capital and 
the eastern provinces, the given institutional structures at both levels, aspects 
of leadership and personalities as well as competitive behaviour.  
Finally, in the concluding section, I will briefly summarize and 
contextualize the main findings of this chapter. 
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6.1 Aligning Understandings 
While interaction implies for both Kinshasa- and Goma-based implementing 
actors the sharing of views, opinions and information, field-based 
implementers interpret interaction as also implying concerted action. In this 
regard, a Goma-based EU Official points out the necessity for international 
actors of “fitting and feeding into the existing cluster” (EU Official b, Goma, 
2012-10-08). Moreover, a very specific need for interaction is identified in 
areas where bilateral policy initiatives are dominant, as is the case in the field 
of SSR. Although bilateral approaches are generally understood as requiring 
less actor interaction compared to multilateral initiatives, implementing 
actors in Goma repeatedly highlight the necessity of interacting, at least in 
the sense of sharing information, to reach better understanding of what other 
actors in the same policy field are doing. Repeatedly mentioned in this 
context are, for instance, the training and capacity building activities 
provided for the Congolese National Police and the FARDC. An apparent 
insufficient sharing of information among implementers regarding these 
efforts is criticized for having frequently provoked situations in which 
implementers have too little knowledge on what other actors in the same field 
are doing. This seeming ignorance has led to an overlap and/or lack of 
training activities, as cynically highlighted by a Goma-based UN Official:  
A positive result of the war now is that it shows that the training schemes didn’t 
work, independent of whether they were carried out by the US, the UN or the EU. 
So what is needed is a common, joint approach (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06). 
In this context, international implementing actors consider themselves as 
being directly confronted with the dissatisfaction of Congolese policy 
recipients, who wonder why separate training approaches with differing 
contents are offered. The dissatisfaction expressed among their Congolese 
counterparts as well as the Congolese public is understood as motivating, at 
least to a certain extent, increased actor interaction and efforts to align the 
international approach. From the perspective of Goma-based implementing 
actors, interaction is thus understood as providing an opportunity to balance 
the vagueness of the policy standards and objectives as well as to form 
working groups in implementation. In this context, and through increased 
interaction, the definition of joint standards for training sessions and 
provision of follow-up mentoring services is identified as possible way 
forward (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-09). A capital-based interviewee 
likewise advocates for initiating a committee that gathers both international 
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and Congolese actors and aims at coordinating and streamlining bilateral 
programmes and projects (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-12). 
Hence, by putting efforts into interaction, implementing actors actively 
contribute to streamline a common understanding and to align ambiguous 
policies. Thus, the implementing actors’ understandings of the policies as 
being vague and ambiguous and their decision to interact, aiming at 
clarifying policy objectives, can be understood as directly influencing the 
execution of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo. 
6.2 Creating Influence 
Like their field-based colleagues, capital-based implementers consider 
interaction as inevitable. The necessity of sharing views, opinions and 
information is repeatedly highlighted. In this regard, the EU-Delegation is, 
for instance, identified as “a common point of reference”, facilitating political 
dialogue notably among EU member states but also in relation to other 
actors, such as the UN (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15).  
In contrast to their field-based colleagues, however, Kinshasa-based 
actors hardly talk about prospects of teamwork as providing an opportunity 
for enhancing implementation. Capital-based interviewees aim instead at 
banding together to strengthen their position towards the Congolese 
Government. Aiming at creating pressure as well as at more effectively 
imposing the international actors’ will are thus identified as incentives for 
enhanced interaction: 
We [the international actors] need to create political pressure; we need to talk to 
each other about it. We then need to create messages for the government and 
repeat them again and again. The Congolese say that yes, they want progress, but 
there is no clear political sign (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-12). 
In this context, interviewees and notably Kinshasa-based Diplomats clearly 
advocate for interaction between international and Congolese implementing 
actors. This interaction is however not understood as taking place on a level 
playing field.54 Instead, a strengthened position of the group of international 
actors vis-à-vis Congolese Government officials is understood as increasing 
the political pressure on Congolese policy makers to invest in SSR and 
stabilization initiatives. What is thus needed, according to several 
                                                                 
54 A similar pattern is revealed by Uvin, who studies development actors and concludes that debates among 
donors oftentimes centre “around ways donors can more effectively impose their will, if necessary by ganging 
up against governments who do not behave the way donors think they should” (Uvin, 1999, p. 21). 
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interviewees, is a joint appearance of international actors. In this line of 
thought, a Kinshasa-based Diplomat calls for  
a concerted effort of the international community to push the government to do 
long-lasting reforms (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-18).  
Otherwise, if the Congolese government does not take SSR and stabilization 
seriously, any implementation efforts are considered pointless (EU Official, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-15; Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-18).  
Hence, capital-based actors generally share the assumption that increased 
interaction among international implementers is lucrative in the sense of 
pushing the implementation of SSR and stabilization forward. Increased 
interaction is also understood as making it more difficult for the Congolese 
Government to follow its own strategies. This applies, for instance, to the 
government’s intention to spend financial assistance provided by the 
international community on its own interests. Since Congolese interests are 
oftentimes expected to be in opposition to donors’ interests, international 
actors are eager to influence, if not to decide upon, government spending. In 
line with this, international actors further mention a fear of falling victim to 
the whims of Congolese interests. Corporate action is thus considered a way 
to avoid feelings of weakness and meaninglessness vis-à-vis their Congolese 
counterparts: 
The international community is more and more realizing that the Congolese 
Government is not a serious partner. Donors start realizing that the government 
plays a game to weaken us. Consequently, the money spent is fragmented; there is 
little coordination but bilateral projects. However, if the international community, 
if we were coordinated, we would be stronger, and it would be more difficult for 
the Congolese Government to play us off against each other (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 
2013-04-18). 55 
From the perspective of smaller and less influential individual nation-states 
that have certain demands in the DR Congo despite their limited influence, 
interaction is understood as providing one means to become more influential 
(cf. Chafer, 2002). Implementers thus identify a correlation between the size 
and the desired role of individual nation-states in the DRC and the degree of 
motivation among their country representatives to interact with other 
international actors. In other words, the smaller and less influential individual 
nation-states represented in the DR Congo are, the bigger seems their 
motivation to interact as underlined by a senior EU Delegation Official:  
                                                                 
55 The implementing actors’ understanding of the political setting that they have to navigate will be subject to 
in-depth discussions in the third empirical chapter. 
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Big states play their own game. If a state is influential enough, there is very little 
interest in interaction. Instead, bilateral initiatives are pushed to further national 
interest” (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
Interaction at Kinshasa-level is thus predominantly understood as interaction 
among international implementing actors. The aim is thereby to either 
influence the Congolese Government in a specific way or to bring national 
interests forward. 
6.3 Distance and Institutional Set-Up 
Despite certain incentives for interaction, as analysed in the preceding 
sections, interaction among international implementers is consistently viewed 
as “very weak” (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10), and the international 
community is commonly described as “much divided” (UN Official, Goma, 
2012-11-06).  
One potential aspect that is repeatedly referred to as affecting interaction 
is the distance between Kinshasa, the national capital, and Goma, the capital 
of the eastern province of North Kivu. Both Kinshasa- and Goma-based 
actors tasked to implement SSR and stabilization policies collectively 
articulate feelings of detachment from each other. The reasons for these 
perceptions are located both in the spatial distance between Kinshasa and 
Goma and in the institutional set-up, which is described as hierarchical and 
capital-focused. 
In terms of the spatial distance, it is worth noting that the geographical 
distance between Goma and Kinshasa is about 1500 km. Until today, no 
domestic airline covers the route. Thus, it is primarily the UN providing 
travel connections, for its own personnel as well as for other non-UN actors. 
The spatial distance in combination with limited connections is considered a 
very practical aspect separating implementing actors in their daily work 
routines. Attempting to bridge the distance, several nation states, such as the 
UK, France and the US, have created posts for political advisors being 
stationed semi-permanently in Goma. Apart from being contact persons for 
field-based national staff in development projects, for instance, they further 
collect first-hand information on the situation in the Kivu provinces and 
report back to their respective embassies (for example, Diplomat, Goma, 
2012-11-10; Diplomat, Goma, 2012-10-05). 
In addition to the spatial distance, the seemingly hierarchical structure, 
with the centre being Kinshasa, is commonly identified by implementing 
actors as affecting interaction. Due to the dominant role taken on by capital-
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based implementing actors, a widely shared feeling of imbalance among 
implementing actors has been created. 
To begin with, the sharing and exchange of information between the 
capital and the eastern provinces is understood as ill functioning. While the 
sharing of information is in principle understood as inevitable, implementing 
actors complain that information is oftentimes withheld, and that views and 
opinions are rarely shared. This has provoked a widely voiced feeling of 
resignation, as summarized by a senior Kinshasa-based EU Official: “it is 
how it is” (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15).  
According to several UN Officials, personnel throughout the country 
should be able to access all information collected countrywide and reported 
to Kinshasa to the same degree. In practice, however, both capital- and field-
based interviewees consistently complain about the difficulty of obtaining 
essential information. Implementers thus request comprehensive 
improvement of the system for information gathering and sharing but are at 
the same time sceptical towards any improvements (UN Official, Goma, 
2012-10-9; UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17).  
In this context, for instance, the given institutional structure is 
characterized by a senior Kinshasa-based UN Official as being “excessively 
hierarchic”, thus, reflecting a stovepipe bureaucratic organization:  
Kinshasa sucks in all information and we’re not allowed to share it. The fear is 
that information can leak out to the media (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15).  
Likewise, a senior UN Official who has worked in both Kinshasa and Goma 
criticizes the heavily capital-focused institutional set-up for restricting the 
transfer of tasks and responsibilities from the capital to the eastern provinces: 
We have a huge problem in horizontal coordination. Kinshasa generates its own 
workload, there are too many people, and there is too much leadership; too few 
duties are transferred to the field (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-09).  
Implementing actors thus consistently criticize the restrictions resulting out 
of the spatially given and structurally created distance between Kinshasa and 
Goma. More specifically and considering the implementing actors’ demand 
to align understandings in implementation (6.1.1), the substantially unequal 
access to information is pointed out as impeding the execution of SSR and 
stabilization policies. 
Similar to their capital-based colleagues, field-based actors are concerned 
with interaction being restricted by an unclear allocation of responsibilities. 
Notably regarding the ISSSS, several interviewees criticize that the 
integration of the stabilization strategy into the ongoing peacekeeping 
mission is not only understood as insufficiently thought through in terms of 
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conceptual definitions, as elaborated on in the preceding chapter (see 5.1), 
but also regarding administrative divisions. The secretarial unit for the 
ISSSS, the so-called Stabilization Support Unit (SSU), is placed within 
MONUSCO and staffed by UN agencies, donors and MONUSCO. At the 
same time, however, the unit works semi-autonomously from the mission. 
Implementing actors thus experience a situation of ambiguity, for instance, 
regarding the assignment of roles and responsibilities. Hence, uncertainty 
among implementing actors is widespread and has, according to a senior 
Goma-based UN Official, created a situation in which the SSU  
belongs to everybody and nobody… it is everybody’s and nobody’s baby at the 
same time (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15).  
At the conceptual level, a Kinshasa-based UN Official describes this set up as 
positive because it does not exclude any actors. The delegation of tasks from 
the SSU to the various UN agencies, which are specialized units usually 
possessing strong capacities in the operational area, is furthermore 
understood as working out very well (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). In 
practical terms, however, field level implementers complain that work is 
rendered more difficult since the semi-autonomous status of the SSU takes 
away responsibility, in cases of failure. In other words, if something does not 
work out, no one feels responsible (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15; UN 
Official, Goma, 2012-10-06). To provide for more clarity, one suggestion is 
thus to place the responsibility for stabilization on one specific body which is 
then also in charge of the outcome (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
According to a UN Official, the inadequate administrative set-up is 
further reflected in the prevalent tensions between the SSU and the Head of 
MONUSCO for North Kivu. These tensions become apparent regarding the 
diverging interpretations of the stabilization approach as elaborated on in the 
previous chapter (see 5.1). Moreover, interviewees point out that the unclear 
allocation of responsibilities creates a general feeling that stabilization 
efforts, in the context of MONUSCO, are of minor importance. 
Implementing actors thus explicitly verbalize an experienced downgrading of 
stabilization endeavours (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-09). The apparent 
difficulty of fostering stabilization issues among MONUSCOs leadership is 
also criticized:  
It became difficult to push up stabilization aspects on the higher level (UN 
Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-09).  
In this regard, the by-then SRSG Roger Meece is explicitly blamed for failing 
to make the ISSSS part of MONUSCO (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-12). 
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Considering the institutional set-up of MONUSCO, a Kinshasa-based UN 
Official refers to the aspect of language. While language issues are hardly 
understood as being of relevance at the administrative level, they seem to 
play a major role at troop level. The countries contributing most of the 
personnel to MONUSCO are non-English and non-French speaking.56 This is 
understood as having two implications on interaction: first, there is no 
common language spoken within MONUSCO. Hence, the sharing of 
information is exacerbated, and various actors may not necessarily receive 
crucial information. Second, main parts of the troops are not able to 
communicate with Congolese actors. Interaction is thus hampered if not 
made impossible from the outset (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17).57 
6.4 Leadership and Personalities 
In addition to the factors regarding distance and institutional set-up, the style 
or rather apparent lack of leadership and the prominence of personalities are 
also consistently pointed out as hampering interaction.  
A key role in the context of UN peace operations is naturally assigned to 
the respective Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) acting 
as Head of Mission (HoM). As elaborated on in chapter 4, MONUSCO 
currently consists of around 22,000 personnel. At Kinshasa level, 
implementing actors thus consistently call for strong leadership. They further 
highlight the necessity of having someone who pulls the strings and interlinks 
all the different units. In the scholarly debate on peace operations, the 
prominent role of the SRSGs is, for instance, highlighted by Karlsrud (2013): 
SRSGs enjoy relative independence and physical distance from UN headquarters. 
With backgrounds often from diplomatic careers, plus relative autonomy and 
interpretations of the UN, they can wield influence thanks to a certain level of 
decentralized authority and their personal prestige (p. 525). 
MONUSCOs leadership, and notably Roger Meece, the by-then SRSG and 
HoM, are however consistently described by implementing actors in the DR 
Congo as being weak: 
                                                                 
56 At present, 55 countries provide personnel to MONUSCO (MONUSCO: Facts and Figures: 
https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/facts-and-figures; accessed: 2017-12-14). 
57 For a more detailed overview on the aspect of language in military and/or peace operations, see, for 
instance: van Dijk, A. and J. L. Soeters "Language matters in the military". Armed Forces and Conflict 
Resolution: Sociological Perspectives. 303-325; Baker, C. (2010). "The Care and Feeding of Linguists: The 
Working Environment of Interpreters, Translators, and Linguists During Peacekeeping in Bosnia-
Herzegovina." War & Society 29(2): 154-175; Crossey, M. (2005). "Improving linguistic interoperability." 
NATO Review. from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art4.html, and Dallaire, R. (2004). 
Shake hands with the devil: The failure of humanity in Rwanda. London: Arrow Books Ltd. 
ACTOR INTERACTION 
105 
We have a structural problem of being so big. If the organization is so big, you 
need strong leadership. If you don’t have strong leadership in such a big 
organization, it is uncoordinated… [cynical] Is this the aim? (UN Official, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
Furthermore, the interviewee even blames the mission’s leadership of at 
times deliberately refusing to demand in-depth information, notably 
regarding strategic analyses of the ongoing political situation in the DRC. 
According to the interviewee’s understanding, a properly carried out political 
analysis would almost necessarily point out issues that are sensitive, notably 
for the Congolese Government. The interviewee however blames his direct 
superiors of not wanting to receive such analyses, although such information 
essentially for the missions’ leadership is classified as being of utmost 
significance: 
We [the Political Affairs Section] are responsible for a more strategic political 
analysis, which inevitably would include saying things that are not acceptable. We 
are advisors to the Head of Mission. Everything should be linked to the political 
unit but it’s not. The Head of Mission does not link to the political analysts (UN 
Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
According to the interviewees’ understanding, this has provoked a situation 
in which having information is equated with having power. Depriving 
implementers of information is thus understood as hampering policy 
execution. While implementing actors try to facilitate the sharing of 
information and to increase interaction, notably between units, the 
hierarchical set-up is once again identified as a limiting factor. Frustration 
thus spreads among implementing actors: 
MONUSCO is a big organization, and it is uncoordinated. Every unit works on its 
own. Information and knowledge is produced but only transferred to the top. The 
sharing of information seems to be difficult. We try to facilitate that. We try to 
share information also horizontally, which is needed to understand the bigger 
picture. But it seems that we are feeding a stovepipe that has no leaks on the side 
(UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
The interviewee furthermore accuses MONUSCO’s leadership and top-level 
diplomats of prioritizing meetings with diplomats and politicians from 
countries that are understood as having specific interests in the DRC, such as 
Belgium, France and the UK (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
CHAPTER 6 
 106
Leadership is thus understood as not falling far short but as being essentially 
performed in cases where particular interests are at stake.58 
Criticism towards MONUSCOs leadership can further be found outside 
the mission. Following the UNs approach towards SSR, as specified in the 
various mandates, MONUSCO should play a leading and coordinating role in 
terms of SSR support provided by both UN entities and international as well 
as bilateral partners. MONUSCO is thus considered as the entity which 
should take on “the task to prepare some common ground and understanding 
among key players on a strategic level” (Svartefoss, 2013, p. 3). In practice, 
however, the Head of Mission as well as higher-ranked officials are 
repeatedly criticized for not taking over a coordinating role and thus, for not 
living up to expectations, specifically regarding the reform of the FARDC:  
We meet each other, but I think MONUSCO is not taking its responsibility. The 
army reform is a big issue, but the UN is not pushing, not giving ideas, not 
coordinating (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-12).59  
Due to MONUSCOs weakness, the EUPOL RD Congo mission has de facto 
taken the lead regarding the reform of the police as part of the broader SSR 
efforts even though UNPOL is much bigger, in terms of both staff and 
financial resources. The allocation of tasks and the coexistence of actors are 
thus described as “awkward” (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). With a 
more inward-looking view, the senior EU Delegation Official further 
confesses that the Delegation structure after the transformation of the former 
Commission Delegations into EU Delegations, as elaborated on in the 
preceding chapter, looks de facto promising on paper, while it is still 
considered “a labyrinth” in practice (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
Although posts of senior coordinators have been created to help navigate the 
labyrinth, the old structures are understood as being conserved, and 
reservation still haunts people’s mind: 
The role of the senior coordinator is to bring consistency, but it’s not easy (…). 
There are problems between the people and the different cultures of the 
Commission and the Council. There are also prejudices between the missions 
[EUPOL and EUSEC] and the EU Delegation. Some people may say that the 
                                                                 
58 A similar argument is made by Nilsson and Zetterlund (2014) who underline that the autonomy of the 
leadership of UN missions implies that both individuals in leadership positions and personal relationships play 
a significant role. Hence, command and control structures are understood as working “as long as people in key 
positions are competent and able to work together” (pp. 25-26). Furthermore, the major influence of 
individuals can be seen “as strength, if the right person is in the right position but potentially dangerous when 
this is not the case” (ibid.).  
59 A counterexample is provided by Karlsrud (2013) who highlights the role taken on by SRSGs in 
Afghanistan and Cote d’Ivoire deciding “to take initiative to controversial actions, stepping out of the comfort 
zone and actively interpreting their mandates. This is a necessary feature of their role, if SRSGs are to be 
relevant and useful to the countries where they are employed” (p. 539). 
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missions are just driving around and not adding anything, while the Delegation is 
also accused of not doing much (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15).60 
Likewise, a senior UN Official, who has worked with the stabilization 
strategy in both Kinshasa and Goma, highlights that the relationship between 
diplomats and development actors within the donor coordination group poses 
a major challenge regarding actor interaction. Mentioned in this context are 
different ‘organizational cultures’ prevailing between diplomats and 
development actors. Interaction between these two groups of actors is thus 
understood as “complicated” (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-09). Since the 
ISSSS is supposed to include a stronger political orientation in its second 
phase, which implies that development cooperation efforts will be 
increasingly combined with diplomatic undertakings, interaction between the 
different actors will become of even greater significance (Stabilization 
Support Unit, 2013). 
Interviewees working for the two EU SSR missions, EUPOL and EUSEC 
RD Congo, highlight furthermore that interaction is not only dependent on 
distance and institutional structures, as discussed in the preceding section but 
also further understood as being “certainly up to the personalities of the 
people” (EU Official c, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).61 Focusing more specifically 
on individual attitudes regarding interaction, a senior capital-based UN 
Official working with SSR mentions an apparent distaste among international 
implementing actors of being coordinated:  
there are splendid ideas of coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated (UN 
Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17).  
The interviewee furthermore discloses that controversies between two top-
level officials who basically did not get along with each other negatively 
affected MONUSCO’s SSR support. A perceived overall loss of significance 
if not even a standstill of SSR activities, was understood as resulting out of 
these controversies: 
                                                                 
60 For a detailed analysis of coordination and coherence within and among EU entities, see Lurweg, M. (2011). 
"Coherent Actor or Institution Wrangler? The European Union as a Development and Security Actor in 
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo." African Security 4(2): 100 – 126. 
61 In terms of personalities and leadership performance, previous research highlights Roeland van de Geer, the 
EU Special Representative who had been deployed from 2007 until 2011 to the African Great Lakes Region 
(GLR) as a rare example of someone being acknowledged by implementing actors for effectively facilitating 
regional and cross-institutional interaction. An EU Official working for the by then EU Commission 
Delegation in Kigali, Rwanda, underlined for instance, his ability to meet with many different actors involved 
in the GLR. As an example, one source stated that van de Geer at times met with Kabila and then brokered 
with other states. Therefore, the EUSR was considered to hold a valuable position that allowed for a super 
exchange of sensitive information (Lurweg, 2011, p. 115).  
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We [the international implementing actors being engaged in SSR] are going down 
the road for three years and we’re always hitting the wall. We’ve basically no 
alternative but will do business as usual (…) going down the same road again. Our 
hands remain tied (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-17). 
Constricted implementation opportunities causing widespread frustration 
among implementing actors are thus once again the consequences. 
6.5 Competitive Behaviour 
Focusing on interaction among international implementers assigned to 
support SSR, a split between Kinshasa- and Goma-based actors becomes 
visible. While capital-based implementers consider the approaches chosen by 
different actors and agencies as complementary, field-based implementers 
experience competitive behaviour as a daily occurrence. 
Goma-based implementing actors working for the EU and the UN on SSR 
commonly acknowledge that direct interaction between the different entities 
is hardly taking place. In this context, some interviewees consider themselves 
as ‘merely coexisting’, which basically does not call for specific interaction 
(EU Official b, Goma, 2012-10-08). Other actors, in contrast, fear that 
insufficient coordination structures lead to an overlap and/or lack of 
activities. Several implementers thus specifically ask for someone to take a 
coordinating role.62 Once again, based on numbers of staff and resources, 
MONUSCO is pointed out as the designated coordinator. According to a 
senior Goma-based EU Official, however, MONUSCO is not taking on that 
role:  
they [MONUSCO] should take the coordinating role, but well… we’re here and 
we don’t have a problem with them (EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-11). 
Besides this more or less acknowledged state of ‘coexistence’, an apparent 
prominence of competitive behaviour is identified as hampering interaction 
between field-based implementers, thus, restricting policy implementation 
(EU Official b, Goma, 2012-10-08; UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-09). A 
senior Goma-based EU Official remarks in this context that EUPOL and 
UNPOL, for instance, carry out very similar activities regarding police 
                                                                 
62 This argument has also been brought up in previous research on aspects of coherence and coordination 
among EU actors in eastern DR Congo and highlighted by an EU official stating that: “Finally, we realize that 
everyone does the same thing, without any dialogue. Consequently, what bothers me a little bit is that we can 
detect that there is a loss of energy and loss of money by doing so, because here, we do not know how to 
coordinate ourselves. That’s it” (Lurweg 2011, p. 115). 
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reform. Actors thus experience a situation of competition and blame each 
other for it: 
Actually, we [EUPOL and UNPOL] do the same thing (…) but they, MONUSCO 
and UNPOL, see police reform as a market, a commercial for the UN. They 
understand us as competitors. What UNPOL does is quantity, but we go for 
quality. We have expertise, they have the money. I wonder what they [UNPOL] 
are actually doing (EU Official b, Goma, 2012-10-08). 
A Goma-based UN Official, in turn, accuses EU actors, and notably EUPOL 
staff, of being selfish, inward-looking and difficult to interact with:  
There is not much cooperation with EUPOL. They’re operating in their own 
bubble. The reason for that is that EUPOL comes with a mandate from Brussels, 
which is neither streamlined with our mandate nor with the government. There is 
not much to do about it (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-09).  
Interestingly, though, Kinshasa-based implementing actors working on SSR 
in general and on police reform, in particular, paint a completely different 
picture. Instead of raising concerns over potentially competitive situations, 
capital-based actors working at the strategic level of SSR generally describe 
their work as complementary. Strategic arrangements based on different 
starting conditions are hereby considered as the determining factor. While the 
UN has the manpower and financial resources to carry out basic training 
sessions for up to several hundreds of police officers, EUPOL RD Congo 
consists of a comparably small number of experts who are involved in 
supporting police reform at the strategic level. While EUPOL has also 
become active in training activities, these have an in-depth focus and are 
targeted at groups of 20 to 30 police officers that already have expertise in a 
specific area (EU Official b, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10; EU Official, Kinshasa, 
2013-04-15). Training activities carried out by EUPOL are thus understood 
as complementary to UN-led training activities: 
Competition is not seen at the strategic level. The two Heads of Mission work on 
the principle of complementarity. EUPOL is organizing coordination meetings and 
providing trainings in certain niches. EUPOL simply cannot finance huge 
trainings, which could then potentially be seen as being in competition with 
UNPOL. But there is neither the will nor the need for competition (EU Official b, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
While several implementing actors seem to accept the prevailing competitive 
behaviour without a word of protest, others are more critical. According to a 
Goma-based UN Official, competition among international implementing 
actors should not be condoned since it squeezes national actors out of 
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implementation and exemplifies the lack of respect, oftentimes shown 
towards Congolese actors: 
What has to stop is the competition between the various actors (…) everyone 
thinks that one is doing better than everyone else. But people don’t accept and 
relate to the context. Local organizations are better in that, more flexible to the 
context but have less competence, for example, in project implementation. So, 
everyone should recognize that the other one has to add something (UN Official, 
Goma, 2012-11-06). 
The UN Official is critical that international interventions in general continue 
to rely predominantly on international staff, which undermines the role of the 
recipient country. In the specific case of the DRC, this has led to a situation 
in which the Congolese are not considered as partners on a level playing 
field. The interviewee thus demands for increased interaction based on the 
principle of mutual respect. Highlighted at the same time, however, is the 
need to maintain basic principles, for instance, regarding the prevalent high 
levels of corruption: 
We have to stand for principles [i.e. with regard to corruption], but they 
[Congolese actors] know the situation better and have better access. But 
international interventions are still mainly based on UN people and donors at the 
national level. The international community simply does not really respect the 
Congolese (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06). 
Following this line of thought, a senior Kinshasa-based EU Official 
challenges the prevalent prioritization of interaction among international 
implementing actors. The official thus warns against blocking out any 
interaction with Congolese actors: 
We’re so absorbed with our own coordination; we talk too much to ourselves and 
we have little time for the Congolese. It’s also a culture. We hang around together 
in meetings and share information between diplomats. There are so many working 
groups here. You always talk about the Congolese situation but what you should 
do is to talk to the Congolese. The real challenge is to get to know the actual 
situation in the country and not to hang around just in Gombe,63 which is not 
Congo (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
Without negating the fact that interaction with Congolese implementing 
actors is generally understood as demanding, the EU Official thus clearly 
                                                                 
63 Gombe (or: La Gombe) forms one part of the capital city of Kinshasa. It is a residential area where many of 
the expatriates working in Kinshasa live as well as the capital’s business district. Many national and 
international institutions are based in Gombe. 
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criticizes the tendency of international implementing actors to stay amongst 
them instead of engaging with national actors. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This second out of three empirical chapters explored the implementing 
actors’ understanding of interaction taking place at the stage of policy 
execution. While implementing actors commonly agree on the significance of 
interaction in policy implementation, yet based on different motivations, 
several aspects are outlined as impeding factors. 
To begin with, the interview material reveals that both capital- and field-
based implementing actors generally share the understanding that interaction 
is a way to sharpen common understanding of policies and projects. 
Interaction is thus understood as compensating, at least to a certain extent, for 
ambiguities following the equivocality of policy standards and objectives as 
elaborated on in the preceding chapter. Focusing specifically on SSR policies 
and the dominance of bilateral policy initiatives, implementers commonly 
motivate interaction also as a way to align the international approach and to 
prevent situations in which insufficient consultation provokes either an 
overlap or a lack of training activities. Moreover, the empirical material 
reveals that for Goma-based actors, a mere sharing of information is 
insufficient. Instead, more extensive interaction is justified with the perceived 
necessity of fostering teamwork to be able to drive the implementation of 
both SSR and stabilization policies forward. Hence, with regard to 
interaction, both the actors’ organizational affiliations and the policy foci are 
understood as irrelevant. Field-based implementers thus share a positive and 
goal-oriented understanding of interaction.  
In contrast, and apart from acknowledging interaction as an exchange of 
information, Kinshasa-based officials, and notably diplomats, accentuate 
interaction as a possibility to create political pressure to more effectively 
impose the international actors’ will and to avoid feelings of weakness vis-à-
vis their Congolese counterparts. Similarly, smaller and less influential states 
being represented in the DRC recognize interaction as being a way to 
increase their influence and to become a counterbalance to countries such as 
Belgium, France and the UK understood as typically setting the tone.  
In addition, the empirical material also reveals several aspects that are 
considered as limiting interaction. These include the distance between 
Kinshasa and the eastern provinces, the given institutional structures at both 
levels as well as the hierarchical set-up, which centres information, tasks and 
responsibilities in Kinshasa. The spatial distance in combination with 
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severely restricted travel connections is thus considered as a very practical 
aspect, hampering interaction and leading to a shared feeling of 
disconnectedness among actors. This feeling is further intensified by the 
seemingly hierarchical structure understood as severely restricting the 
accessibility to and the exchange of information outside of the capital. 
An interesting split becomes apparent, in terms of the understanding of 
interaction among Kinshasa-based actors working on SSR in contrast to their 
Goma-based colleagues. While the former consistently highlights 
complementing each other’s work at the strategic level, the latter identifies 
prevailing competition as impeding interaction. Repeatedly brought up by 
capital-based implementers and understood as impinging upon interaction is 
the significance of personal relationships and leadership style. Notably, 
Kinshasa-based implementers highlight the existence of different 
organizational cultures between diplomats and development actors but also 
between staff of the EU Delegation and the EU SSR missions. A further 
prominent though negative example is the leadership of MONUSCO. In 
particular, the by-then HoM, Roger Meece, is understood as lacking 
leadership competencies. He is furthermore accused of prioritizing 
interaction to pursue certain individual interests rather than to promote 
common welfare. 
In sum, implementing actors share the understanding that interaction at 
the stage of policy implementation is considered inevitable. The reasons 
provided for fostering interaction differ however. While field-based 
implementers aim at balancing the vagueness of and aligning SSR and 
stabilization policies, their capital-based colleagues interpret interaction as 
being a way to create pressure on and to influence the Congolese 
Government. Interaction is also understood as affected by several factors, 
including the spatial distance separating Kinshasa- and Goma-based 
implementers in combination with a hierarchical and capital-centred 
institutional set-up, the style or rather the apparent lack of leadership and the 
prominence of personal relationships. In addition, and especially at field 
level, competitive behaviour between implementers is identified as 
outweighing interaction. 
 
   
 
 
 
 113
7 
7.Implementation Context 
The situation in the field [in eastern DR Congo] is so dynamic that any project is 
out-of-date before it has been initiated. And there is no political will and no 
government ownership (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
In addition to the policy content and actor interaction taking place, the 
context in which policies are translated into action is understood as another 
key issue in the analysis of policy implementation. The aim of this third and 
last empirical chapter is thus to explore the implementing actors’ 
understanding of the context in which SSR and stabilization policies are 
executed in the DRC. 
The following chapter is divided into two parts and a chapter conclusion. 
In the first part, I will explore the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
local circumstances with a specific focus on the conflict setting, which 
characterizes the context in which SSR and stabilization policies in the DRC 
are executed. In this respect, the intricacy of ongoing conflict and a situation 
of general insecurity, which implementing actors must navigate are 
highlighted. In the second part of the chapter, I will elaborate on the 
implementing actors’ understanding of the political setting as part of the 
implementation context. In this regard, aspects of state fragility, political will, 
capacity, and ownership, understood as constituting the political context, will 
be analysed. I will furthermore investigate various interests understood by 
implementing actors as influencing and driving the international peace 
operations in the DR Congo and thus shaping the political setting in which 
SSR and stabilization policies are executed. 
Finally, I will provide a summarizing conclusion of the implementing 
actors’ understanding of the implementation context. 
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7.1 Conflict Setting 
Being interested in the conditions prevailing in the implementation context 
and being identified by implementing actors as affecting policy 
implementation, this section elaborates on the complexity of the conflict 
setting, particularly with regard to eastern DR Congo.  
Throughout the interviews, field-based implementers consistently refer to 
the intricacy of ongoing conflict and general insecurity as posing specific and 
serious challenges for policy implementation, as noted by a Goma-based UN 
official: 
When thinking about the Congo, the first word that comes to my mind is 
‘complexity’. There are different layers of the various problems, and one should 
think at least double before acting (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06). 
At the time of data collection, in fall 2012, field-based implementers jointly 
and independent of any organizational affiliations or policy foci stress that 
they consider themselves as being highly influenced by the intricate and 
challenging conflict setting, which jeopardizes any implementation efforts. 
Due to the tense security situation, implementers, for instance, have to be 
highly flexible and adaptive in their daily working life. As a concrete 
example of policy implementation being affected by conditions prevailing in 
the environment, EU Officials point to the severe travel restrictions they had 
to face following the deteriorating security situation in North Kivu due to the 
M23 rebellion in 2012. Since the implementing actors’ field of activity had 
been limited to the city of Goma, it had thus become basically impossible to 
fulfil day-to-day duties, such as performing follow-up activities of SSR 
projects that had previously been initiated outside the provincial capital (EU 
Official b, Goma, 2012-10-08). Since this specific situation was however 
insufficiently acknowledged by their superiors in Kinshasa, Goma-based 
actors nevertheless felt obliged to pretend to do business as usual (EU 
Official b, Goma, 2012-10-08). Field-based implementers thus blame their 
capital-based colleagues and superiors of dismissing these aggravating 
circumstances and remark that they do not feel as if they are taken 
seriously.64  
A Goma-based UN Official furthermore openly blames capital-based 
implementers and the international community for being blind to the intricacy 
                                                                 
64 Similar experiences of field-based implementers are illustrated by Autesserre (2014): “In Congo in late 2010 
and early 2011 (…) interviewees working for all kinds of organizations in South Kivu complained that their 
Kinshasa-based supervisors had a profoundly biased view of the situation in their province. For the latter, 
political and security conditions were improving and on the way to stabilization, while for the former, they 
were deteriorating and on the way to extensive renewed violence” (pp. 26-27). 
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of the conflict and for consciously playing down the prevalent political and 
security conditions:  
[In Kinshasa, prevailing is] a lot of propaganda, wrong information and a biased 
way of looking at things (…) the international community is not aware of the fact 
that they promote ideas that are not based on facts, but on prejudices and biased 
information (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06).  
Following the apparently diverging and, to some extent, biased assessments 
of the implementation context, frustration among field level based 
implementers is thus verbalized: 
There I,s on the one hand, the reality in which we work, and then there is the 
myth, Kinshasa, the donors and the international community believe in. (…) Our 
[implementing actors on the ground] challenge is to live with the myth instead of 
saying openly that it’s messy, complex and grey (…) there are different ways of 
understanding the conflict. The international community tends to see the conflict 
as much easier as it is and sets itself up to fail. I never believed in it (UN Official 
b, Goma, 2012-11-10). 
International implementing actors furthermore recurrently claim that from 
2008/2009 onwards, the international community, UN agencies and NGOs 
alike, predominantly pretended to operate in the logic of a post-conflict 
situation, while in fact conflict was still ongoing. A senior Goma-based 
Diplomat thus highlights that long-term post-conflict projects were launched 
but insufficiently adapted to the actual situation: 
NGOs started to construct schools and health centres, being overly optimistic that 
peace had come some time ago and that such longer-term projects could be 
launched. But we’re still in the middle of the conflict. Many of this is getting 
destroyed now. We have to realize that we’re highly influenced by the complex 
and constantly changing context (Diplomat, Goma, 2012-10-05). 
The initiation of the ISSSS is pointed out as another example. A senior 
capital-based UN Official explains that when the ISSSS was initiated in 
2008/2009, widespread optimism prevailed among international actors based 
both in the DRC and in capital cities and Headquarters around the world that 
the conflict in eastern DRC had come to an end. The international community 
was thus searching for a possibility to promote what was perceived as a 
promising peace process. Consequently, the ISSSS was negotiated:  
The idea behind the ISSSS and STAREC was to support the peace process 
following the signing of the peace agreement. In reality, however, there was no 
peace. The ISSSS and STAREC were based on a misleading starting point (UN 
Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
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Field-based implementers thus repeatedly claim to better understand the 
prevailing complexity of the conflict situation, as well as the requirements for 
and the obstacles to the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies.  
The misinterpretation of the implementation context is commonly due to 
implementing actors having insufficient knowledge and understanding of the 
conflict, in general, and regarding the actual situation on the ground, in 
particular. In this regard, another UN Official who had originally been based 
in Kinshasa before being stationed in Goma frankly admits:  
Our initial hypothesis was faulty. We [the architects of the ISSSS] didn’t know 
enough about the situation (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15).  
A lack of understanding of the implementation environment thus becomes 
apparent in relation to the initiation of the ISSSS. While this shortcoming 
seems to be widely acknowledged, hardly any lessons learnt seem to be 
drawn. During the time of data collection in 2012, field-based implementers 
once again blamed the international community for being blind to what is 
going on in eastern DRC and for disregarding their experiences. 
Consequently, policies formulated and in particular projects initiated are 
understood as not being comprehensive enough in relation to the complex 
conflict situation. More specifically, the international community is accused 
of tending to lose sight of the conflict. In this regard, a Goma-based Diplomat 
who underlines having work experience from both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
highlights:  
I have never seen a context as complex as this one before with all these different 
levels of dispute. But the international community focuses primarily on triggers. 
What is needed is the broader picture. And the political will to change something 
at every single level (Diplomat, Goma, 2012-11-10). 
The understanding that external actors in the Congo, and notably those based 
in the capital, are basically not willing to see the complexity of the conflict is 
shared by another field-based implementer. According to the UN Official, 
this indifference is understood as inevitably leading to a failure of the 
international approach in general and the ISSSS in particular, and most likely 
even after its revision. The outbreak of violence in late 2012 due to the M23 
rebellion is therefore considered ‘useful’ as pointed out by the interviewee: 
Now, with the M23, it becomes clear that the conflict had never stopped (UN 
Official B, Goma, 2012-11-10).  
Hence, while clearly condemning the repeated outbreak of violence following 
the M23 rebellion, field-based implementers hope that in the wake of 
renewed conflict, their capital-based colleagues and the international 
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community will eventually develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
the implementation context, not least through taking the experience and the 
knowledge of field-based implementers into account (UN Official B, Goma, 
2012-11-10; EU Official b, Goma, 2012-10-08). Field-based implementers 
thus consider themselves as a resource that has so far received too little 
attention. This is of specific interest following the understanding that context 
sensitivity in peace operations is understood as impeded, amongst others, by 
too few country experts (Call & Cousens, 2008, p. 15). 
7.2 Political Setting 
Building upon the analysis of the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
conflict setting in the preceding part of the chapter, the second part of the 
chapter explores their understanding of the political setting in which SSR and 
stabilization policies are executed in the DR Congo. Considering the 
analytical framework and derived from the empirical material, this section 
focuses more specifically on the closely interlinked aspects of state fragility, 
political will, capacity and ownership, understood by implementing actors as 
constituting the political setting. Also, I will explore the implementing 
actors’ understanding of certain national and, to a lesser extent, personal 
interests, which are considered to both influence and drive the international 
peace operations in the DR Congo and thus shape the political setting in 
which SSR and stabilization policies are executed. 
7.2.1 State Fragility 
International actors repeatedly classify the DRC as a fragile state. An absent 
or fragile state can generally be defined as “a state where the government is 
not able or willing to deliver core functions to the majority of its population, 
i.e. controlling the territory and providing security” (DFID, 2005, p. 7). This 
classification of the Congo is repeatedly mentioned by interviewees and not 
least provided as a justification for the international community’s efforts in 
the country:  
You know why we [MONUSCO] are here: the DRC is almost a failed state (UN 
Official, Goma, 2012-10-10). 
According to a Goma-based Informant, the description of the DRC as a failed 
state can however be misleading. The informant rather advocates for a more 
CHAPTER 7 
 118
nuanced understanding of the Congo as a state that is functioning, albeit to a 
certain extent and in a very specific way: 
The State is not absent but only present where the money is. But the money is not 
distributed to the public; it’s used by the elite to enrich themselves (Informant, 
Goma, 2012-10-15).  
The political elites are thus accused of exploiting the political system for their 
own benefit while at the same time rendering any progress for the Congolese 
population difficult if not impossible. The weakness of the system is also 
understood as promoting insecurity and armed groups, such as the M23. The 
main difficulty is described as: 
To realize (…) that the Congolese elite is the political elite (…) the system that is 
there works in a particular way. Once you’re in a position of power, you get the 
feeling that you’ve no share with the population. You stay in the system and 
you’re not accountable to the population. The more you come in, the more you 
become part of the system (…) the way the system works; it perpetuates itself 
(Informant, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
The political system as such, including the behaviour and interests of 
responsible government officials, who are the international actors’ 
counterparts in any policy implementation efforts, is understood as a critical 
factor in the implementation context. As elaborated on in the analytical 
framework, implementing actors are expected to be responsive to their needs 
as well as to the needs and concerns of the policy recipients (Grindle, 1980, 
pp. 10-12; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 471). However, it is remarkable 
in this regard that instead of showing responsiveness, both Kinshasa- and 
Goma-based implementing actors almost consistently speak out negatively 
about their Congolese counterparts. A senior EU Official, for instance, who 
was at the time of interviewing tasked to implement development-oriented 
projects in Goma, lumps the Congolese together and criticizes their apparent 
short-sightedness. The interviewee furthermore describes them as lazy and 
difficult to persuade to work: 
I’ve been living in this country for the last 35 years. A long-term vision doesn’t 
exist. Roads were constructed but not maintained. I’m sceptical. Nothing is 
maintained. Professors and teachers are not paid (…) I still believe in our current 
electrification projects. We will help to electrify a hospital and four schools. But 
the question of sustainability and longevity – that’s something different (EU 
Official, Goma, 2012-10-12). 
A prevailing understanding among international implementing actors 
regarding the Congolese Government is that it cannot be treated as an equal 
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partner. Instead, the government is commonly described as “weak” (UN 
Official, Goma, 2012-10-16) or even as  
dysfunctional and corrupt and not working as a real government but strongly 
divided along group and personal interests (UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-06).  
A Kinshasa-based senior UN official forthrightly calls the governing 
President Joseph Kabila “an idiot” (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
Likewise, another capital-based interviewee openly questions the 
Government of President Joseph Kabila and wonders why the international 
community has not yet taken actions against it:  
To be frank, I don’t know why we’ve accepted this government for so long 
(Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-18).  
Implementing actors thus tend to generally look down on the Congolese 
public as well as on Congolese policy makers. They also repeatedly express 
themselves in a patronizing way. A senior Kinshasa-based EU Official, for 
instance, openly compares the government with recalcitrant teenagers: 
It is easy to have access to members of the government at all levels. We can have 
quite frank discussions (…) the problem here is that there’s no follow-up. The 
government is ‘a wall made up of pudding’; it reacts like a teenager. They say: 
Yes, you’re right, absolutely… but then, nothing is done (EU Official, Kinshasa, 
2013-04-15). 
Likewise, a capital-based diplomat highlights the supremacy of international 
approaches by holding the Congolese side responsible for deficiencies in the 
implementation of SSR and stabilization efforts. The interviewee furthermore 
accuses the Congolese Government of being indifferent regarding the 
interests pursued by the international community: 
The biggest problem is the Congolese side. They [the Congolese Government] 
have other objectives than what we would like them to have. There is political 
business; there are political considerations. They are not really interested in what 
we would like them to do (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-12). 
Being interested in the rationale behind such understandings, a senior EU 
Official tries to explain why the government acts as it does. According to the 
interviewee’s understanding, the government’s behaviour is not based on 
deliberate unwillingness but rather on its disorganization, classified as a 
characteristic following the weakness of the state:  
I don’t think that it’s bad will. I think it’s typical for weak states; they are not 
organized among each other. There is no follow-up in the sense that there is no 
working administration (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15).  
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The interviewee touches upon several aspects repeatedly taken up by 
Kinshasa- as well as Goma-based implementing actors, including the 
characterization of the DRC as a weak state. This, in turn, implicates 
insufficient political capacity on behalf of the government. Regarding the 
aspect of political will, however, the official’s understanding differs 
fundamentally from the understandings of the majority of implementing 
actors interviewed. While the official does not believe in deliberate 
unwillingness to reform, this is exactly what other actors interviewed 
commonly attribute to the Congolese Government; Congolese policy makers 
are almost consistently accused of lacking the political will to reform. 
The second part of the chapter will therefore focus on the aspects of 
political will, capacity and ownership, identified by implementing actors as 
further influencing the political setting they have to navigate. 
7.2.2 Political Will, Capacity and Ownership 
The roles of political will, capacity and ownership are consistently referred to 
by implementing actors and understood as shaping the political setting in 
which SSR and stabilization policies are implemented. As elaborated on in 
the theoretical foundations, political will in this study has been defined as 
“the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular 
policy solution to a particular problem” (Post et al., 2010, p. 659). Following 
this definition, capacity is understood as forming an integral part of political 
will. 
Since SSR and stabilization are identified as political processes, which lie 
at the heart of the state’s sovereignty, international actors attribute the 
responsibility for actively driving these efforts to the Congolese Government. 
In terms of the stabilization agenda, implementing actors clearly refer to the 
government’s responsibility, in terms of political commitment, as noted by a 
Kinshasa-based UN Official:  
The stabilization approach will only work if there is political will (UN Official, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).  
However, being confronted with unsatisfying results regarding progress 
achieved in both policy fields of SSR and stabilization, implementers openly 
blame the Congolese Government for being the culprit.65 Thus, the apparent 
lack of political will on behalf of the government is commonly provided as 
                                                                 
65 This argument is supported by a study of the Eastern Congo Initiative on SSR efforts in the DRC. See: 
Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI) (2012). The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector 
Reform, p. 8.  
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an explanation for policy failure, as exemplified by a Kinshasa-based 
Diplomat: 
Regarding SSR, there is a lack of political will to change something. The 
government is just not willing. Donors seem to not lose hope that it will change. 
But why should it? In the last 10 years, not much has changed. Of course, you can 
also make the picture look greyer. But, there is no real willingness on the side of 
the state and a lack of capacity. But 90% of the failure is due to unwillingness 
(Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
Repeatedly referred to throughout the interviews are apparent gaps in the 
government’s capacity to implement reforms and strategies, such as SSR and 
STAREC, which are extensively supported by the international community. 
In contrast to lacking political will, capacity gaps are predominantly taken for 
granted and not understood as a major obstacle. The prevailing understanding 
among interviewees is that those gaps are possible to fill, at least to a certain 
extent, for instance, through the provision of training activities. However, if 
the political will is missing, basically nothing is considered achievable: 
A capacity gap we can try to fill with knowledge through giving trainings. 
UNPOL, for example, trained 600 police men over a six months period. And this 
is a positive step. But in the end, if they don’t want to change anything… the lack 
of will is the biggest challenge… and we cannot do anything against their will 
(UN Official, Goma, 2012-11-10). 
Despite the lack of political will, some progress has nevertheless been 
achieved, in terms of stabilization efforts implemented under the ISSSS. 
According to a capital-based interviewee, this progress is notably located in 
technically-oriented projects, such as the development of infrastructure 
(Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). Interviewees refer, for instance, to the 
rehabilitation of several hundred kilometres of roads and the building of 
numerous police stations, court houses and prisons. Furthermore, hundreds of 
police officers and administrative officials received training that was 
provided, amongst others, by the UN and the EU (NGO Official, Goma, 
2012-10-10).66 Due to a lack of commitment and non-compliance with 
negotiated agreements, aspects of permanence and sustainability are however 
considered as remaining particularly critical: 
There are examples of what has worked as part of the ISSSS but there is still the 
question of durability and sustainability, which needs support from the 
                                                                 
66 Dixon (2012, pp. 21-22) specifies that more than 600km of roads have been rehabilitated, 81 police 
buildings were built and more than 900 police officers and more than 200 administrative officials have 
received training by the UN only. In addition to the UN, the EU has been active in training police officers 
through the EUPOL RD Congo mission (EU Council Secretariat, 2010b). 
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governmental level. But there is no true dialogue. And if there is dialogue, they’re 
not committed to agreements they made. It’s a nightmare scenario (Diplomat, 
Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). 
According to the implementing actors’ understanding, it is thus the 
Congolese Government that has to eventually take ownership of the reform 
processes. These include the policy fields of SSR and stabilization, which are 
heavily supported by the international community:  
The government has to take ownership. Programmes implemented by international 
actors are only sustainable if the government takes over; otherwise, it’s just not 
sustainable (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).  
According to the interviewee, ownership is reached when the Congolese 
Government has ‘taken over’. This understanding confirms the criticism 
raised by scholars that the concept of local ownership is oftentimes used as a 
buzzword to insist that instead of respecting local autonomy, domestic 
political structures have to take ownership over externally defined policy 
prescriptions (Donais as quoted in Sending 2009, p. 19). A Goma-based UN 
Official even demands support from the government. When commitment is 
lacking, any international effort is understood as foredoomed:  
If we don’t have the support at the national level, we will fail (UN Official, Goma, 
2012-11-06).  
In literally every single interview conducted in both Kinshasa and Goma, 
international actors remark that they see themselves as being confronted with 
a government that lacks both the political will and political commitment to 
implement reform and thus denies taking ownership, as noted by a UN 
Official:  
There is almost no political commitment. The government is not taking ownership. 
But that is what is needed (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-09). 
While international actors thus officially demand for government ownership, 
at least rhetorically, they de facto rather ‘do’ and ‘define’ than ‘support’ 
policy reforms. Hence, ownership is rather interpreted as an external instead 
of an internal process by implementing actors.67 
In terms of ownership, however, one UN Official encourages to 
distinguish between the capital- and the field level:  
                                                                 
67 Likewise, Sending (2009) argues that “[c]urrent peacebuilding practice tends to interpret ownership in a 
nominal, technocratic way, aimed at transferring responsibility of externally defined reforms to local 
authorities, yet leaving little room for genuine dialogue, experimentation and innovation to establish custom-
size approaches” (p. 19). 
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Local government officials are often on top of the game. But the problem at 
Kinshasa level is that they don’t keep their own promises (UN Official, Goma, 
2012-10-09).  
The interviewee once again underlines the understanding that more attention 
should be paid to actors and occurrences at the local level. It is however 
simultaneously remarked that field-based implementers oftentimes feel their 
hands being tied due to deficiencies at capital level: 
There is a strong link between what we do and what we can do and central reform, 
for example, in terms of decentralization and particularly regarding fiscal 
decentralization (…) No one has the leverage to push as long as the law is not in 
place. (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-09) 
As examples of the government’s unwillingness and incapacity to reform, 
implementing actors consistently refer to the inadequate follow-up of training 
activities, insufficient and unreliable payment of state officials as well as the 
government’s non-transparent deployment policy Interviewees thus criticize 
that despite the extensive international support and provision of training 
activities, the government does not take on its responsibility to adequately 
employ and care for these officials:  
The government has to change its policies; it has to provide the officials with 
appropriate salaries as well as allowances for accommodation (NGO Official, 
Goma, 2012-10-10).  
Capacity building activities are also understood as rather needless if not 
followed-up accordingly. To begin with, training activities are understood as 
doomed for failure in cases where participants basically consider the per 
diem paid as the only incentive for participation (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-
04-18). Police officers, who are inadequately paid, are furthermore 
considered as unlikely to end common practices of abuse and illegal taxation, 
as experienced by a Goma-based UN Official:  
When they [police officers who received training] hit reality and nothing has 
changed for them, they fall back into old habits (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-09).  
In line with this, another interviewee criticizes that the deployment of police 
officers who have received specialized trainings either gets delayed by the 
central administration or they are not deployed according to their specialized 
trainings. The whole idea behind capacity-building training activities is thus 
understood as being reduced to absurdity:  
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Trainers are trained but they’re not employed as trainers in the training centres. 
They end up as police officers somewhere. That’s what I’m fighting for when I’m 
in Kinshasa, but it’s very, very challenging (NGO official, Goma, 2012-10-10).  
As a further consequence of inadequate salaries and allowances, newly 
constructed buildings, such as police stations, prisons, and court houses 
frequently remain empty. Higher-ranked police officers and lawyers, if not 
paid accordingly, oftentimes decline employment opportunities in the eastern 
provinces. Hence, due to weak political back-up of the reform processes and 
despite extensive capacity-building and training programmes, the Congolese 
police is still understood as being far from professional, well-paid and 
cohesive (cf. Dixon, 2012, p. 30). Among implementing actors, it is beyond 
dispute to blame their Congolese counterparts for this non-satisfying 
situation. 
Considering the stabilization efforts concentrated under the ISSSS in 
support of the national stabilization plan STAREC, international actors 
express their concerns in a similar way. Any lack of political will to foster 
STAREC is understood as not only negatively affecting the outcomes of 
STAREC but also those of the ISSSS. Hence, interviewees once again seem 
to be worried that shortcomings on the Congolese side are directly linked to 
their own efforts. In this context, what is understood as an exemplifying 
example of the lack of political commitment on behalf of the Congolese 
Government is the insufficient provision of funds to STAREC. Therefore, 
according to implementing actors, it is the international community that 
basically has to bear the responsibility for any stabilization efforts on its own: 
The Congolese Government doesn’t provide funds. Sometimes they put in some 
money, something like 50,000 USD. But all projects are funded by the 
international community and through the I4S. But if the government doesn’t put 
money in STAREC, this is not good for creating ownership and leadership. The 
leadership is taken by the international community (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-
16). 
In this regard, however, it is remarkable that both Kinshasa- and Goma-based 
interviewees are surprisingly silent concerning the insufficient provision of 
funds to the ISSSS. Financial constraints do not seem to bother the 
implementing actors interviewed for this study although such constraints are 
continuously highlighted in the literature on both peace operations and policy 
implementation as a necessary condition for implementation (Cleaves, 1980; 
Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Thakur, 2005). This is 
more striking, as implementing actors are fully aware of the fact that funds 
for the ISSSS, predominantly consisting of bilateral donor support and 
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mission resources, are clearly not provided according to official promises. 
While the total budget requested for the ISSSS is roughly US$ 835 million, 
as of April 2012 the ISSSS had US $338.41 million in resources, out of 
which US$ 203.88 million had been spent in the first three years 
(Stabilization Support Unit, 2012, p. 3)68  
Despite the funding situation, which does not live up to expectation, 
implementing actors generally acknowledge that a strongly donor-led 
approach has emerged over the years. Some actors however consider 
international initiatives as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they are 
described as ‘somehow good’, as highlighted by a Goma-based Informant: 
“MONUSCO is keeping some sense of security” (Informant, Goma, 2012-
10-15). On the other hand, a Goma-based UN Official clarifies that the 
responsibility for providing security as well as for holding elections should 
not be “the job of international agencies” (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-16). 
In line with this, a Goma-based Informant becomes explicit regarding the role 
international actors should play: 
MONUSCO cannot and should not replace the army and the police. And it is the 
responsibility of the state to hold elections. But who took the ballots to the remote 
places? It was MONUSCO (…) the government should take the lead. But instead, 
the international community is thinking for them. Just look at the revision of the 
ISSSS. Who is concerned with it? It’s not the government; it’s the international 
community (Informant, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
The interviewee thus points out tensions between national ownership and 
external imposition in the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies. 
The process of elaborating on a joint definition of stabilization during the 
revision process of the ISSSS can serve as an example which almost 
exclusively involved international actors. While implementing actors assess 
this as inadequate, one Goma-based UN Official almost excusatorily admits 
that it appeared to be the only feasible approach: 
The Congolese are not taking part in the discussion. This is not how it should be. 
But to be honest, I must confess that it is just easier to sit down with 
internationals. It’s hard to get everybody around one table based on the political 
context at a given time. I wonder if it’s possible at all (UN Official, Goma, 2012-
10-15). 
                                                                 
68 The largest bilateral donors are the US (US$ 95.1 million), followed by the Netherlands (US$ 72.44 million) 
and the UK (US$ 57.24 million); see Stabilization Support Unit (2012). International Security and 
Stabilization Support Strategy for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Quarterly Report April to June 
2012. Kinshasa/Goma. 
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Hardly surprising, the interviewee criticizes that the ISSSS, due to the 
strategy’s virtually ‘imposed’ character, “has not been able to sell the soul of 
stabilization” (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15). Furthermore, and due to the 
absence of tangible outcomes, the population lost trust in the international 
actors’ approach:  
We built these beautiful buildings […], which are now looted, destroyed or taken 
over by the rebels. We lost the credibility and the reputation with the local 
population – and that is much more serious than losing buildings […] they tell us: 
‘you promised us – but look where we’re now!’ (UN Official, Goma, 2012-10-15) 
Judged from the perspective of the local population, who had initially put 
trust in the international community’s stabilization efforts, the activities 
carried out during the first four years of stabilization are not only considered 
as been ineffective, but even as harmful:  
It is not only a setback to zero but we’re beyond where we started (UN Official, 
Goma, 2012-10-15).  
Linked to the apparent understanding that implementing actors consider 
themselves as sitting in the driver’s seat for achieving any change true to the 
motto “we’re the donors, we have the money and we know what to do” (UN 
Official, Goma, 2012-10-15), several interviewees discretely challenge 
whether true ownership is in fact preferred by the international community. 
On the one hand, implementing actors repeatedly highlight the significance 
of ownership, which is basically equated with government ownership. On the 
other hand, several implementers challenge whether this calling for 
ownership is meant to be serious. A Goma-based UN Official, for instance, 
remarks that some international actors who disapprove the government’s 
behavior in public are accused of nevertheless supporting the president and 
its government in secret:  
The state is not caring about its own people. But there is the will to keep Kabila. 
You need to recognize this! (UN Official B, Goma, 2012-11-10) 
Building upon this, the following section will focus in-depth on interests 
understood by implementing actors as underlying the international 
community’s overall engagement in the DR Congo. 
7.2.3 Interests 
In implementation studies, it is assumed that interests can have an influence 
on the implementing actors’ strategic decision making (Lester & Goggin, 
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1998, p. 5). Investigating the implementing actors’ understanding of SSR and 
stabilization policies in the DRC, it is striking that implementing actors 
consistently refer to external national interests and, to a lesser extent, 
personal interests as influencing and driving the international peace 
operations in the DR Congo. National interests are thus frequently 
understood as the donors’ motivations to become engaged in the specific 
context of the DRC in the first place, while personal interests are understood 
as potentially influencing the implementing actors’ strategic decision making 
in the execution of SSR and stabilization. 
In this context, implementing actors raise concerns that a small number of 
influential nation-states are viewed as considerably influencing the 
embodiment of peace operation policies based on interests (EU Official, 
Goma, 2012-10-16). Justaert (2012, p. 229), for instance, describes the EU 
missions in the DRC as an instrument for EU member states to promote 
“principal foreign policy objectives” and refers more specifically to the 
gender focus from the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Other scholars, 
on contrast, point out interests, which are suspected to be masked up with the 
extensive peace operation efforts, understood as being either economically 
motivated, for instance, by the wealth of natural resources and raw materials 
in eastern DRC, or politically driven, defined in terms of former colonial 
interests (i.e. from a Belgian perspective) and the intention to sustain 
influence in the region (i.e. French interests) (Froitzheim, 2014, p. 200; 
Froitzheim, Söderbaum, & Taylor, 2011, p. 45; Lurweg, 2011, p. 117).69 In 
this context, a Goma-based UN Official bluntly remarks that:  
It’s all about interests. Everyone has his or her own interests. A joint approach is 
paramount, but people don’t want to work on a joint approach (UN Official, 
Goma, 2012-11-06).  
A senior Kinshasa-based UN Official furthermore openly accuses 
international actors of dealing in an underhanded manner, which is 
understood as provoking frustration among implementing actors:  
Peacekeeping came up for political and economic interests and is now controlled 
by these economic interests (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
                                                                 
69 As another case where national political interests are suspected to lie behind the establishment of an EU 
mission, Berg (2009) highlights for instance the predominant French interests behind the EUFOR Chad/RCA 
mission.: “Couched in positive terms, France’s goal was to stabilize the Chad government whose rule was 
seriously threatened by ever stronger rebel groups. The motive for this support can be found in the intricate 
relationship between the elites in Paris and the former French colonies known as “France Afrique”. Although 
French interest in the region has dwindled in recent years (…) entrenched networks and the clientelism of 
these elites continue to have a strong influence on French foreign policy” (p. 61). 
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In a similar vein, focusing on SSR, Chanaa (2002) highlights that the donors’ 
motivations to become engaged can commonly be understood as “cohesive 
and uncontroversial” at the very general level of the SSR agenda but that it 
becomes problematic as soon as SSR is contextualized: 
At this more specific level, international assistance to armed forces, police and 
other law enforcement agencies may often be guided, and constrained, more by the 
commercial and political interests of donor governments than by an overriding 
commitment to promoting sustained development through improving security (p. 
56). 
In line with this, implementing actors go as far as accusing members of the 
international community of not being interested in a strong and politically 
committed government to be able to follow their own interests in the DRC 
(UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15; Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).70 As 
a justifying example, a Kinshasa-based Diplomat points out the weakness 
commonly attributed to MONUSCO and its leadership, which is both heavily 
criticized and implicitly tolerated if not supported by international actors:  
MONUSCO should be much stronger and much more serious. But Meece is very 
kind. And honestly, no one challenges him (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).  
EU member states are in a similar vein suspected of masking up national 
interests with commitment shown under the EU umbrella. Following the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, on 1 January 2010, and the establishment of 
the European External Action Service, all former European Commission 
Delegations were renamed into EU Delegations. The new EU Delegations 
were thereby transformed into embassy-type institutions and are now headed 
by an ambassador from one of the EU member states. The new EU 
Delegations thus possess both greater powers compared to the former 
Commission Delegations and are much more politically-orientated compared 
to previous focus on development cooperation.71 According to a senior EU 
Official working for the EU Delegation in Kinshasa, this transformation 
implicates two advantages: First, the institutional set-up is understood as 
being more consistent, and second, the political focus is understood as 
increasing the importance of the EU as an actor: 
                                                                 
70 The apparent significance of interests in policy implementation has already been discussed in relation to 
interests of the donor community understood as influencing the translation of policy standards and objectives 
into specific policy approaches (see 5.2). 
71 For an extensive analysis of the main challenges inherent in the creation of EU Delegations following the 
Lisbon Treaty, see for example: Drieskens, E. (2012). "What’s in a Name? Challenges to the Creation of EU 
Delegations." The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7(1): 51-64.  
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The Commission was not in the driver’s seat for political dialogue. But now, 
everything is consolidated and concentrated: The political work, the political 
analysis and the political dialogue with other players is no longer isolated from the 
rest but embedded in the EU Delegation. This opens up huge opportunities in 
terms of consistency. And there is no questioning of the EU as primus inter pares. 
(EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15)  
Another EU Official however openly criticizes that this transformation has de 
facto provoked a situation in which the Delegations are much more driven by 
national political interests. In this regard, it is repeatedly criticized that the 
appointment of diplomats into leading positions is predominantly based on 
strong national interests. Regarding the specific case of the DRC, an 
economic interest due to the wealth of natural resources and raw materials in 
eastern DRC is one aspect brought up by an EU Official in Kinshasa. 
Moreover, the interviewee mentions former colonial interests and an interest 
in sustaining influence in the region, or put more simply, in ensuring 
visibility (EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-16). In other words, the Official 
accuses EU member states of pursuing economically motivated or politically 
driven interests by deliberately placing their ambassadors in EU Delegations 
of strategic significance. In line with this, understood as questionable is the 
appointment of the French Diplomat, Jean-Michel Dumond, as Head of the 
EU Delegation to the Congo:  
We [the EU] don’t have European policies [in the DRC] because we have French 
policies (…) and we [EU actors] play as if we were pure virgins. But it is not so 
clear who we are (EU Official, Goma, 2012-10-16). 
In addition to pursuing national interests through the EU Delegation, 
criticism is raised that EU member states use the cover of peace operations 
policies to de facto push national interests. EU member states are thus 
accused of taking advantage of the EU to pursue national interests: 
From time to time, you may miss one point. We have to take care, but we may 
forget that the UK, Belgium and other [EU] member states may sometimes have 
their own interests. Belgium plays traditionally a great role. If the ambassador says 
something, then that is important. But they luckily put their cards on the table. 
France is also important, and the UK has become a strong strategic actor in SSR. 
In fact, there are strong bilateral relations and it becomes obvious that the EU is 
not the only actor in town (EU Official, Kinshasa, 2013-04-15). 
In a similar vein, Gegout (2009) argues that the EU’s conflict management 
policy towards Africa is dominated by influential member states, such as 
France, setting the agenda and exploiting the EU to be still perceived as an 
ethical actor. The reason for this, according to Wong (2005), is that “the EU 
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provides even the larger states (especially those with colonial histories) a 
means to re-engage in areas of former colonial influence in Africa” (p. 147). 
Thus, “by acting as an agent of European foreign policy, Britain, France, 
Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands could claim more credit for their dual 
national/European roles in troubled areas in the African Great Lakes Region” 
(ibid.).72 
A seemingly prominent example repeatedly brought up in this regard is 
the suspicion that UK, by officially supporting and driving SSR initiatives at 
an increasing degree, de facto pursues national economic interests. A senior 
EU Official based in Kinshasa bluntly questions the UKs growing interest 
and motivation in supporting SSR in the DRC:  
The stakeholders, they all have their own agenda. They don’t tell the truth. Or why 
has the UK become a main contributor of the reform of the police although they’re 
not even French-speaking? (EU Official a, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10).  
Confronted with the severity of this statement, the informant claims that the 
interest in and the sheer number of bilateral policy initiatives pursued in the 
DR Congo proves the statement to be correct. Although the UK is considered 
a prominent example, it is not the only country that is accused of masking up 
economic interests with initiatives supporting SSR. In this regard, a senior 
Kinshasa-based EU expert on SSR accuses certain member states of using the 
EU SSR missions as “a political tool covering strong interests in resources” 
(EU Official B, Kinshasa, 2013-04-10). Following the understanding that the 
policies as such thus tend to generally fade into the background, independent 
of how they are formulated or implemented, implementing actors express 
feelings of frustration and resignation. 
However, this negative understanding is not consistently shared. A 
Kinshasa-based Diplomat, for instance, speaks out more diplomatically on 
the same issue. While the interviewee does not generally neglect the fact that 
economic interests do play a role, those are understood as at least not 
exclusively motivating the international community’s engagement:  
There are economic interests, of course, but those interests do not motivate the 
extensive commitment of the international community in general and the 
commitment of specific nation-states in particular (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-
16).  
                                                                 
72 Likewise, Olsen (2009, p. 245) argues that EU military conflict management policies have been and are still 
first and foremost motivated “by European concerns and European interests” and only secondly by concerns 
for Africa: “Because (…) [EU] conflict management is guided by the principle of intergovernmentalism, some 
member states, particularly France, exert significant influence on the EU’s conflict management policy in 
Africa” (ibid.) 
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The diplomat further describes the argumentation that the general interest in 
the DRC can be interpreted as being primarily based on economic interests as 
a “premature analysis” (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-16). According to the 
interviewee’s understanding, it is rather unlikely that the quite extensive 
British support for SSR initiatives creates economic benefits and influence.73 
While the issue of economic interests understood as possibly influencing 
policy objectives and approaches is thus repeatedly raised, interviewees 
commonly do not want to go more into detail. One capital-based diplomat 
however explicitly links the focus on the conflict to interests regarding the 
mineral wealth of eastern DRC: 
If you ask five people about the situation in the East, you will get five different 
answers. The problem is that the situation is so crazy, so complex, and so messy 
(…) and at the same time, everyone is talking about minerals. The interest in 
minerals, such as coltan, puts a stronger focus on the conflict (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 
2013-04-18). 
Also addressed in the interviews is an apparent crisis-driven interest in 
showing presence. This aspect links back to the criticism discussed in the 
literature, in terms of the oftentimes rather short political attention spans 
regarding peace operations (cf. 2.3.4 and Call & Cousens, 2008). In this 
context, one example is provided by an EU Official pointing out that the EU 
member states’ interest in supporting SSR activities is generally decreasing 
except for acute crisis situations, such as the M23 rebellion in eastern DRC in 
2012. According to the interviewees’ understanding, EUPOL RD Congo 
would not have been closed if the M23 had taken control over Goma before 
the decision to close the mission was made (EU Official a, Kinshasa, 2013-
04-10).74 
In terms of personal interests, a senior Kinshasa-based UN Official 
bluntly accuses international implementing actors of behaving in a certain 
way, putting forward personal interests to maximize personal profit. 
According to the interviewee, this behaviour should not be linked to 
individual cases but should rather be understood as a behaviour that is built 
into the system of international peace operations in the DRC. In this regard, 
the pursuing of personal interests is understood as spreading suspiciousness 
                                                                 
73 Another example given by the interviewee is German support regarding the certification of minerals under 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This support is also not understood as being driven by 
the aim of driving economic interests forward (Diplomat, Kinshasa, 2013-04-16). For more information on the 
EITI, see: https://eiti.org/ (accessed 25 March 2018). 
74 For a similar argument on security interests understood as determining the level of emergency assistance, 
see: Olsen, G. R., N. Carstensen, et al. (2003). "Humanitarian Crises: What Determines the Level of 
Emergency Assistance? Media Coverage, Donor Interests and the Aid Business." Disasters 27(2): 109-126.  
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among implementing actors. This is repeatedly mentioned both explicitly and 
implicitly by Kinshasa- and Goma-based actors:  
You have people here who have been here for years. But then you get partial. I 
suspect that many people [international actors] have their own business interests. 
It’s a bad habit that people stay here for too long. (UN Official, Kinshasa, 2013-
04-15)  
Consequently, implementers repeatedly find themselves struggling with their 
work assignments and their role as actors implementing peace operation 
policies. In this context, one EU Official cynically notes: 
Before I came here [Goma], I thought everyone is for the same thing [supporting 
the peace process]. But Bosco [Ntaganda] played tennis with the MONUSCO 
people (EU Official b, Goma, 2012-10-08). 75 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the implementing actors’ understanding of the 
implementation context identified as influencing policy implementation. The 
chapter thus sought to provide the third and last building block aiming at 
investigating the implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo. 
In terms of the implementing actors’ understanding of the conflict setting, 
a divide between field- and capital-based implementing actors becomes 
visible. Independent of any organizational affiliation or policy focus, field-
based implementers consistently refer to the intricate conflict situation, which 
is understood as severely shaping the implementation context and thus 
impeding policy execution. Field-based implementers highlight two 
implications for policy implementation: first, practical challenges relating to 
their day-to-day work including travel restrictions, which severely limit the 
area of operation. Second, the launch of unrealistic projects and programmes 
based on misjudgments of the severity of the conflict situation by capital-
based implementers and the international community. 
Field-based actors thus claim to have better understanding of the 
prevailing complexity of the conflict situation in eastern DRC as well as of 
the requirements for and obstacles to the implementation of SSR and 
stabilization policies. While this contextual knowledge could be used to 
                                                                 
75 As briefly discussed in chapter 5, Bosco Ntaganda is a former leader of the CNDP. In 2009, Ntaganda and 
his fighters were integrated into the FARDC; however, in 2012, he led a mutiny that turned into the M23 
rebellion. Following infighting between various M23 factions in March 2013, Ntaganda turned himself in to 
the US Embassy in Rwanda from where he was flown to The Hague. In late 2015, the trial in his case at the 
International Criminal Court began where he is accused of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
the DRC (Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
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improve the formulation of policies in general and the development of policy 
approaches, in particular, field-based actors remark instead that they do not 
feel taken seriously, have a general sense of inferiority and feel obliged to 
even pretend doing business as usual in situations where policy execution has 
de facto become impossible. 
In sum, despite the underlined need for context-sensitive policies and 
projects, disregarding the context-specific knowledge of field-based 
implementers can be interpreted as a missed opportunity (cf. chapter 6). 
Furthermore, the strong emphasis on the complexities that field-based 
implementers have to deal with on a daily basis puts peace operation efforts 
and in particular the limited success of interventions in a different 
perspective. It thus calls for more flexibly formulated projects and 
programmes and emphasizes the necessity for implementers to have at least 
some room to manoeuvre in the implementation process. 
In terms of key issues constituting the political setting, the weakness and 
absence of the state as well as the role of political will, capacity and 
ownership are commonly highlighted by implementing actors. Interests are 
furthermore referred to as influencing the international peace operations in 
the DR Congo and thus shaping the political setting in which SSR and 
stabilization policies are executed. 
Derived from the empirical material, it is striking that both capital- and 
field-based implementers speak out negatively on their Congolese 
counterparts. By highlighting the perceived supremacy of international actors 
and approaches and by challenging the legitimacy of the Congolese 
Government, implementers, notably Kinshasa-based actors, tend to deny their 
Congolese counterparts of both the capacity and the political will to execute 
political reforms, including SSR and stabilization. This behaviour thus calls 
into question the responsiveness of international implementers regarding the 
needs and worries of policy recipients (Grindle, 1980, pp. 10-12; Van Meter 
& Van Horn, 1975, p. 471).  
Furthermore, it is striking that implementing actors, on the hand, attribute 
the responsibility for driving SSR and stabilization approaches to the 
Congolese Government and thus demand the Congolese side to take 
ownership. On the other hand, a strongly donor-led approach has emerged in 
which international actors basically define policy reforms and tell the 
government what it ought to do. This approach is justified with an apparent 
lack of political will and capacity on behalf of the Congolese Government. 
Interaction, as elaborated on in the preceding chapter, thus becomes of 
significance, in terms of pushing the Congolese Government towards the 
international implementers’ will. Interestingly though, insufficient financial 
CHAPTER 7 
 134
resources provided for the implementation of SSR, and stabilization projects 
are hardly mentioned by implementing actors. 
Instead, national, and to a lesser extent personal interests are viewed as 
influencing the embodiment of policies, most notably in the context of 
security sector reform. Actors thereby differentiate between interests being 
either politically or economically motivated. The UK, for instance, has been 
accused of providing support to SSR, aiming at fostering national economic 
interests. In line with this, the EU is understood as being an umbrella for 
disguising national interests in the DRC viewed as being, for instance, 
directly built into the Delegation structure through the possibility of 
delegating diplomats to strategic positions. In terms of personal interests, 
implementing actors furthermore accuse colleagues of becoming partial and 
linking any official employment with the aim of maximizing personal profit. 
In sum, implementing actors share the understanding that certain factors 
in the implementation context affect policy execution. While field-based 
actors however predominantly refer to the complexity of the given conditions 
on the ground, including the situation of ongoing conflict and general 
insecurity, capital-based implementers refer to the weakness of the state, a 
perceived lack of political will, capacity and ownership as well as the 
influence of first and foremost national interests on policy execution. A 
situation has thus emerged in which Goma-based actors do not feel taken 
seriously by their colleagues and superiors in Kinshasa but blame them for 
consciously turning a blind eye on the intricacy of the local circumstances. At 
capital-level, in turn, international implementing actors seem to disregard 
their Congolese counterparts, leading to a situation in which the significance 
of political will and ownership on behalf of the Congolese Government is 
consistently pointed out as necessary but remains de facto in the hands of 
international implementing actors. The implementation context, both 
regarding the conflict and the political setting, are thus understood as clearly 
affecting the execution of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo. 
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8.Conclusion 
Peacekeeping and stabilization [in the DR Congo]? A mess at the moment, no 
doubt about it (UN Official a, Goma, 2012-10-15). 
Considering the troubling lack of adequate knowledge on what happens when 
peace operations are executed, this study investigated the implementation of 
peace operations deployed by the international community in third countries. 
More specifically, the research explored the execution of SSR and 
stabilization policies as part of the broader peace operation efforts in the DR 
Congo. Since the actors who are responsible for policy execution have to 
understand and interpret the policies before making decisions at the 
implementation stage, their understanding of implementation became the key 
focus of analysis. 
In the broader context of the study, this conclusion draws together the 
empirical findings and the theoretical implications to provide answers to the 
overall research question, which motivated as well as guided the study at 
hand. I will furthermore reflect on the analytical framework gathered by 
drawing upon implementation studies. Moreover, I will discuss the 
applicability of this inquiry beyond the DR Congo, in terms of using an 
implementation approach to contribute knowledge on what happens when 
peace operations are executed as well as discuss how an implementation 
focus can help to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Finally, I will 
explore potential avenues for future research. This conclusion thus argues for 
the relevance of the study’s findings, by pointing out its potential to enrich 
ongoing debates and puzzles in the field of peace operations through 
explicitly focusing on the stage of policy execution. 
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8.1 The Execution of SSR and Stabilization in the 
DR Congo 
This study investigated the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies 
targeted at the DR Congo. By combining the results from the three empirical 
chapters, the following section provides answers to the overarching research 
question formulated as: How do implementing actors understand the 
implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo? 
The overall picture painted by implementing actors is one in which the 
implementation of SSR and stabilization policies as part of the broader peace 
operations targeted at the DR Congo is understood as deficient. The 
execution of SSR policies is, for instance, summarized by a field-based 
implementer as “a daily struggle with unsatisfactory results” (EU Official, 
Goma, 2012-10-11). According to the implementing actors, there are multiple 
reasons for the perceived deficiencies at the stage of policy execution. 
Implementing actors furthermore point out notably national interests as 
underlying and motivating and thus affecting the international peace 
operation efforts in the DR Congo. 
Building upon the three sub-research questions, the following sections 
summarize the overall findings of the three empirical chapters, which focused 
at the stage of policy execution on the implementing actors’ understanding of 
the policy content, actor interaction taking place and the implementation 
context. Hence, I will explore the implementing actors’ attempts to balance 
policy ambiguities and to handle the dominance of technically-oriented 
approaches, to use interaction strategically and to deal with obstacles 
impeding interaction, as well as to manoeuvre ongoing conflict, a particular 
political setting and various underlying interests. 
8.1.1 Balancing Policy Vagueness and the Dominance of 
Technically-Oriented Policy Approaches 
Implementing actors in both Kinshasa and Goma almost consistently point 
out the vagueness and ambiguity of the standards and objectives regarding 
SSR and stabilization policies, which provoke different interpretations among 
implementers and thus affect the process of policy execution. This 
understanding contrasts the assumption that policy standards and objectives 
are supposed to be clear, appropriate and achievable to reveal more concrete 
aspects of the policy and to facilitate similar understandings and 
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interpretations among implementing actors in the process of implementation 
(Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, p. 466). 
A prime example that implementers refer to in this context is the concept 
of stabilization upon which the ISSSS is developed. Besides limited practical 
experiences among implementers with the execution of stabilization policies 
and the novelty of having stabilization integrated into an ongoing peace 
operation, the concept of stabilization remained undefined during the first 
phase of the ISSSS. Hence, a situation emerged in which interpretations 
ranged from identifying stabilization as a military-led strategy to ‘clear hold 
and build’ unstable areas, to identifying stabilization as a development-
oriented bottom-up approach in areas of relative stability.  
While a certain flexibility of the policy standards and objectives can 
possibly allow for discretion (cf. Lipsky, 1971, p. 15; Barrett, 2004, p. 252), 
thus enabling implementers to adapt stabilization policies to the specific 
circumstances or to interpret stabilization in combination with other policies, 
such as SSR, implementing actors criticize that they predominantly have to 
translate the stabilization objectives into technical infrastructure-focused 
projects. Therefore, a discrepancy is identified between claims of pursuing 
political objectives at the stage of policy formulation and a de facto technical 
orientation of projects at the stage of policy execution. However, among 
implementing actors, different views prevail pertaining to the dominance of 
technical policy interpretations. 
One group of implementing actors, particularly in the field of SSR, refers 
to the motto of ‘becoming realistic’ in relation to the specific context in the 
DR Congo. Politically-oriented objectives are thus subordinated to the given 
circumstances and to what appears ‘manageable’ to implement. Another 
group of implementers refers to the funding agencies’ condition of achieving 
visibility and publicity (cf. Sedra, 2010). Implementers thus feel compelled to 
implement visible short-term projects to satisfy the donor community, which 
implies the translation of policies into certain projects that they do not believe 
in. Providing visibility and publicity is however at the same time understood 
as securing the funding which can then, at least partly, be used for more time-
consuming, comprehensive and from a donors’ perspective less attractive 
political-oriented projects (cf. Schiavo-Campo, 2003). The most prominent 
example given in this context is the attractiveness of projects against SGBV 
in eastern DRC (cf. Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2010), versus the 
unattractiveness of the provision of strategic advice to top-level officials 
within the Congolese National Police in Kinshasa. 
A third group of implementers, notably executing stabilization policies, 
do not accept but explicitly call attention to the perceived shortcomings of 
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favouring technical approaches, thus, demanding for a more political 
orientation of the ISSSS. Referring to the dominance of infrastructure 
projects, in terms of building roads, prisons, police stations and court houses 
which were for the most part used for purposes other than intended or even 
destroyed during the M23 rebellion, implementers insist on changing the 
focus of the ISSSS to emphasize the paramount significance of political 
processes in any stabilization efforts in eastern DRC.  
To summarize, the empirical analysis of the implementing actors’ 
understanding of the policy content highlights that understandings and 
interpretations among implementing actors differ, mainly due to ambiguously 
formulated policy standards and objectives. It shows furthermore that 
implementers can be restricted by certain requirements and simultaneously 
possess a certain amount of flexibility in implementation. While 
implementers oftentimes have to align policy execution with donor interests, 
this requirement can also, depending on the implementers’ decision-making, 
be interpreted as creating room for programmes understood as essential from 
an implementer’s but less attractive from a donor’s perspective. Hence, 
implementers play a decisive role in policy execution. The prominence of 
implementing actors becomes further visible in the revision process of the 
ISSSS in which the field level implementers’ demand for acknowledging the 
significance of political processes de facto resulted in a more politically-
oriented stabilization approach. 
8.1.2 Using Interaction Strategically and Dealing with 
Obstacles to Interaction 
In terms of actor interaction, implementing actors consistently share the 
understanding that interaction is considered inevitable to balance the 
vagueness of the policy content of SSR and stabilization and thus to align the 
international approach. Both capital- and field-based implementers 
furthermore agree that increased interaction facilitates a concerted approach. 
Yet, the aims to be achieved through interaction differ drastically. 
According to field-based implementers, the sharing of information is 
essential to reach better understanding of what other actors in the same policy 
field are doing. Through interacting, implementers thus try to avoid a lack or 
overlap of projects and programmes to be executed. Provided as cautionary 
tales are bilaterally conducted training activities in the field of SSR, which 
remained uncoordinated and created dissatisfaction and frustration both 
among international implementers and Congolese policy recipients. Field-
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based implementers thus understand interaction as a way to enhance policy 
execution. Their capital-based colleagues, in contrast, aim at strengthening 
their position and at creating pressure to ‘push’ their Congolese counterparts 
to invest in SSR and stabilization policies according to the international 
actors’ understanding (cf. Uvin, 1999). 
While implementers consider interaction as necessary in the process of 
policy execution, yet from different perspectives, they concurrently refer to 
several obstacles. To begin with, they point out the spatial distance between 
Kinshasa and Goma, as well as the institutional set-up, which is described as 
hierarchical. Because of the spatially given and structurally created distance, 
sharing and exchange of information as well as transfer of tasks and 
responsibilities from the capital to the eastern provinces is described as ill-
functioning. Hence, due to substantially unequal access to information, field-
based implementers, in particular, feel restricted in their task to execute SSR 
and stabilization policies resulting in feelings of discrimination. 
Further aspects identified as affecting implementation relate to the style 
of leadership, the prominence of personalities and competitive behavior, 
among especially field-based implementers. Roger Meece, by-then Head of 
MONUSCO, is described as being weak and accused of neither pulling the 
strings nor interlinking the different units. Indecisive leadership, or rather 
leadership performance almost solely associated with the pursuit of certain 
interests, combined with the prominence of personalities is understood by 
implementers as certainly affecting interaction and thus the implementation 
process. An overall loss of significance of SSR activities within MONUSCO 
was, for instance, attributed to personal differences among top-level officials. 
Similarly, under the revised structure of the EU Delegations, interaction is 
understood as impeded by ‘different cultures’ between diplomats and EU 
Commission Officials. 
To summarize, the empirical analysis highlights that actor interaction is 
both used strategically and impeded by several factors. While actor 
interaction is considered essential in policy execution, be it to streamline 
international approaches or to strengthen the own position and to create 
pressure on the Congolese counterparts, the hierarchical and capital-focused 
institutional set-up in combination with the spatial distance between Kinshasa 
and Goma, a lack of leadership and the prominence of personalities are 
understood as negatively affecting interaction and thus the implementing 
actors’ policy execution efforts. 
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8.1.3 Manoeuvring Ongoing Conflict, a Particular Political 
Setting and Interests 
Focusing on the implementation context, and more specifically on factors in 
the implementation context, which are considered as affecting policy 
execution, this inquiry illustrates fundamental differences in the 
understanding of capital- and field-based implementing actors.  
According to field-based implementers, the intricate and challenging 
conflict setting constitutes a major stumbling block in policy execution (cf. 
Karkoszka, 2002). Implementing actors not only have to be highly flexible 
and adaptive in their everyday working life but also time and again escalating 
conflicts may provoke situations in which policy execution becomes de facto 
impossible. This is for instance the case if the liberty of action is severely 
restricted due to travel limitations following deteriorating conflict situations. 
Yet, field-based implementers accuse their capital-based colleagues and 
superiors as well as the international community, located in headquarters and 
capital cities around the world, of downplaying the experienced conditions. 
Field-based actors thus undergo a situation in which their ‘experienced 
reality’ remains unacknowledged or even neglected. Hence, instead of being 
consulted and taken seriously, they feel pressured to pretend to engage in 
business as usual even if the execution of policies has de facto become 
impossible.  
Kinshasa-based implementers, in contrast, highlight the weakness of the 
state, prevailing lack of political will, capacity and ownership as factors 
impeding implementation. Identified at capital-level is thus the political 
setting rather than the context of ongoing conflict and general insecurity. 
Exploring the political setting more in-depth, it is striking that international 
implementing actors do not consider their Congolese counterparts as equal 
partners but almost consistently speak out negatively about them. They are 
accused of being indifferent to international support and, based on the 
allegation of lacking political will to reform, made responsible for any 
deficiencies in the implementation of SSR and stabilization efforts.  
Moreover, implementing actors consider peace operation policies as 
frequently being de facto motivated in the first place by national interests. 
These interests are considered as underlying any international efforts aiming 
at pushing through political or economic objectives as well as showing 
presence and maintaining influence in the DRC and the wider African Great 
Lakes region. EU member states are furthermore accused of masking up 
national interests with commitment shown under the EU umbrella or, more 
concretely, by appointing diplomats into leading positions in the EU 
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Delegation. Implementing actors are thus confronted with interests that do 
not directly play out at the stage of policy execution, but which are 
understood as being of significance at an overarching level. This study thus 
illustrated that implementing actors have to deal with interests, which are 
located at a level beyond their area of influence in the process of policy 
execution. Implementers furthermore suspect colleagues of pursuing personal 
interests rather than working towards the greater good of the Congolese 
society. 
To summarize, the empirical analysis of the implementing actors’ 
understanding of the implementation context highlights that profound 
differences prevail between capital- and field-based implementers. While the 
former identifies a lack of political will, insufficient political capacity and 
unwillingness to take ownership as affecting policy execution, their field-
based colleagues refer to the conflict setting that they have to navigate on a 
daily basis. Field-based implementers furthermore accuse their Kinshasa-
based colleagues and superiors of neglecting the complexity of the 
implementation context they are confronted with.  
8.2 Reflections on the Analytical Framework 
By drawing upon implementation studies, this inquiry explicitly focused on 
the implementing actors’ understandings and decisions made at the stage of 
policy execution. The analytical framework underlying this inquiry and 
providing the analytical tools to study the implementation of peace 
operations, was developed upon key issues distilled from the theoretical 
discussions in the two fields of peace operations and policy implementation. 
By combing these key issues identified as constituting implementation, the 
analytical framework was constructed around the three aspects of policy 
content, actor interaction and implementation context. Considering the 
empirical analysis carried out and the findings presented in this study, the 
focus of the analytical framework on these three aspects proved to be both 
appropriate and useful to investigate the implementation of peace operations 
in the DR Congo.  
Reflecting furthermore on the applicability of the framework, I argue that 
the framework is neither bound to the specific case of the implementation of 
peace operations in the DR Congo nor to the policy fields of SSR and 
stabilization as sub-units of analysis. Instead, aiming at exploring the policy 
content, policies are generally expected to be clear, appropriate and 
achievable while some flexibility may create room for implementers to 
interpret and adjust objectives to the given conditions in the implementation 
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context (cf. Brahimi, 2000, p. 10; Karlsrud, 2013; Lipsky, 2010; van der Lijn, 
2009, p. 52; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Actor interaction is furthermore 
understood as an integral part of the implementation process as such since it 
influences any action and behaviour of those actors responsible for policy 
execution (cf. Elmore, 1979). Finally, conditions in the implementation 
context are commonly expected to affect implementing actors in their policy 
execution efforts (cf. Grindle, 1980; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Hence, 
considering the focus of the aspects of policy content, actor interaction, and 
the implementation context, I argue that the framework is not bound to any 
specific policy or the case in focus. While the framework thus proved to be 
both useful and applicable, several challenges were encountered. 
To begin with and drawing upon implementation studies to investigate the 
execution of peace operations, one must have in mind that peace operation 
policies have different orientation compared to national public policies. 
Implementation studies have so far predominantly focused on public policies, 
which are formulated and implemented within a domestic political setting. In 
the field of global policy studies, the focus has notably been on policy 
implementation in global and regional institutions (cf. Kwon, 2013; Soroos, 
1990; Stone, 2008). Peace operation policies, however, are usually 
formulated and decided upon by actors of the international community but 
directed at and implemented in third countries. Hence, international activities 
in the field of SSR imply, for instance, the provision of strategic support to 
decision-makers within the national police and the armed forces, while the 
ultimate responsibility for the reform of the security sector remains with 
national policy-makers. Similarly, in the field of stabilization, the 
international community agreed upon the ISSSS to bundle international 
efforts aiming at supporting initiatives under the Congolese owned 
stabilization strategy STAREC. Hence, implementing actors tasked to 
execute international peace operation policies are commonly ‘external’ to the 
society in which they act. While it is not given that actors implementing 
national policies are automatically familiar with the prevailing conditions in 
the implementation context, international implementers may be confronted 
with even bigger challenges, in terms of having different national 
backgrounds, speaking various languages and operating in a setting they are 
not accustomed to.76 These aspects may make high demands on international 
implementing actors and thus influence implementation. While I was initially 
afraid that the study’s focus on the diverse group of international 
implementing actors could potentially pose major difficulties, the framework 
developed allowed me to account for the complexity and facilitated the 
                                                                 
76 To recap, focusing only on MONUSCO, the mission’s personnel come from 55 different countries. 
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inclusion of several aspects concerning, for instance, the role of personalities, 
organizational cultures and leadership style in the analysis. 
Moreover, there is a general risk that there may be overlaps between the 
different aspects upon which the analytical framework is established. 
Furthermore, findings may become visible which as such do not neatly fit 
into the framework. Since this study does not represent an exception, the 
interconnectedness of findings subsumed under the three categories of the 
policy content, actor interaction and implementation context poses a further 
challenge. Hence, in the process of data analysis as well as throughout the 
writing of the empirical chapters, the categories were at times difficult to 
keep apart. One such example is the implementing actors’ understanding that 
the translation of SSR policies into more concrete projects is driven by the 
perceived necessity of ‘becoming realistic’, in terms of defining de facto 
manageable projects regarding the prevailing conditions in the 
implementation context. Contextual factors were also identified as affecting 
actor interaction. Implementing actors referred, for instance, to the given 
spatial distance between Kinshasa and Goma in combination with a 
hierarchical capital-centred institutional set-up.  
Being confronted with these overlapping categories, I tried both to 
arrange the empirical findings in the best way possible and to maintain the 
structure developed in the analytical framework. In cases of overlap, I 
inserted references to other sections in which similar aspects were discussed. 
Hence, I tried not to be too rigid but to allow the empirical findings to be 
visible even if the empirical chapters thus became less neat and tidy, as I had 
hoped for. 
A specific challenge in this context is related to the aspect of interests, 
and notably national interests, as it was brought up throughout the interviews. 
Apart from interests on behalf of the donor community which play out at the 
stage of policy execution, implying for instance the implementers’ necessity 
of translating policies into visible and publicly-exploitable projects, the 
empirical material put forth other interests that are understood as underlying 
and motivating the international community’s concern to become engaged in 
the first place. While these interests are thus located beyond the stage of 
policy execution and thus beyond the implementing actors’ area of influence, 
they are nevertheless understood as influencing policy implementation. The 
challenge was thus to integrate these specific empirical findings in the 
analysis. Hence, I had to allow for a category that did not neatly fit into the 
analytical framework to become visible. Eventually, I decided to explore the 
aspect of interests as part of the political setting and thus the implementation 
context. 
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8.3 Thinking Beyond the Congo 
Building upon the reflections on the analytical framework, this section 
focuses more specifically on possibilities to broaden the research by thinking 
beyond the case of the implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo. 
In this context, I argue that some of the more specific findings, based on the 
similarity of initial conditions of peace operations, may not only be valid in 
the context of the implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo. 
While several factors in relation to peace operations certainly differ, such as 
the scope of the mission and the specific local circumstances, the initial 
conditions upon which peace operations are based remain similar. 
Considering that these initial conditions are commonly referred to in studies 
concerning peace operations, I argue that the implementing actors’ 
understandings of these initial conditions are presumably similar across 
cases, at least to a certain extent.  
To begin with, peace operation policies in general, and mission mandates 
in particular, are expected to be clear, credible and achievable (cf. Brahimi, 
2000; Tull, 2009). At the same times, however, they are frequently criticized 
for being vague and ambiguous (Hänggi, 2004; Muggah, 2014b). 
Ambiguously formulated peace operation policies can thus generally be 
considered as potentially provoking diverging understandings among 
implementing actors and affecting policy execution. Moreover, half-hearted 
or compromise mandates are considered as dangerous. The case of the failure 
of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) before and 
during the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 can serve as a prime example 
illustrating what may eventually happen when a peace operation mandate 
remains inadequately contextualized regarding its content, lacking, for 
instance, an adequate political analysis of the implementation context, and 
considering the means provided to implement the mandate, relying, for 
instance, on a very limited number of personnel (Carlsson, Han, & Kupolati, 
1999, pp. 31-32). 
Repeatedly highlighted is also the dominance of technically-oriented 
short-term projects outweighing political activities (cf. Chappuis & Bryden, 
2015). Moreover, the existence of hierarchically-organized mission structures 
and the prominence of personality issues and leadership style are often 
mentioned (cf. Nilsson & Zetterlund, 2014). I therefore assume that field- and 
capital-based implementing actors commonly feel disconnected although the 
rather exceptional spatial distance between Kinshasa and the eastern 
provinces, in combination with very limited travel connections may be an 
added factor. In this context, implementing actors also identified the 
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perceived weakness and lack of leadership of Roger Meece, the by-then 
SRSG and Head of MONUSCO, as impinging upon policy execution. 
Karlsrud (2013, p. 525), however, shows that SRSGs in other contexts have 
de facto positively influenced policy execution by taking advantage of 
decentralized authority structures as well as physical distance and 
independence from UN Headquarters. Hence, thinking beyond the 
implementation of peace operations in the DR Congo, it is of interest to 
deepen the analysis of the role of mission structures and leadership style. 
Moreover, complex conflict situations and political settings characterized 
by lack of political will, capacity and ownership on behalf of the receiving 
end are not unusual in fragile post-conflict contexts in which peace 
operations are commonly deployed (cf. Brinkerhoff, 2007; Hendrickson & 
Karkoszka, 2002). Hence, implementing actors in other implementation 
contexts are expected to experience similar challenges, including, for 
instance, practical challenges, relating to the day-to-day work of field-based 
implementers, such as travel restrictions and the launch of unrealistic projects 
and programmes based on misjudgements of the severity of the given conflict 
situation. Moreover, capital-based implementers are expected to be 
confronted with challenges related to the weakness of the state and thus, 
related to aspects of political will, capacity and ownership. The relevance of 
various interests underlying international peace operation efforts is 
furthermore repeatedly highlighted (cf. Berg, 2009; Justaert, 2012). Although 
the Congolese case, in terms of interests, may be specific regarding the 
country’s exceptional wealth of resources, interests are also beyond the 
Congo expected to provoke the entanglement of support for peace operations, 
with the pursuing of economic and strategic objectives in the receiving 
country. Hence, the political setting in which peace operations are 
implemented are commonly expected to be shaped, at least to some extent, by 
interests. 
To summarize, the analytical framework developed, and the findings 
illustrated, encourage one to think beyond the case of the implementation of 
peace operations in the DR Congo. I thus argue that based on similar initial 
conditions regarding peace operations, several findings presented in this 
study are presumably not exclusively valid in the context of the 
implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the DR Congo but may 
be transferrable, at least to a certain extent, to other contexts. This inquiry, 
therefore, provides a major piece to the puzzle on what happens when the 
international community executes peace operations in third countries and 
why peace operations look as they do in practice. 
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8.4 Bridging Theory and Practice through an 
Implementation Focus 
Although a multitude of peace operations are currently deployed around the 
world in extremely complex conflict situations to implement increasingly 
challenging duties and responsibilities (cf. Bellamy & Hunt, 2015), this 
inquiry shows that there remains a lack of knowledge on what happens when 
peace operations are executed. In this section, I will thus explore how a focus 
on the stage of policy implementation can contribute to bridge the prevailing 
gap between the theory and practice of peace operations. 
To begin with, this inquiry suggests shifting the focus of interest on the 
implementing actors. Implementing actors are those actors that possess the 
authority, responsibility and the resources to execute policies (Nakamura & 
Smallwood, 1980, p.47). Furthermore, their decisions, work routines and 
strategies to handle uncertainties are expected to become the policies they 
implement (Lipsky, 1971, p. xiii). Implementing actors are thus expected to 
play a decisive role in policy implementation.  
Considering the findings of this study, the anticipated significance of 
implementing actors regarding the execution of peace operations becomes 
explicit. As highlighted in the empirical analysis, implementing actors have 
to balance policy ambiguities, align diverging policy approaches and adapt 
projects to a challenging and fast-changing implementation context. Field-
based implementers thus consider themselves as a resource not least 
regarding context specific knowledge in policy implementation. It is 
therefore striking that the implementing actors’ role in policy execution has 
so far been underestimated, in particular against the claim that context 
sensitivity in peace operations is impeded, amongst others, by too few 
country experts (Call & Cousens, 2008, p. 15). Implementing actors are 
furthermore expected to satisfy the donor community by translating policies 
into visible and publicly exploitable short-term projects, which, at the same 
time, may create room to manoeuvre to implement less visible politically-
oriented projects. Despite difficulties encountered such as the spatial distance 
between Kinshasa and Goma and a hierarchical capital-focus institutional set-
up affecting equal access to information, implementing actors are 
furthermore expected to interact with diverse actors involved in policy 
execution. Hence, implementing actors interlink different actors at different 
levels in the process of policy execution (cf. Lipsky, 2010, p. xiii). 
Consequently, the findings suggest that the decisions made by implementing 
actors de facto become the policies they execute. 
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This inquiry furthermore argues for a more nuanced focus which 
distinguishes between policy implementation at the capital- and field level 
due to potentially significant differences occurring within the targeted 
country. As this inquiry has shown, field-based implementing actors have to 
navigate situations of recurring conflict, while capital-based implementers 
have to essentially deal with the given political setting characterized by state 
fragility and perceived lack of political will and ownership. Implementing 
actors are thus confronted with different situations at the outset. In addition to 
acknowledging these differences, policy standards and objectives should 
furthermore be translated into more concrete policy approaches, which are 
explicitly adapted to the particular implementation environment. Hence, the 
significant role played by implementing actors regarding the execution of 
peace operations is once again highlighted. 
Consequently, by choosing an implementation focus and by highlighting 
the role played by implementing actors, which is considered as vital though 
understudied, this study provides crucial knowledge on what emerges as 
peace operations are executed, and thus enhances our understanding on the 
embodiment of policy-in-practice. This knowledge will help to ultimately 
bridge the prevailing divide between the theory and practice of peace 
operations. 
8.5 Future Research 
The research findings presented in this thesis should be viewed as 
contributing to deeper understanding of the implementation of peace 
operations deployed by the international community in third countries. They 
should thus not be considered as providing all-encompassing and ultimate 
answers. Hence, in this final section, I will elaborate on two themes for future 
research that I consider as important to pursue. 
First, the findings presented in this inquiry suggest that the implementing 
actors’ role in policy execution has so far been undervalued. Future research 
could thus expand the focus of this inquiry, in relation to the role played by 
implementing actors in policy implementation. While I tried to stress 
diverging understandings among implementers, for instance, between capital- 
and field-based actors, future studies could further explore whether more 
explicit patterns, in terms of shared or diverging understandings may become 
visible and if such patterns become visible, how they would be shaped. Also, 
focusing on the aspect of actor interaction, the empirical data collected for 
this inquiry allowed to draw conclusions but primarily on aspects understood 
as facilitating and impeding interaction. Building upon the analytical 
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framework and inspired by bottom-up perspectives in policy implementation 
studies, a deepening of the understanding of interaction is desirable to 
explore whether implementation structures and/or networks can be identified. 
Since interaction is understood as a decisive factor in policy implementation, 
future research could focus in-depth on the work relationship of 
implementers, aiming at more systematically mapping out interaction at the 
stage of policy execution. 
While this study was limited to the international implementing actors’ 
understanding of policy execution, it could furthermore be of interest to 
broaden the analysis by including the national implementing actors and their 
understanding of the implementation of SSR and stabilization policies in the 
DR Congo. As elaborated on previously, the international efforts are thought 
to support the Congolese in fostering SSR and a transition towards a more 
stable and peaceful future. Congolese implementing actors are thus both 
policy recipients, regarding the international peace operations efforts, and 
responsible for the implementation of national SSR and stabilization 
endeavours, such as the Congolese-owned stabilization strategy STAREC. 
Hence, future studies could have a broader focus, including Congolese 
implementing actors and their understandings as policy recipients as well as 
implementing actors bearing the responsibility for the execution of national 
SSR and stabilization policies. One concrete suggestion for future research is 
thus to broaden and deepen the inquiry through conducting more 
ethnographic-oriented field research and thus to enrich the empirical data 
collected for this study, which was limited to semi-structured interviews with 
international implementing actors at both capital- and field level (cf. 
Autesserre, 2010, 2014). 
The second theme comprises the aspect of interests, and notably those 
interests that lie outside the implementing actors’ area of influence. In this 
regard, interviewees consistently referred to notably national economic and 
political interests understood as underlying and to some extent driving the 
overall international peace operation efforts. These interests, in contrast to the 
interests of the donor community in visible and publicly-exploitable projects, 
for instance, were located at a different level than the level of policy 
execution and were not as such part of the analytical framework. This study 
thus illustrates that implementing actors are confronted with another set of 
interests in policy implementation, in addition to interests on behalf of the 
donor community (cf. Justaert, 2012, p. 229). Future research could therefore 
reconsider how these higher-level interests could be theorized and thus 
become part of an analytical framework guiding the analysis of the 
implementation of peace operations. 
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Hence, by pursuing an implementation focus, a broadening and deepening 
of the analysis of peace operations is expected to contribute significant and 
essential knowledge on what happens when peace operations are executed. 
Such enhanced knowledge is considered fundamental as well as 
indispensable for current and future peace operations to meet the growing 
challenges they are increasingly confronted with not least due to being 
deployed in exceedingly challenging contexts. 
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Svensk Sammanfattning 
 
Fler fredsoperationer än någonsin tidigare genomför för närvarande alltmer 
utmanande uppgifter i komplexa konfliktsituationer över hela världen. Dessa 
inkluderar till exempel stöd till återuppbyggnad av statliga institutioner, 
leverans av humanitärt bistånd, samt övervakning av överenskommelser av 
vapenstillestånd och politiska åtaganden. I detta sammanhang har 
fredsbevarande aktörer allt oftare till uppgift att använda alla nödvändiga 
medel för att skydda civilpersoner från våld (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015, s. 1277) 
och att genomföra stabiliseringsinsatser (se Bloching, 2011, Boshoff, 
Hendrikson, More, & Vircoulon, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Muggah, 2014c; 
Steven A. Zyck, Barakat, & Deeley, 2014). 
Fram tills idag finns det dock brist på djupgående analyser som explicit 
undersöker utförandet av fredsoperationer ur ett implementeringsperspektiv. 
Den här kunskapsluckan är dock överraskande, eftersom utbyggnaden av allt 
mer komplexa fredsoperationer förväntas få en rad konsekvenser. För det 
första har kraven på de olika aktörerna ökat, t.ex. när det gäller samverkan 
mellan institutioner (se Brosig, 2015, de Coning, Gelot, & Karlsrud, 2016). 
För det andra är dessutom nuvarande fredsoperationer inte längre konsekvent 
styrda av FN:s principer bakom fredsbevarande insatser; medgivande, 
opartiskhet och begränsad användning av våld. I samband med att FN:s 
fredsbevarande uppdrag genomgår en ökad inriktning mot skydd av civila 
och stabiliseringsinsatser, en utveckling som gets namnet ’a robust turn’, 
växer klyftan mellan förändrade metoder och FN:s fredsbevarande principer 
fram (se Coning, Aoi, & Karlsrud, 2017; Hunt, 2017). För det tredje, i 
samband med det utvidgade uppdraget av mandatet, förväntas de 
fredsbevarande internationella institutionerna också att genomgående 
reformera, anpassa och förbättra utformningen och leveransen av 
fredsoperationerna (se HIPPO, 2015). 
Mot denna bakgrund är syftet av avhandlingen att undersöka 
implementeringen av fredsoperationer. Genom en djupgående analys av 
imlementeringen av säkerhetssektorreformen (SSR) och stabiliseringsinsatser 
i Demokratiska republiken Kongo (Kongo-Kinshasa) som en del av det 
internationella samfundets fredsoperationer, undersöker avhandlingen vad 
som uppstår när dessa policy implementeras i praktiken. Eftersom de aktörer 
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som implementerar policy antas spela en avgörande roll vid 
implementeringen, tar jag ett aktörsorienterat tillvägagångssätt som innebär 
att det är deras förståelse av genomförandet som blir analysens huvudfokus. 
Den huvudsakliga forskningsfrågan som vägleder studien är: Hur förstår 
implementeringsaktörerna implementeringen av fredsoperationer i 
Demokratiska republiken Kongo? 
Avhandlingen baseras på debatterna inom två akademiska fält; 
fredsoperationer och implementeringsforskningen, vilket har lett till att tre 
delfrågor behandlas i analysen: 
 
o Hur förstår implementeringsaktörerna innehållet i de policy som ska 
genomföras? 
o Hur förstår implementeringsaktörerna samspelet mellan de olika 
aktörer som är involverade i genomförandet? 
o Hur förstår implementeringsaktörerna den kontext där den 
fredsbyggande policyn genomförs? 
 
Ur ett metodologiskt perspektiv utgör avhandlingen en kvalitativ fallstudie av 
fredsoperationer som utförs av det internationella samfundet i Kongo-
Kinshasa. Mer specifikt kommer jag analysera implementeringen av SSR och 
stabiliseringsinsatser. 
Studien bidrar med både teoretiska och empiriska resultat till den aktuella 
forskningen om fredsoperationer. Det viktigaste teoretiska bidraget av 
studien är att använda implementeringsteori för att undersöka 
fredsoperationernas genomförande. Genom att införa ett tydligt fokus på 
policy-genomförande och utveckla ett analytiskt ramverk som tillåter en 
djupgående analys av policyimplementering, bidrar denna studie med 
kunskap om vad som händer när fredsoperationer genomförs i praktiken. 
Med tanke på de ökade utmaningarna institutioner som utför fredsoperationer 
står inför, inklusive trenden gentemot mer robusta och 
stabiliseringsorienterade insatser, antas att en bättre förståelse för vad som 
händer när fredsoperationerna genomförs är nödvändig för anpassnings- och 
reformarbeten i pågående och kommande fredsoperationer (se HIPPO, 2015; 
Hunt, 2017). 
Det andra teoretiska bidraget är avhandlingens fokus på 
implementeringsaktörerna och deras förståelse av fredsoperationers 
implementering. Genom att introducera en explicit studie av genomförandet 
av fredsoperationer utifrån ett aktörs-orienterat perspektiv, kommer denna 
undersökning att bidra med kunskaper om en grupp aktörer som bara nyligen 
har blivit viktiga i fredsstudier (se Autesserre, 2010, 2014; da Costa & 
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Karlsrud, 2013). Genomförande aktörer antas spela en nyckelroll i policy-
genomförandet, eftersom deras beslut, som fattas mot bakgrund av deras egna 
förståelse, intressen och motiv, blir de policy som genomförts (Lipsky, 2010, 
s. xiii). Implementeringsaktörernas förståelse av policy-implementeringen 
förväntas därför ge avgörande insikter om vad som händer när 
fredsoperationer genomförs. 
Genom att illustrera vad som händer när fredsoperationer genomförs, 
försöker denna studie dessutom att överbrygga den rådande klyftan mellan 
problemlösande och kritiska perspektiv avseende bristerna och kritiken mot 
fredsoperationer. 
Avhandlingen bidrar dessutom med empirisk kunskap om genomförandet 
av SSR och stabiliseringsinsatser. Även om de senaste åren har sett en 
ökning av både policy-relaterade och akademiska studier om SSR:s normer 
och principer (se Sedra, 2006, OECD, 2007) samt begreppsmässiga och 
praktikorienterade debatter relaterade till stabiliseringsinsatser (Muggah, 
2014c; Steven A. Zyck et al., 2014), finns det fortfarande brist på kritiska 
undersökningar om genomförandet av SSR och stabiliseringsinsatser (se 
Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012; Peake, Scheye & Hills, 2006a). 
Genom en aktörsorienterad analys av implementering, accentuerar denna 
studie faktorer som kan påverka genomförandet av SSR och 
stabiliseringsinsatser. Med tanke på de pågående förändringarna av 
fredsoperationer i relation till ’a robust turn’, bidrar den här studien med 
empirisk kunskap till två policy fält som blir allt viktigare för nuvarande 
fredsoperationer. 
Till sist presenterar denna studie unikt empiriskt material som bidrar till 
vår förståelse av viktiga faktorer som styr genomförandet av SSR och 
stabiliseringsinsatser i Kongo-Kinshasa. Genom att undersöka förståelse hos 
och beslut som fattats av de aktörer som genomför SSR och 
stabiliseringsinsatser, som är baserade både i huvudstaden och i fältet, bidrar 
denna studie med kunskap om de faktorer som anses utgöra grunden för 
genomförandet av SSR och stabiliseringsinsatser i Kongo-Kinshasa. Dessa 
faktorer innefattar de implementeringsaktörernas försök att balansera 
politiska tvetydigheter, hantera skillnaden mellan politiskt hävdade och 
tekniskt inriktade tillvägagångssätt, använda interaktionen mellan aktörer 
strategiskt samt att hantera de hinder som påverkar interaktionen. Dessutom 
innefattar faktorerna aktörernas försök att manövrera den pågående 
konfliktsituationen i Östra Kongo såväl som att hantera den specifika 
politiska scenen. 
Den övergripande bilden som målas upp av implementeringsaktörerna är 
en där implementeringen av SSR och stabiliseringsinsatser, som en del av 
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fredsoperationerna, anses vara bristfällig. Resultaten tyder på att 
genomförandet av SSR och stabiliseringsinsatser i Kongo-Kinshasa påverkas 
av flera aspekter. Aktörerna pekar på att dessa aspekter ofta handlar om 
oklarheter kring olika policy och givarsamhällets behov av att genomföra 
synliga och offentligt utnyttjningsbara kortsiktiga projekt. Dessutom anser 
aktörerna att avståndet mellan Kinshasa och Goma, i kombination med en 
hierarkisk och institutionell struktur med fokus på huvudstaden Kinshasa 
samt brist på ledarskap, ytterligare hindrar interaktionen mellan aktörerna och 
därmed genomförandet av SSR och stabiliseringsinsatser. En ytterligare 
faktor som aktörerna identifierar är komplexiteten i den pågående konflikten 
såsom den politiska miljön, där den politiska miljön kännetecknas av statlig 
bräcklighet och en uppfattad brist på politisk vilja, kapacitet och ägande.  
Genom att använda en implementeringsfokus för att undersöka 
fredsoperationernas genomförande, bidrar avhandlingen med viktig och 
väsentlig kunskap om vad som händer när fredsoperationer utförs. Sådan 
kunskap antas vara grundläggande och oumbärlig för fredsbevarande 
institutioner, i synnerhet med tanke på de utmaningarna som nuvarande och 
kommande fredsoperationer står inför. 
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Appendix - List of Interviews 
 
October 2012, Goma, DR Congo: 
 
Interview #1: Diplomat, 5.10.2012 
Interview #2: UN Official, 6.10.2012 
Interview #3: EU Official, 8.10.2012 
Interview #4: EU Official, 8.10.2012 
Interview #5: UN Official, 9.10.2012 
Interview #6: UN Official, 10.10.2012 
Interview # 7: NGO Official, 10.10.2012 
Interview #8: EU Official, 11.10.2012 
Interview #9: UN Official a, 11.10.2012 
Interview #10: UN Official b, 11.10.2012 
Interview #11: Diplomat, 11.10.2012 
Interview #12: EU Official, 12.10.2012 
Interview #13: UN Official a, 15.10.2012 
Interview #14: UN Official b, 15.10.2012 
Interview #15: Researcher, 15.10.2012 
Interview #16: EU Official, 16.10.2012 
Interview #17: NGO Official, 16.10.2012 
Interview #18: UN Official, 16.10.2012 
 
October 2012, Kigali, Rwanda: 
 
Interview #19: EU Official, 19.10.2012 
 
April 2013, Kinshasa, DR Congo: 
 
Interview #20: UN Official, 9.4.2013 
Interview #21: EU Official a, 10.4.2013 
Interview #22 EU Official b, 10.4.2013 
Interview #23: EU Official c, 10.4.2013 
Interview #24: Diplomat, 10.4.2013 
Interview #25: UN Official, 10.4.2013 
Interview #26: EU Official, 11.4.2013 
Interview #27: Diplomat, 12.4.2013 
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Interview #28: EU Official, 15.4.2013 
Interview #29: UN Official, 15.4.2013 
Interview #30: Diplomat, 16.4.2013 
Interview #31: UN Official, 17.4.2013 
Interview #32: EU Official, 17.4.2013 
Interview #33: Diplomat, 18.4.2013 
Interview #34: UN Official, 18.4.2013 
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